

CHARLES P. RIES, DANIEL EGEL, SHELLY CULBERTSON,
DAVID E. THALER, C. ROSS ANTHONY, ROBIN MEILI,
MARK CHRISTOPHER SCHWARTZ, AMAL ALTWAIJRI,
RAPHAEL S. COHEN, MARZIA GIAMBERTONI, TREVOR JOHNSTON,
ROBERT LANE, CLARA DE LATAILLADE, PAULINE PAILLÉ,
THEILINE PIGOTT, ERIC S. RUBIN, KOBI RUTHENBERG,
ALEXANDRA STARK, MICHAEL T. WILSON

Pathways to a Durable Israeli-Palestinian Peace



For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR3486-1.

About RAND

The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. To learn more about RAND, visit www.rand.org.

Research Integrity

Our mission to help improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis is enabled through our core values of quality and objectivity and our unwavering commitment to the highest level of integrity and ethical behavior. To help ensure our research and analysis are rigorous, objective, and nonpartisan, we subject our research publications to a robust and exacting quality-assurance process; avoid both the appearance and reality of financial and other conflicts of interest through staff training, project screening, and a policy of mandatory disclosure; and pursue transparency in our research engagements through our commitment to the open publication of our research findings and recommendations, disclosure of the source of funding of published research, and policies to ensure intellectual independence. For more information, visit www.rand.org/about/principles.

RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

© 2025 RAND Corporation

RAND® is a registered trademark.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

ISBN: 978-1-9774-1480-9

Cover image: Hemis/Alamy.

Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights

This publication and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited; linking directly to its webpage on rand.org is encouraged. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research products for commercial purposes. For information on reprint and reuse permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.

About This Report

Militant forces associated with the Gaza Strip's governing Hamas faction crossed into Israel on the night of October 7, 2023, initiating an attack on civilians and Israeli forces of exceptional brutality. The attack, and the strong response by the Israel Defense Forces, initiated a conflict in Gaza that continues as of this writing (fall 2024) and, measured against previous conflicts in the area, is unprecedented in duration and destructiveness.

The authors of this report examine whether—in the context of such a devastating war—the basis for a durable peace between Israelis and Palestinians might yet be found. To do so, they examine the factors that have made the Israeli-Palestinian conflict historically so hard to solve and draw insights from other partly analogous ethnic and territorial conflicts around the world. The report also provides a possible road map to a durable peace, involving security, governance, economic, physical and social, and international initiatives that might buttress a new generation of Palestinian and Israeli leaders willing to change the course of recent history.

This report was undertaken in the context of earlier RAND research on the dilemmas of Israeli-Palestinian peace, including *Building a Successful Palestinian State* (2007); *The Arc: A Formal Structure for a Palestinian State* (2005); *The Costs of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (2015); and *Alternatives in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (2021).¹

This report should be of interest to policymakers in Israel, Palestinian policymakers in the West Bank and Gaza, Israel's neighbors in the Middle East region, and the international community. It is oriented to foreign policy and regional experts and to organizations and individuals commit-

¹ The RAND Palestinian State Study Team, *Building a Successful Palestinian State*, RAND Corporation, MG-146-1-DCR, 2007; Doug Suisman, Steven Simon, Glenn Robinson, C. Ross Anthony, and Michael Schoenbaum, *The Arc: A Formal Structure for a Palestinian State*, RAND Corporation, MG-327-2-GG, 2005; C. Ross Anthony, Daniel Egel, Charles P. Ries, Craig A. Bond, Andrew Liepman, Jeffrey Martini, Steven Simon, Shira Efron, Bradley D. Stein, Lynsay Ayer, and Mary E. Vaiana, *The Costs of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, RAND Corporation, RR-740-1-DCR, 2015; and Daniel Egel, C. Ross Anthony, Shira Efron, Rita T. Karam, Mary E. Vaiana, and Charles P. Ries, *Alternatives in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, RAND Corporation, RR-A725-1, 2021.

ted to finding a durable and peaceful resolution to decades of conflict and terrorism and untold suffering.

Funding

Funding for this work was provided by gifts from RAND supporters and income from operations.

RAND National Security Research Division

This research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy (ISDP) Program of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD), which operates the RAND National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense intelligence enterprise.

For more information on the RAND ISDP Program, see www.rand.org/nsrd/isdp or contact the director (contact information is provided on the webpage).

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Dalia Dassa Kaye, Andrew Parasiliti, and Thomas Warrick, who carefully reviewed this report and provided invaluable comments and suggestions on its content and presentation. The authors express deep gratitude to Mina Pollman of RAND for her leadership and insights that helped shape Chapter 3 (“Case Studies”), to Heather Williams for her contributions to the Iran analysis in Chapter 4 (in the “Pathway E: International Actors” section), to Joel Braunold for his contributions to the U.S. analysis in Chapter 4 (in the “Pathway E: International Actors” section), and to Jonathan Lincoln for broader contributions to the discussion of international actors. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Shira Efron provided unique insights and advice during our research. In addition, we are grateful to the

RAND Board of Trustees for their steadfast support and, in particular, Joel Hyatt and Karen Elliott House, who provided insightful suggestions to the research team throughout.

The study team received support from many people for which we are extremely grateful. These include Omar Al-Ani, Amal Altwajri, and AK Keskin.

As in previous Israeli-Palestinian work, the study team received invaluable help from our indefatigable communications analyst Mary Vaiana—and, this time, from administrative assistant Donya Avery.

Summary

The Israel-Gaza war began October 7, 2023, when Hamas militants crossed the border into Israel, initiating an attack of exceptional brutality on Israeli forces and ordinary citizens. More than 1,200 were killed, and hundreds of Israelis were taken hostage. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) responded with an ongoing offensive aimed at destroying Hamas as the governing entity in Gaza and ensuring that neither it nor any other group dedicated to the destruction of Israel ever again exerts authority. The war thus far has led to widespread destruction and loss of life throughout Gaza and major humanitarian suffering, and it has inspired determined international efforts to find a basis for a ceasefire and return of the remaining hostages.

In one form or another, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been underway for more than 75 years. It has vexed would-be peacemakers in the region and internationally. The authors of this report examine the possibility that the extraordinary costs and destructiveness of the present conflict could demonstrate to all the urgent need for a path to a durable peace. The authors consider the history of this asymmetrical conflict and what has been learned from attempts to resolve other thorny conflicts elsewhere and set out short-, medium-, and long-term security, governance, economic, physical and social, and international pathways to such a peace.

Key Characteristics of the Conflict

Three characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have made it especially difficult to resolve, despite many international attempts to do so.

First, there are few credible Israeli or Palestinian partners to exert *leadership* for peace. Palestinian political direction is divided between the Palestinian Authority, which has limited administrative responsibilities in the West Bank, current political stagnation, and scant public support, and Hamas, quixotically dedicated to terror and the destruction of Israel and fully responsible for the vicious attacks of October 7. On the other side, there are fierce political divisions within Israel, and, following the horrors

of October 7, there is no evident support now for a future based on two states living in peace and security.

Second, *territorial claims* of both sides are incompatible. Previous efforts through the Oslo process and other rounds of negotiations to find solutions have come to naught, in light of differences over Jerusalem and the West Bank in particular.

Third, the conflict has attracted much *international involvement*, not always in support of compromise and peace. The Iranian regime is among other spoilers who see the continuing conflict as serving their political interests and regional influence aspirations.

Insights from Case Studies

While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in many ways unique, examination of other difficult international conflicts over decades provides some insights for the search for a durable peace.

The Egypt-Israel and Northern Ireland cases highlight the importance of individual leaders' personal and political commitment to peace in negotiating an end to the conflict—such leaders as Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, Tony Blair, and Bertie Ahern. Both cases also highlight the role that outside individuals can play—Jimmy Carter in Egypt-Israel, Bill Clinton and George Mitchell in Northern Ireland. Leaders who can stand up and say that it is time to explore peace can make a dramatic difference.

