Russia's Military After Ukraine

As of the writing of this report, the ultimate resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war is likely far off. Many questions remain, such as how the conflict will ultimately end, what the status of Russian and Ukrainian forces will be at the conclusion, and the lessons that Russia, Ukraine, and the West will learn from the years of fighting. What is clear, however, is that afterward, Russia will face the challenges of regenerating specific capabilities and systems and rethinking the role of its armed forces in countering perceived threats and achieving its strategic objectives.

In this report, the authors examine how reconstitution efforts might be shaped by (1) historical Russian defense reforms, (2) the Russian armed forces' performance in the Ukraine conflict, and (3) political, economic, demographic, technical, and foreign relations factors. They analyze Russian official statements and military scholarship on reconstitution and incorporate findings from discussions with experts on Russia and government advisers in Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Sweden.

From this analysis, the authors developed four potential reconstitution pathways: The Shoigu Plan, which reflects thinking on reconstitution that was proposed by Russia's former Minister of Defense; Revisiting Old Models, which would be a return to an emphasis on mass and a heavy reliance on conscription, mobilization, nuclear capabilities, and domestic production; A New, New Look, which would entail the rebuilding of a smaller, yet qualitatively superior, force; and A New Operational Model, which would involve major institutional reforms.