East Timor shows the possible advantages of international pressure and the significance of geopolitical changes. After the end of the Cold War, the United States was finally willing to pressure Indonesia—its anticommunist partner—to let East Timor go. In the Balkans, Russia and China's tacit acceptance of Western pressure on Bosnia-Herzegovina led to a more stable outcome there, while Russian and Chinese opposition to Kosovo's independence means that its international standing remains precarious. The implication for the Gaza conflict is that the international community can make a difference, even if the two sides are still far apart.

Pathways to Peace

This report is based on the premise that a pathway to a durable peace between Israelis and Palestinians is possible, although it will be unquestionably difficult to navigate. It is framed around the destination of a “second state” for the Palestinians, with our analysis describing the prerequisites and the modalities needed to get there.

Security Initiatives

The pathway to a durable peace must be based on effective security. The starting point must be the elimination, or near elimination, of Hamas as a governing entity and a security threat, consistent with the IDF’s intention. Hamas’s basic rationale and ideology is antithetical to the establishment of a durable peace between Israelis and Palestinians. As in the Balkans and East Timor, under a multinational coalition authority, an interim multinational security force based on Western and Arab forces, with support from a vetted and trained Palestinian security force, can bring safety and security to traumatized Gazans. Over time, an effective, legitimate Palestinian security force can be built and can progressively take responsibility for aspects of law and order. Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration programs will be required to wean rank-and-file militants from violence. Also, new forms of Israeli-Palestinian security relationships and cooperation will be required. The pathway must include measures to secure humanitarian aid and emergency services.

Governance Initiatives

New governance concepts and arrangements must closely follow effective security measures. Governance should begin at local levels to boost participation and build a sense of engagement. An interim technocratic government would be able to take responsibility over time for civilian tasks, initially under the authority of the multinational coalition authority. Later, a national Palestinian reconciliation process between Gazans and West Bankers can lay the groundwork for the drafting of an interim constitution and the subsequent holding of national elections. A new, legitimate Pales-

tinian entity can confidently conduct final status negotiations with Israel, with the support of the international community.

Economic Initiatives

Economic strategies for Palestinians and Israelis will depend on opening commercial corridors between Gaza and the West Bank; capitalizing a strong Palestinian banking system that can help finance a revival of the private sector; the rebuilding of power, water, and transport infrastructure; and the re-creation of cross-border opportunities for Palestinian laborers. The development of the Gaza Marine gas fields can provide resources to support economic development.

Physical and Social Initiatives

Rebuilding Gaza's devastated physical and social infrastructure will be crucial to navigating the pathway to durable peace. A decisive turn toward peace cannot be managed if physical and social structures remain devastated and hope elusive. Success will require careful assessment and planning, significant international assistance, local involvement, and thoughtful urban planning. Health and education infrastructures will have to be rebuilt and funded. Many Gazans will likely live in camps for some years, and so care should be placed into the design of these medium-term new communities.

International Actors

International actors will be decisive in pursuing the pathway to a durable peace, as their influence has, at times, been a contributor to sustaining the conflict. The United States should see its role as a process orchestrator rather than a mediator, and in the short term its assistance should be focused on the international security force, governing multinational coalition authority, and near-term stabilization for Gaza's civilians. The United Kingdom and the European Union, in association with Arab states, must provide substantial financial support for humanitarian assistance and longer-term development needs in the context of the parties' commitment to a pathway to durable peace. China should be encouraged to play a constructive, signifi-

cant role in negotiating and supporting the durable peace effort. Iran and Russia should be deterred from playing spoiler roles.

Conclusion

Success would be transformative for the region, its peoples, and the wider world. The benefits will include restored security for both Israelis and Palestinians, a new construct for Palestinian governance over the longer term, and economic and social revival for Gazans and Palestinians in the West Bank. While the prerequisites to peace are not trivial—because it will require credible leadership from all sides dedicated to peace—failure would make conflicts more likely and even more devastating, threatening the future of Israelis and Palestinians alike.

Contents

About This Report	iii
Summary	vii
Figures and Tables	xv
 CHAPTER 1	
A Hinge Point?	1
Elements of an Enduring Peace	4
Organization of This Report	7
 CHAPTER 2	
Challenges to Building a Durable Israeli-Palestinian Peace	9
The Lack of Credible Partners for Peace	10
Incompatible Territorial Claims	16
The Internationalization of the Conflict	18
 CHAPTER 3	
Case Studies	21
Case Study 1: Bosnian War	24
Case Study 2: Kosovo Independence	27
Case Study 3: East Timor Independence	30
Case Study 4: Camp David Accords	35
Case Study 5: The Troubles (Northern Ireland)	37
Case Study 6: Kashmir Conflict	40
Case Study 7: Nagorno-Karabakh	42
Conclusion	45
 CHAPTER 4	
A Road Map to a Durable Peace	47
Pathway A: Restoring and Sustaining Security for Palestinians and Israelis	50
Pathway B: Governance	73
Pathway C: Economics	87
Pathway D: Rebuilding Gaza's Physical and Social Infrastructure	108
Pathway E: International Actors	127

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions	149
The Prerequisites.....	149
Insights from Other Conflicts.....	151
The Pathways	152
Key Short-Term Measures.....	158
 Abbreviations	 161
Bibliography	163

Figures and Tables

Figures

4.1.	Israeli and Palestinian Economic Growth Since the Oslo Accords.....	89
4.2.	Incremental Urbanism: From Camps to Communities	120

Tables

3.1.	Summary of Key Insights for Peacebuilding from Successful Case Studies	22
3.2.	Summary of Key Insights from Unsuccessful Cases	23
4.1.	Security Components of the Road Map to a Durable Peace	57
4.2.	Governance Components of the Road Map to a Durable Peace.....	78
4.3.	Economic Components of the Road Map to a Durable Peace.....	92
4.4.	Physical and Social Components of the Road Map to a Durable Peace	112
4.5.	International Actors and the Road Map to a Durable Peace.....	128

A Hinge Point?

In one form or another, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has vexed would-be peacemakers for more than 75 years. World leaders, experienced diplomats, and committed activists on all sides have tried unsuccessfully to find the right formulas to guarantee peace, security, and prosperity for both peoples and to embed the solution in institutions and ensure guarantors for the long term.

October 7, 2023, will go down in history for the ferocity and brutality of surprise attacks by terrorists from Gaza on civilian communities, a music festival, and security installations in Israel. Close to 1,200 mainly civilian Israelis were killed, many in horrific ways, and 251 were taken back to Gaza as hostages.¹

In response, Israel launched an air and land assault on Gaza that thus far has led to the deaths of approximately 40,000 people and as many as 90,000 wounded, according to Palestinian Health Ministry estimates.² The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) estimate that perhaps 17,000 of those killed were Hamas fighters of various kinds.³ Much of Gaza's infrastructure, including housing; hospitals; and power, water, and sewage facilities, has been destroyed. Food and medical care are now scarce, and disease is spreading.⁴

¹ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Swords of Iron: Hostages and Missing Persons Report," December 2, 2024.

² United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), "Humanitarian Situation Update #223 | Gaza Strip," September 27, 2024e.

³ Ido Levy, "Hamas Is Weakened, but a Prolonged Guerilla Conflict Looms," *Policy-Watch* 3929, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 12, 2024.

⁴ Ahmed Fouab Alkhatib, "Gaza's Suffering Is Unprecedented," *The Atlantic*, September 23, 2024.

More than 1.5 million Gazans have been displaced, and the United Nations (UN) reports that perhaps as many as 495,000 face imminent starvation.⁵

In its duration and ferocity, the current conflict in Gaza is unlike any previous conflict between Israel and Palestinian groups since Lebanon in 1982 (including the First and Second Intifadas and the Gaza conflicts of 2014 and 2019) and is unlike Israel's wars with its Arab nation neighbors in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. Hamas justified its attack as a step toward the elimination of Israel. Israel's war aim has been the elimination of Hamas.

At the time of this writing (fall 2024), it remains uncertain how and when active and intense fighting between Israel and Hamas will end and, equally importantly, what will follow. Israel is understandably hoping to restore a sense of security to its shaken citizens and assure them that an event such as October 7, or even air or land attacks of a lesser scale, cannot occur ever again.

For their part, Palestinian inhabitants of the Gaza Strip may also seek an end to the cycle of destruction, if they could be asked for their views away from the baleful control and influence of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Palestinians in the West Bank have long hoped for a state of their own, but they see settlements encroaching on the land they had expected to be part of that state. Although accurate polling is difficult under conditions of conflict, the most recent polling shows eroding support for Hamas and an increase in support for a negotiated two-state solution.⁶ Support for Hamas's actions is still widespread, though polling conducted during the

⁵ An early estimate by international agencies was 1.1 million at risk (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, "Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 15 February–15 March 2024 and Projection for 16 March–15 July 2024," webpage, March 18, 2024); Israeli sources contested this estimate, and food insecurity has fluctuated with the pace of relief shipments (*Times of Israel* staff and Reuters, "'Multiple Factual Flaws': Israel Contests UN-Backed Report on Imminent Famine in Gaza," *Times of Israel*, March 30, 2024). More recent estimates are that some 495,000 at risk (Aidan Lewis, "High Risk of Famine Persists Across Gaza, Global Hunger Monitor Says," Reuters, June 26, 2024).

⁶ Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), "Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (93)," webpage, September 17, 2024b.

final months of the first year of the war suggests that support may be declining in Gaza.⁷

Bound up in any armed conflict are urgent, moral questions of responsibility, international law, geostrategic interests, and humanitarian imperatives. This asymmetric conflict presents daunting challenges on all of these dimensions, given the long history, many provocations, and concomitant loss of life. It is not just a territorial dispute. If Israel does not accept a Palestinian state, how will it govern more than 5 million Palestinians in perpetuity and remain a democracy? How will the governance of the holy sites of Jerusalem be managed?

But as from any crisis, especially one so unexpected and horrendous, opportunities may emerge to break with the past and find a new basis for relations between two peoples at the fulcrum of the Middle East, benefiting both them and the broader regional and international community as well. Could this war be such a hinge point in history?

Such an outcome is by no means preordained, nor even the most likely outcome. But in this study, we explore whether the Gaza war provides an opportunity to achieve a new and enduring relationship of peace between Israelis and Palestinians and security and prosperity throughout the Middle East region. We leave defining the exact details of the postwar arrangements to diplomats and the leaders directly responsible. We focus instead on the core problems that must be addressed and choices that must be made to achieve a lasting stability—security challenges, governance challenges, economic challenges, and needed social services—in light of what the international community has learned in other settings and consistent with the resources and opportunities available in the region today. The case studies we examine from other times and locations are necessarily imperfect comparisons to the specific and extraordinary challenges that Israelis and Palestinians (and their international allies and supporters) will face in the aftermath of this conflict, but these case studies can be instructive nonetheless in identifying policy approaches that should be followed—or avoided.

⁷ PCPSR, 2024b.

In this report, we draw on RAND's decades of careful, peer-reviewed research on insurgencies, post-conflict stabilization, and nation-building.⁸

Elements of an Enduring Peace

The historic and courageous 1977 Sadat visit to Jerusalem (the subject of a case study in Chapter 3) unlocked the Israel-Egypt peace agreement, which has endured for 45 years.⁹ What could be the components of a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace now, based on the destination of a sovereign state for the Palestinian people, which we term a *second state*? How can this peace be best brought about?

Paying close attention to how issues faced by Israel and Palestinians have been tackled in other settings and in other times, in this report, we aim to

⁸ Among many examples: Howard J. Shatz, Gabrielle Tarini, Charles P. Ries, and James Dobbins, *Reconstructing Ukraine: Creating a Freer, More Prosperous, and Secure Future*, RAND Corporation, RR-A2200-1, 2023; James Dobbins, Jason H. Campbell, Laurel E. Miller, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman, *DDR in Afghanistan: Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating Afghan Combatants in Accordance with a Peace Agreement*, RAND Corporation, PE-343-A, February 2020; James Dobbins, Stephen Watts, Nathan Chandler, Derek Eaton, and Stephanie Pezard, *Seizing the Golden Hour: Tasks, Organization, and Capabilities Required for the Earliest Phase of Stability Operations*, RAND Corporation, RR-2633-A, 2020; James A. Shear, Jeffrey Martini, Eric Robinson, Michelle E. Miro, and James Dobbins, *Stabilizing Eastern Syria After ISIS*, RAND Corporation, RR-2541-OSD, 2020; James Dobbins, Laurel E. Miller, Stephanie Pezard, Christopher S. Chivvis, Julie E. Taylor, Keith Crane, Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, and Tewodaj Mengistu, *Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building*, RAND Corporation, RR-167-CC, 2013; James Dobbins, Michele A. Poole, Austin Long, and Benjamin Runkle, *After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush*, RAND Corporation, MG-716-CC, 2008; and James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Andrew Radin, F. Stephen Larrabee, Nora Bensahel, Brooke Stearns Lawson, and Benjamin W. Goldsmith, *Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo*, RAND Corporation, MG-722-RC, 2008.

⁹ The magnitude, and the courage, of Sadat's historic trip were brought home when Sadat was subsequently assassinated in 1981 by an Egyptian Islamic Jihad militant group. Similarly, after signing the historic Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated in late 1995 by an Israeli far-rightist. This history illuminates the very real personal risks that leaders must take to advance peace. Unfortunately, the final Camp David Accords sidelined the Palestinian issues, as Sadat could not get the Israelis to agree to compromise on them.

consider why—despite long odds—such a durable peace outcome may be possible now, and how the parties to the conflict and the international community can help bring that about.

The key elements of a durable peace are relatively easy to articulate but immensely challenging to implement. In our view, the indispensable elements are as follows:

1. a major Palestinian leader, or leaders, willing to commit to a durable peace, comprising interim arrangements for a Palestinian entity and a path to a definitive and final territorial settlement recognizing Israel and a future Palestinian state. Also required is a sincere dedication by Palestinian leaders and the general public to nonviolence and a cooperative, good neighborly relationship with the State of Israel.
2. a willing responsible partner, or partners, on the Israeli side willing to commit to ending the occupation and a certain sovereign future horizon for a State of Palestine, embedded in reliable security arrangements in the region and as a recognized member of the international community. Israeli leaders would also need to convince those Israelis who are opposed to a second state for Palestinians and who are seeking territorial expansion.
3. economically viable borders for the new Palestinian entity and eventual state, to include large parts of the West Bank and Gaza, and some form of secure land bridge between them. As in the so-called Clinton Parameters of 2000, certain adjustments both ways would be made to the 1967 borders to minimize disruption of long-standing Israeli settlement blocs and to make the resulting Palestinian entity economically viable. The equally difficult challenge of the status of Jerusalem will need to be negotiated as part of the settlement.
4. a robust security apparatus for the Palestinian entity, with vetted officers publicly pledged to peaceful coexistence and effective counterterrorism strategies. The new entity would not have an offensive conventional military capability, such as tanks and heavy artillery. But it would have strong civilian law enforcement cadres (police and gendarmerie) such that it can handle public security challenges of all sorts. The Palestinian commitments in this regard would be

strengthened by security advisers from the international community and would benefit from U.S. intelligence and law enforcement support.

5. a new Palestinian entity that would develop a constitution or basic law for transition to statehood. The constitution would provide for basic human rights, individual liberties, and participation in community governance, and it would be embedded in international agreements with partners.
6. a council of regional and global powers that would buttress peace arrangements between Israel and Palestine, undertaking special responsibilities in this regard, in some ways akin to what the Multinational Force and Observers did for the Egypt-Israel peace. Key countries in such a council would include those willing to provide political, security, or economic support to peace arrangements and reconstruction—for example, the United States, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Germany, and France, and potentially China, depending on its contribution. The European Union (EU) should also participate, as it does in the Group of Seven (G7).
7. peace agreements between Israel and Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, thereby changing the dynamic throughout the region
8. an international community committed to supporting the reconstruction of Gaza (housing, hospitals, schools, utilities, industrial and agricultural facilities, a port and airport, etc.) and to building the elements of a modern state (a robust judicial system, an education system, a health care system, taxation and trade controls). Priority would be given to economic reforms and elaboration of a modern financial sector (a central bank, bank regulation, commercial activity, construction and mortgage financing, etc.) embedded in the international financial community. (It would be up to the Palestinians to choose a currency for domestic transactions; there is currently no Palestinian-specific currency.)
9. a trade agreement for the Middle East that would open commercial opportunities between Israel, Palestine, and the other Arab states participating in these peace initiatives.

In addition to such an ambitious architecture for a durable peace, and perhaps nearly as challenging, the international community and Palestinian residents in Gaza and the West Bank will have to agree on *interim measures* and ways to transition from the near term to a *long-term stable and economically viable state*. These transitory measures will include steps to protect the security of Israelis and Palestinian communities, secure law and order in Gaza, provide interim housing and social services for the internally displaced, protect property rights, disarm and demobilize militants, provide a process for justice for heinous crimes against humanity, and also support reconciliation for deeply alienated and hostile communities. For an interim period, a strong and capable multinational security force (MSF) will likely be necessary to oversee Palestinian policing and will be responsible for order and reform until durable elements of peaceful coexistence can be built.

In this report, we will explore the obstacles and possible pathways to such a durable peace in the interests of clarifying the ways in which the international community can help to bring it about.

Organization of This Report

In Chapter 2, we identify three definitive challenges that must be addressed immediately (with measures sustained over time) to make possible a more secure future for the Israeli and Palestinian peoples.

In Chapter 3, we explore how such major challenges have been tackled—or not—in other situations over previous decades. As noted, there is no precise analogue to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, but a careful study of other cases and times (including the Sadat-Begin dialogue that led to the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1980) can inform the effort to deal with the challenges of today.

In Chapter 4, which is divided into five sections, we explore the specifics of postwar approaches to deal with specific domains in constructing a durable postwar peace, including careful looks at governance (and political) challenges, security, economics, and social domains.

In Chapter 5, we synthesize the implications and recommendations from our analysis.

Challenges to Building a Durable Israeli-Palestinian Peace

In this chapter, we briefly explore three central challenges to peacebuilding in the post-October 7 context. The historical barriers to resolving this conflict are complex and multiple, and they have been covered by many other scholars. Our intent is not to rehash the history, but rather to illuminate the key barriers. The remainder of this analysis will then focus on how these key barriers can be addressed and overcome.

The three current, central challenges are the following:

1. The lack of credible partners for peace. Israelis' collective trauma from the attacks on October 7 and the impact of the destructive campaign in Gaza on Palestinians that followed have made the prospects of negotiating a comprehensive peace agreement improbable in the near term. The peace process depends on both sides having leaders who are interested in making peace, can credibly negotiate on behalf of their communities, and are able to enforce potential agreements. At present, Israeli leadership (and much of the population) opposes negotiating such an agreement; Palestinians lack clear leadership with the authority or legitimacy to represent Gaza and the West Bank at the bargaining table.

2. Incompatible territorial claims. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict ultimately reduces to a dispute over territory, with both sides viewing key areas as indivisible and essential to their history, religion, identity, and future prosperity and security. This dispute over territory is demonstrated most clearly, perhaps, by the expanding Israeli settlements across the West Bank, which the UN and most of the international community have denounced as an illegal occupation and which many Israelis see as their right. This thorny issue has proven to be the key tension in past negotiations, having upended

potential agreements at the final stage, especially when it comes to Jerusalem. These territorial claims are all the more contentious today following years of settlement expansion in the West Bank and the attacks of October 7, which have reaffirmed for many Israelis the belief that ceding territorial control represents an existential threat.

3. The internationalization of the conflict. The final challenge compounds these issues by entangling regional states and global powers, whose national interests and stakes in the conflict complicate ceasefire negotiations. Many of these states have the potential to offer security support and financial and technical assistance that may be essential to building a durable peace. But these states are not the only international actors that have stakes in the conflict: Potential spoilers threaten to derail peace negotiations through violence that risks regional conflagration. Negotiating, let alone sustaining, a durable peace will depend on keeping these spoiler actors on the sidelines while mitigating the damage they can do.

The Lack of Credible Partners for Peace

Israeli Political Polarization and Eroding Support for the Peace Process

The shocking attacks on October 7 have traumatized Israeli society and galvanized its leaders, who appear publicly unified against trading territory for the promise of security guarantees. Such apparent unwillingness to compromise leaves the Israeli side lacking leadership that can act as a credible partner for peace.

After the October 7 attacks, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu formed a national unity government, representing an uneasy and temporary alliance between his hard-right and ultranationalist religious coalition members and the centrist parties that opposed his polarizing judicial reforms only months prior to the conflict.¹ However, this unity government

¹ Josef Federman, “A Deeply Divided Israel Limp Toward Its 75th Birthday Under Weight of Internal Rift,” *Times of Israel*, April 24, 2023.

has proved unstable, with two of the prominent centrists, former general Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, resigning in June 2024.²

The consequence is that Israel lacks credible leaders with the robust political backing necessary to support a peace process. Its fractious coalition government now depends on a constellation of veto players, many of whom hold divergent positions on the peace process, making future negotiations fraught and any potential agreement more difficult to implement over time.

But even if Israeli leaders enjoyed such credibility, they would face challenges negotiating for peace given broader opposition across Israeli society. Support for the two-state solution has dramatically declined among the Israeli population since the Oslo Accords.³ Even before the October 7 attacks, only 35 percent of Israelis believed that Israel and Palestine could coexist peacefully, compared with 50 percent a decade ago.⁴ Surveys conducted after the attacks and the beginning of the war show that 65 percent of Israelis now oppose a two-state solution, a drastic change from their position ten years ago, when a broad majority (61 percent) supported it.⁵ For many Israelis, Oslo's failure has resulted in years of political violence and the ascendancy of Hamas, leaving Israel less secure and heralding the rightward shift.⁶ Netanyahu's coalition is a product of this shift and reflects this hardening of positions: The past three decades have seen the increasing

² Natan Sachs, "What Benny Gantz's Resignation Means for Israeli Policy and Politics," Brookings Institution, June 14, 2024.

³ Khalil Shikaki and Dahlia Scheindlin, *Role of Public Opinion in the Resilience/Resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict—Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll (2016–2018), Final Report*, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University, December 2018.

⁴ Sarah Austin and Jonathan Evans, "Israelis Have Grown More Skeptical of a Two-State Solution," Pew Research Center, September 26, 2023.

⁵ Benedict Vigers, "Life in Israel After Oct. 7 in 5 Charts," Gallup News, December 22, 2023.

⁶ Dahlia Scheindlin, "Why Israel Won't Change: The War in Gaza Will Likely Reinforce the Country's Rightward Tilt," *Foreign Affairs*, November 29, 2023.

domination in the Knesset of right-wing parties opposing Palestinian statehood, culminating in today's ultranationalist coalition.⁷

Perhaps nowhere is this shift more evident than in the expansion of the settlement movement and the outsized influence it now wields within the Israeli government. The expansion of settlements illustrates the decreased commitment to the terms of the Oslo Accords: According to the UN, some 700,000 settlers now live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, up from 520,000 in 2012.⁸ The land confiscations by Israel and use of excessive force against Palestinians prior to the war had already destroyed any trust by Palestinian leaders that Israel would be willing to make peace: Mahmoud Abbas stated in 2022, “[W]e no longer have an Israeli partner to whom we can talk.”⁹ The right-wing turn in Israeli politics has decreased the incentives for the government to compromise with the Palestinians, a necessary step toward a durable agreement.

Settlers in the West Bank not only represent an increasingly powerful political force;¹⁰ they are also a potential spoiler to the peace process, threatening violence that could disrupt fragile progress. Settlers occupy increasing amounts of land and become entrenched, making their evacuation unlikely,¹¹ with 30 percent of settlers living in Palestinian territories for ideological reasons.¹² Before the attacks on October 7, violence by settlers averaged three incidents per day in 2023; it has more than doubled

⁷ Khaled Elgindy, “30 Years On, Oslo’s Legacy of Failure,” Middle East Institute, September 13, 2023.

⁸ UN, “Human Rights Council Hears That 700,000 Israeli Settlers Are Living Illegally in the Occupied West Bank—Meeting Summary (Excerpts),” press release, March 28, 2023.

⁹ Agence France-Presse, “Israel No Longer ‘Partner’ for Peace, Palestinians’ Abbas Tells UN,” *France 24*, September 23, 2022.

¹⁰ Alex Harris and Sander Eizen, “Tracking the Religious Zionist Party Bloc in the Settlements,” *Fikra Forum*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 22, 2022.

¹¹ Doron Gilad, “*Peace with Spoilers: On the Inclusion of Opposing Groups in the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process*,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2018.

¹² Gilad, 2018.

in frequency following Hamas's attacks.¹³ Such violence often invites reprisals and can lead to escalation,¹⁴ which could disrupt fragile progress in the peace process.

Uncertainty of Palestinian Leadership

Negotiating a durable peace is made all the more complicated by the lack of leadership and clarity on the Palestinian side. Whereas Israeli politics is overwhelmed by a cacophony of dissonant voices, competing veto players, and potential spoilers, Palestinian politics lacks a single voice that could credibly speak for both Gaza and the West Bank.

The Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) is widely considered as corrupt and ineffective, and lacking legitimacy in the eyes of most Palestinians.¹⁵ Leaders from Fatah's historic alternative—Hamas—have traditionally rejected the idea of negotiating a peace with a Jewish state. Meanwhile, there are no other obvious candidates in the West Bank or in exile who enjoy the authority, international standing, or legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of Palestinians, although there are individual Palestinian leaders who enjoy the support of several Arab states.

The PA represents the *de jure* authority in the West Bank. Established in 1994 as part of the Oslo Accords, the PA was intended to serve as an interim governance authority over most of the West Bank and Gaza for five years, after which time, talks would be held to decide permanent status.¹⁶ When talks failed to solve permanent peace issues, the PA became entrenched long

¹³ UNOCHA, "The Other Mass Displacement: While Eyes Are on Gaza, Settlers Advance on West Bank Herders," November 1, 2023.

¹⁴ Recent Palestinian opinion polling shows that a majority now believe that forming armed Palestinian groups is the best response to settler violence. See PCPSR, "Public Opinion Poll No (90)," webpage, December 13, 2023.

¹⁵ "What Is the Palestinian Authority and What Is Its Relationship with Israel?" *Al Jazeera*, October 11, 2023.

¹⁶ "What Is the Palestinian Authority and What Is Its Relationship with Israel?" 2023. The Oslo II Accords provided for division of the West Bank into three areas (Areas A, B, and C) for an interim period of five years, with PA administration of Area A, shared oversight of Area B, and Israeli administration of Area C (Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, September 28, 1995).

past its original five-year mandate and has become increasingly authoritarian and disconnected from the lives of many Palestinians.¹⁷ The inability of the PA to prevent or resist Israeli actions in support of settler violence also severely undermines PA legitimacy.

In a March 2023 poll, PCPSR found that 63 percent of respondents in the West Bank and Gaza viewed the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people.¹⁸ The organization's popularity has only declined since October 7. In a December 2023 poll, PCPSR found that nearly 60 percent of Palestinians supported dissolving the PA, and almost 90 percent called for Abbas's resignation.¹⁹ Ultimately, even if Israel were willing to negotiate with Abbas and Fatah's current leadership, the PA's limited support and legitimacy would likely undermine any agreement.

The same poll that shows the PA's decline also highlighted the growing support for Hamas after October 7, particularly in the West Bank, where support for the militant group more than tripled between September and December 2023.²⁰ While there was some evidence that support for Hamas within Gaza was falling by the end of the first year of the war, one-half of Palestinians polled in September 2024 still believed that Hamas would "emerge victorious" from the conflict.²¹

This enduring support for Hamas is a key challenge, as the organization has consistently demonstrated its unwillingness to negotiate with Israel for

¹⁷ Part of the loss of legitimacy arose from the terms of the accords, which included cooperation on security matters with the Israeli forces. Some segments of the populations see the PA as complicit in helping Israel maintain control over Palestinians, because Israel frequently bypasses the PA's authority when it conducts raids in the West Bank in response to perceived threats from terrorist or extremist groups.

¹⁸ "What Is the Palestinian Authority and What Is Its Relationship with Israel?" 2023. In August 2024, the IDF released what it said was evidence that Hamas had sought to affect the results of a more recent PCPSR poll about attitudes toward Hamas. PCPSR disputes the IDF conclusions. See Emanuel Fabian, "IDF Says Documents Found in Gaza Show Hamas Was Falsifying Prominent Polling Results," *Times of Israel*, August 29, 2024; and Gianluca Pacchiani, "Rejecting IDF Claims, Palestinian Pollster Says 'Highly Unlikely' Hamas Falsified Its Results, but Vows to Probe," *Times of Israel*, August 29, 2024.

¹⁹ PCPSR, 2023.

²⁰ PCPSR, 2023.

²¹ PCPSR, 2024b.

peace. After its birth in 1987 during the First Intifada, Hamas gained popularity in the late 1990s and early 2000s in part because of its expressed opposition to the Oslo Accords and its willingness to use violence against Israel, including through suicide attacks.²² Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 following a political crisis triggered by a Hamas majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). The split made it impossible for Palestinians to present a united front in negotiations with Israel and has undermined the implementation and enforcement of agreements.

If neither the PA nor Hamas represent viable partners for peace, who could plausibly represent Palestinians in negotiating a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel? Arab states and other international actors have offered support for various alternatives, largely focused on former leaders and other elites in exile. Such candidates, like Mohammad Dahlan, former security chief for the PA in Gaza who has become a key adviser for President Mohamed Bin Zayed in the UAE,²³ may enjoy international standing and prominence but often lack local support or popular legitimacy among Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Current polling identifies Marwan Barghouti as the most popular Palestinian leader.²⁴ A Fatah politician touted as the “Palestinian Mandela,” Barghouti has been in an Israeli jail for more than two decades for terrorism-related offenses in the Second Intifada, with no signs of his incarceration ending.²⁵ In his speech to the U.S. Congress in July 2024, Prime Minister Netanyahu did accept the idea of “civilian administration of Gaza run by Palestinians who do not seek to destroy Israel.”²⁶

²² Ibrahim al-Marashi, “What the World Can Learn from the History of Hamas,” *Time*, October 17, 2023.

²³ Lazar Berman, “Exiled Palestinian Official: Arab States Will Support an Independent Leader in Gaza,” *Times of Israel*, February 14, 2024.

²⁴ PCPSR, 2023.

²⁵ “Will Israel Release Marwan Barghouti, the ‘Palestinian Mandela?’” *Al Jazeera*, February 15, 2024.

²⁶ Netanyahu’s position in full was “The day after we defeat Hamas, a new Gaza can emerge. My vision for that day is of a demilitarized and deradicalized Gaza. Israel does not seek to resettle Gaza. But for the foreseeable future, we must retain overriding security control there to prevent the resurgence of terror, to ensure that Gaza never again poses a threat to Israel. Gaza should have a civilian administration run by Palestinians

The uncertainty in Palestinian leadership and insecure environment have made it difficult for the international community to engage with Palestinians and have frustrated efforts to map a viable way ahead. Such efforts will continue to face challenges until a leader emerges with the authority and broad-based legitimacy to speak for Palestinians and with whom Israeli leaders are willing to negotiate.

Incompatible Territorial Claims

At its core, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a dispute over territory and sovereignty of that territory.²⁷ Both the Israelis and Palestinians claim the right to live in historical Palestine and view this land as embodying their history, memory, culture, religion, and future security.²⁸ The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has collapsed multiple times because of the inability of the two sides to resolve these territorial disputes.

The territorial nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict has implications for the likelihood of achieving a lasting, peaceful resolution based on two states. Conflicts over territory are more intractable than other kinds of wars.²⁹ Unlike ideological or civil conflicts, which may be resolved through compromise, competing claims to land are more difficult to reconcile. Territo-

who do not seek to destroy Israel” (“Full Text: Netanyahu’s 2024 Address to Congress,” *Haaretz*, July 25, 2024).

²⁷ Recurrent conflicts have redrawn this border many times. After Israel won the 1967 Six-Day War—fought against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria—it occupied territory that included Gaza, the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. Israel later returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt following a peace agreement. Territorial control changed again in 1993 with the signing of the Israel–Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Declaration of Principles, commonly known as the Oslo Accords.

²⁸ Oren Yiftachel, “Territory as the Kernel of the Nation: Space, Time and Nationalism in Israel/Palestine,” *Geopolitics*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2002.

²⁹ Barbara F. Walter, “Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict,” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2003.

rial conflicts are also more likely to escalate, to produce a greater number of casualties, and to create recurrent militarized conflicts.³⁰

In its simplest formation, there are three central components to the incompatible territorial claims. The first is Jerusalem. Jerusalem is perceived by both Israelis and Palestinians as their nation's symbolic heartland, and neither side is willing to relinquish complete control over it, lest the leaders be perceived as "selling out" their nation.³¹ Inability to compromise over Jerusalem has triggered the collapse of many proposed peace agreements, including the Oslo Accords, the Camp David Summit of 2000, and the Trump administration's Peace to Prosperity 2020 framework.

The second component is the settlements in the West Bank. Negotiations toward a two-state solution typically include a border between Israel and the West Bank based on pre-1967 borders (i.e., before the Six-Day or Arab-Israeli War in which Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank) with "land swaps," allowing settlements to remain and providing the Palestinian state analogous territory elsewhere. The challenge is that some 150,000 settlers are outside the range of any plausible land swap arrangement, and Israel would have to move these settlers in a peace agreement.³²

The third component is the perceived relationship between territorial control and security. The attacks of October 7 reaffirmed for many Israelis the belief that terrorist entities will leverage autonomy over land as a safe haven from which to wage war against Israel. In such a view, any future agreement in which authority is yielded or land is swapped will only make Israel less safe. This challenge is compounded by the expanding network of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, as violence between West Bank settlers and Palestinians is an all-too-common occurrence. While territorial contiguity—particularly of the West Bank—is likely to be a necessity for the economic, political, and social viability of the Palestinian second state, the security arrangements to protect these settlements may preclude this.

³⁰ Paul R. Hensel, "Charting a Course to Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict, 1816–1992," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996.

³¹ D. Newman, "The Geopolitics of Peacemaking in Israel-Palestine," *Political Geography*, Vol. 21, No. 5, 2002.

³² Shaul Arieli, "West Bank Settlements," webpage, Israel Policy Forum, undated.

The Internationalization of the Conflict

International leaders across the globe actively seek to shape the fate of Israeli and Palestinian communities, with some singularly focused on negotiating a durable peace and others seeking strategic advantage. Although this situation is not new, what is new is that there is no longer a single nation with the geostrategic position in the region to mediate between Israel and other parties. The United States long held this position, but it no longer enjoys such a position of influence, nor does any other state or international organization.

The limits on U.S. leverage are most acutely felt when it comes to Israel. While the United States—as Israel’s strongest and most important ally—was able to pressure Israel to remain engaged in negotiations and offer (or accept) concessions for both the 1980 Camp David Accords and the 1991 Madrid Conference, it is no longer able to do so.³³ At the same time, the United States has lost much of its credibility with the Palestinians since the Camp David Summit in 2000 and is now viewed as “Israel’s lawyer.”³⁴ In recent years, this loss of U.S. credibility has been compounded by changes in the fraught relationship between the United States’ and Israel’s political leadership and growing policy disagreements,³⁵ including central issues in the peace process, such as settlements.³⁶

These changes come at a particularly challenging time: No other states or international organizations appear to have the authority, influence, or credibility to broker a sustainable ceasefire, let alone negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement. EU member states are divided on how to respond to October 7 and the Israeli ground invasion of Gaza.³⁷ Meanwhile, a series of

³³ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, Brookings Institution Press, 2010.

³⁴ Aaron David Miller, “Why the Oslo Peace Process Failed—And What It Means for Future Negotiators,” *Times of Israel*, September 14, 2023.

³⁵ Dov Waxman and Jeremy Pressman, “The Rocky Future of the US-Israeli Special Relationship,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2021.

³⁶ Zaki Shalom, “The United States and the Israeli Settlements: Time for a Change,” *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2012.

³⁷ Martin Konečný, “EU’s Gaza War Response: A Tale of Contradiction and Division,” *Clingendael Spectator*, March 16, 2024.

UN Security Council resolutions censuring Israel have been blocked, largely by U.S. veto power,³⁸ proving again the limits of the body to drive decisive international action on contentious issues. With international organizations paralyzed by disagreements, and the United States no longer a credible mediator, the parties at war lack a third-party intermediary to foster talks and enforce an agreement, or at least incentivize it.

Given the vast wealth and influence of the Arab Gulf states, some international observers have envisaged an approach that accords a more prominent role for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. In principle, such a solution would offer promise and would build on the Abraham Accords. In 2020, Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE became the latest Arab countries to officially establish diplomatic relations with Israel.³⁹ Like the Egyptian and Jordanian peace agreements years before, the Abraham Accords largely ignored the Palestinian question. Therefore, parties to the Abraham Accords—however wealthy they are and essential their support may be to rebuilding Gaza—have lost some credibility to shape Palestinian leadership or negotiating positions. As a result of these agreements, public Arab support and commitment to the Palestinian cause was diminished. Palestin-

³⁸ “World Slams US Ceasefire Veto at UN Security Council on Israel’s Gaza War,” *Al Jazeera*, February 21, 2024.

³⁹ Egypt was the first Arab state to sign a peace agreement with Israel. Following 30 years of conflict, the Camp David Accords were signed in 1978 by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The accords consisted of two documents: the first outlining a solution for the Palestinians and the other outlining Egyptian-Israeli peace. While the latter was successful, the former failed to be implemented but has remained the formula for an acceptable compromise. The agreement crucially did not address the fate of Jerusalem or the “right of return” of Palestinian refugees. As a result, it began the marginalization of Palestinians by separating their fate from that of Arab nations. Arab unity over defending the Palestinian cause was broken. The second Arab state to make peace with Israel was Jordan, which signed a treaty in 1994 in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords. Jordan did not want a peace agreement with Israel separate from the Palestinians, and the Oslo Accords opened the door to official talks, unlike the clandestine contacts that had been conducted in the years prior. See Ramyar D. Rossoukh and Naghmen Sohrabi, “On the Third Anniversary of the Abraham Accords: A Conversation with Shai Feldman and Sanam Vakil,” Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, September 15, 2023; and Robert Barron, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, and Michael Yaffe, “Middle East Peace: What Can We Learn from Camp David 40 Years Later?” United States Institute of Peace, March 25, 2019.

ians have felt abandoned by their champions, which limits the leverage of Arab states in determining a durable and peaceful outcome to the current conflict.⁴⁰ In fact, the timing of the Hamas attacks may have been driven by a desire to disrupt the normalization of relations between Israel and Arab states, including the Abraham Accords.⁴¹

Potential negotiations are also particularly fraught because of state and nonstate actors watching on the sidelines who have the potential to upset a quest for a negotiated outcome or even ignite a regional conflagration. Iran and its self-described axis of resistance⁴²—including Hezbollah, the Houthis, and various militant groups in Syria and Iraq—have used the conflict and the plight of Palestinians as justification to launch missile attacks on Israel and the United States and more generally threaten stability across the region. These regional actors, along with local armed groups in Israel (e.g., violent settlers) and Palestine (e.g., militants unwilling to comply with a ceasefire), all have the potential to play the role of spoiler, undermining fragile progress in peacebuilding while risking broader escalation.

⁴⁰ Frances McDonough, “Palestinians More Positive on Abraham Accords and Open to Vying Powers Than Arab Neighbors,” *Fikra Forum*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 23, 2023.

⁴¹ Jim Zanotti and Jeremy M. Sharp, *Israel and Hamas: Major Conflict After Surprise Attacks*, Congressional Research Service, IN12262, October 10, 2023.

⁴² “What Is Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’?” Reuters, April 13, 2024.

Case Studies

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in many ways unique, in its centrality to several global religions and its seeming intransigence to the focused efforts toward peace of modern history's most effective diplomats and political leaders, among others. Yet, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shares elements with other violent disputes and wars over the past century. It is an asymmetric struggle for land, for sovereignty, and for nationalist aspirations where systems of international law and governance have been inadequate to finding solutions. Groups that have considered their rights impaired have turned to violence, often indiscriminately.

In this chapter, we examine other serious conflicts in recent history that have been successfully resolved. This includes the four-year civil war in Bosnia that killed an estimated 100,000 civilians, the ten-year process toward Kosovo independence, the 27-year process for East Timor independence, the Camp David Accords that achieved peace between Israel and Egypt after 25 years of fighting, and the Good Friday Agreement that brought peace to Northern Ireland after 30 years of grinding conflict. None of these case studies is a perfect analogue for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but each shares elements of the core challenges facing the Israelis and Palestinians outlined in the previous chapter.

Our purpose is to draw implications from these conflicts (and the efforts to solve them) that may inform the effort to find a sustainable peace between Israel and the Palestinians.¹ Table 3.1 provides a top-level summary of the central, relevant insights that emerge from these five successful case studies.

¹ Acknowledging the limitations of any comparative method, and being especially sensitive to the differences and likenesses between the cases, we can gather insights that other conflicts and peace processes offer for coping with the challenges of attain-

TABLE 3.1

Summary of Key Insights for Peacebuilding from Successful Case Studies

Case Study	Key Implications
Bosnian war	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air power allowed the Dayton process to unfold, and a sustained military NATO presence and training of Bosnian police and armed forces were critical in the postwar period.• Tacit tolerance of existing arrangements by Russia and China is a key element in the continuing peace.
Kosovo independence	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Sustained NATO presence with a prominent U.S. military component proved essential in sustaining the peace. Legitimacy of the NATO forces was enhanced by NATO's efficacy in managing refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and protecting Serbians and other minorities.• UN-led transitional governance structure proved effective.• Robust and diverse international support helped reach and sustain the settlement.
East Timor independence	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The UN mission enjoyed relative success in institution-building because it was appropriately empowered, was well resourced, and had strong international backing.• Development of the private economy was critical to East Timor's economic future.• Progress toward independence was only achieved when geopolitical events meant that Indonesia could no longer resist international pressure.
Camp David Accords	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• A clear mandate and oversight mechanisms, and a prominent role for the U.S. military, in an enduring international peacekeeping force have been critical.• U.S. economic assistance to both Egypt and Israel linked to the accords has supported the sustainability of the accords.• Courageous local leaders were necessary to begin the process, but international intervention—by the U.S. President—was critical to breaking an impasse.
The Troubles (Northern Ireland)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The availability of a proficient military force was able to partially mitigate the violence among opposed parties, but the cost to this force was enormous.• Economic prosperity was seen as a key ingredient in achieving and sustaining peace.• International leaders with credibility and a commitment to peace—especially the U.S. President, United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister, and Irish Taoiseach—proved critical.

In addition to these five successful cases, we also considered two unsuccessful cases to explore what lessons might be learned from those conflicts. The two cases that we considered—the frozen conflict in Kashmir and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that was resolved through decisive military operations—are not intended to be representative of all the unsuccessful cases. But they are relevant in their recency and similarity to the conditions underlying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Table 3.2 provides a top-line summary of the lessons from these cases.

The following seven sections describe each case study in some detail, providing a brief background on the conflict and attendant peace processes, the degree of similarity to the Israel-Palestine conflict, and relevant implications. A final section concludes by reflecting on the importance of individual leadership and international pressure to the successful resolution of these conflicts; when these critical ingredients are not present, an enduring and fair solution may not be achievable. And when international pressure tapers off, the sustainability of the peace may be at risk.

TABLE 3.2

Summary of Key Insights from Unsuccessful Cases

Case Study	Key Implications
Kashmir conflict	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nations can ignore UN edicts absent the application of any form of credible enforcement.
Nagorno-Karabakh	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iterative seizure of disputed territory via decisive military campaigns was de facto permitted by the international community. • A humanitarian blockade of the civilian population (while the world was distracted in Ukraine) facilitated voluntary self-expulsion of the population in the contested enclave.

ing a secure and sustainable peace in Israel and Palestine. The more that another peace process shares the three challenges identified in the previous chapter, the more directly the implications could be applied to the Israel-Palestine conflict. But even if the peace process faced only one or two of those challenges, it can still offer insights.

Case Study 1: Bosnian War

From 1992 to 1995, a multiethnic civil war claimed the lives of more than 100,000 civilians in what is today Bosnia and Herzegovina.² The war involved fighting among military forces aligned with the three major political factions—Bosniak, Croat, and Serbian—each of which received international backing. The Bosniak and Croat elements combined in 1994 to create the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and fight collectively against the Serbian-supported Bosnian Serbs, who at one point controlled two-thirds of the small nation's territory.³

UN-led and European-led efforts did little to prevent the onset of fighting or the subsequent massacre of civilians. The efforts included creation of the UN Protection Force, multiple UN security resolutions, a series of European-led negotiations efforts, and a five-nation Contact Group established in 1994 by the UK, France, Germany, the United States, and Russia.⁴ Progress toward peace did not come until NATO airstrikes against Bosnian Serb positions in 1995, which paved the way for the eventual Dayton peace agreement.⁵

The fighting ended in 1995 with agreement to the U.S.-brokered Dayton Accords.⁶ The provisions of the Dayton Accords remain in effect to this day. Those provisions include the assignment of an empowered internationally selected High Representative who now plays a reduced but still influential role in mediating disputes and monitors the implementation of the agree-

² “Bosnia War Dead Figure Announced,” BBC News, June 21, 2007.

³ For a discussion, see Daniel Egel, Trevor Johnston, and Ben Connable, *The Future of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces: Lessons from Historical Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Efforts*, RAND Corporation, RR-A722-1, 2023.

⁴ U.S. Department of State, “Bosnia Fact Sheet: Chronology of the Balkan Conflict,” webpage, December 6, 1995.

⁵ NATO, “Statement by the Secretary General of NATO,” press release 95(79), September 5, 1995; Ivo H. Daalder, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,” Brookings Institution, December 1, 1998.

⁶ U.S. Department of State, 1995.

ment.⁷ The accords created a parliamentary assembly whose composition was split between two-thirds of delegates from the Bosnia-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and one-third from the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska. Even now, tensions remain high within Bosnia between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian-Croat federation, but peace has held since Dayton.⁸

This conflict contained components of each of the unique challenges facing a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace. The lack of a credible partner for peace, at least on the Serbian side, was evident in the violent response—by the Bosnian Serbs with the support of the Serbian government—to the referendum in which Bosnians voted overwhelmingly in favor of the establishment of a tripartite Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁹ Territorial contestation was similarly a powerful motivator for the conflict, particularly for Bosnian Serbs who feared that they would be ejected from the communities where they had lived for generations and the leaders of neighboring Serbia who desired an ethnically homogenous Bosnian Serb state bordering Serbia.¹⁰ The Bosnia conflict was also highly internationalized, although that internationalization was mostly regional—from the nations that emerged from the collapse of Yugoslavia. The major global powers of the time were on the side of peace.

Several relevant lessons emerge from the success of the Dayton Accords, which themselves came after several years of violence and failed international efforts:

⁷ NATO, “15 Years Ago, Dayton Peace Accords: A Milestone for NATO and the Balkans,” webpage, December 14, 2010; The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed at Paris, December 14, 1995; Florian Bieber, “Bosnia-Herzegovina Since 1991,” in Sabrina P. Ramet and Christine M. Hassenstab, eds., *Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989*, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

⁸ International Crisis Group, “Helping Keep Bosnia and Herzegovina Together,” May 23, 2024.

⁹ Marie-Janine Calic, *A History of Yugoslavia*, Purdue University Press, 2019.

¹⁰ Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44, No. 3, May 2007.

- **Security:** In addition to the NATO airstrikes that allowed the Dayton process to unfold, an international military—initially of some 60,000 personnel and eventually shrinking to 7,000 in 2004 before the end of the mission¹¹—was critical to the stability of the peace.¹² Training of both police and armed forces began immediately following the Dayton Accords and continues today under the auspices of the EU.
- **Governance:** The Dayton Accords established two separate political entities, separating the Bosnian Serbs (Republika Srpska) from the Bosniaks and Croats (Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina). The nation's parliament, presidency, and government were designed to reflect ethnic balance (one-third each) between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.¹³ This governance arrangement has proved difficult,¹⁴ although it remains in place 30 years later.
- **Economics:** Financing for the creation of key economic infrastructure—such as transportation, energy, and telecommunications—was a key component of the Dayton Accords.¹⁵
- **Social and physical infrastructure:** The Dayton Accords included provisions to enable the return of both refugees and IDPs across Bosnia-Herzegovina, including specific provisions to enable the safe return of individuals or families through assistance for repatriation, property restitution or compensation, or amnesty.¹⁶
- **International actors:** Intensive airstrikes against neighboring Serbia proved critical to achievement of the Dayton Accords. A key element

¹¹ NATO, “Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995–2004),” webpage, last updated March 21, 2024.

¹² The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995; United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Background,” webpage, 2003.

¹³ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995.

¹⁴ International Crisis Group, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Deterring Disintegration,” January 27, 2022.

¹⁵ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995.

¹⁶ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995.

in the continuing peace is the continued tacit tolerance of existing arrangements by Russia and China.¹⁷

Case Study 2: Kosovo Independence

Kosovo—which had been an autonomous province in Serbia under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—began a nearly ten-year process toward independence in 1990, when ethnic Albanian legislators declared Kosovo to be an independent republic.¹⁸ Serbia refused to acknowledge the ethnic Albanians’ initially peaceful push for independence, and, beginning in 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)—an Albanian militia force considered by many to be a terrorist group—conducted a series of violent attacks targeting Serbian civilian and military forces.¹⁹ Violent Serbian reprisals against Albanian Kosovars began in February 1998; more than 11,000 would be killed in the subsequent 16 months of intense violence that was repeatedly branded by the UN Security Council as Serbian “ethnic cleansing” of Kosovo.²⁰

International efforts to mediate the violence began in May 1998, following a UN Security Council resolution condemning the violence.²¹ The following month, after another wave of Serbian-initiated violence, U.S. President Bill Clinton published an executive order characterizing the actions of

¹⁷ David Salvo and Stephanie De Leon, “Russia’s Efforts to Destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina,” German Marshall Fund Alliance for Securing Democracy, Brief No. 17, April 2018.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, “Kosovo Timeline,” fact sheet, December 21, 2015.

¹⁹ Egel, Johnston, and Connable, 2023.

²⁰ United Nations Peacemaker, “Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) on the Situation Relating to Kosovo,” webpage, June 10, 1999; U.S. Department of State, “Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting,” webpage, December 1999; NATO, “NATO’s Role in Kosovo,” webpage, last updated November 20, 2023.

²¹ U.S. Department of State, 2015. The UN had previously (in 1993) documented the “repression of the Albanian population” and a deterioration of conditions such that the “subsistence of many Albanian families is threatened” (Commission on Human Rights, “Forty-Ninth Session, Agenda Item 27, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,” February 10, 1993).

Serbia as destabilizing to the region.²² A series of U.S. and other diplomatic efforts—including a short-lived ceasefire in October 1998—culminated in the Rambouillet Agreement, in which Serbia and international powers decided that Kosovo would be an autonomous province of Yugoslavia under NATO military control.²³ Serbia and Russia subsequently rejected the terms of the agreement, triggering a three-month NATO bombing campaign targeting Serbian military capabilities across the country.

Following three months of NATO bombing, Serbian accepted a negotiated peace in June 1999 and withdrew its forces from Kosovo as NATO deployed a peacekeeping force to uphold the ceasefire.²⁴ Simultaneously, the UN deployed an “interim administration mission” to govern the territory until an independent state was established.

Although Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, a number of key international players have proved unwilling to recognize this independence. This includes Russia, which saw Kosovo’s independence as part of a “US drive for a ‘unipolar world’” that undermined the authority of the UN;²⁵ China, which is concerned about the precedents for secession by ethnic minorities;²⁶ and Spain, which shares similar concerns about the secession precedent. Kosovo and Serbia remain at peace, although there are periodic eruptions of violence along the border. And the United States, which immediately recognized Kosovo independence in 2008, has maintained a significant military presence in the country as part of the NATO Kosovo Force.

The Serbian and Albanian Kosovar contestation over Kosovo’s future contains analogues to each of the challenges facing a durable Israeli-Palestinian peace. The credible partner challenge was somewhat more lim-

²² William J. Clinton, “Blocking Property of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Montenegro, and Prohibiting New Investment in the Republic of Serbia in Response to the Situation in Kosovo,” Executive Order 13088, June 9, 1998.

²³ U.S. Department of State, “Rambouillet Agreement,” webpage, undated-d.

²⁴ UK Ministry of Defence, “Kosovo Force 1999–2000 (KFOR),” webpage, undated.

²⁵ James Hughes, “Russia and the Secession of Kosovo: Power, Norms and the Failure of Multilateralism,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 65, No. 5, June 6, 2013.

²⁶ “Kosovo Awaits Recognition, China Deeply Concerned,” *ChinaDaily*, February 2, 2008.

ited, as the Albanian Kosovars proved immediately willing to accept international mediation, although Serbia required NATO airstrikes to come to the peace table. However, territorial contestation was a prominent issue, as Kosovo contains many religious and historical sites of significance to all Serbians;²⁷ additionally, as control of the West Bank is for the current Israeli government, promotion of Serbian control over Kosovo was a core political objective for the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic.²⁸ And although Russia did not attempt to prevent the NATO-imposed peace (despite its earlier efforts to disrupt peace), the rejection by China, Russia, and other international powers of what was perceived as U.S.-sponsored secession highlighted the international challenge facing the creation of new states.

Several relevant lessons emerge from the now nearly 30-year project for Kosovo independence:

- **Security:** NATO's use of force against an intransigent antagonist proved critical to peace efforts, and a sustained NATO presence with a prominent U.S. force has proved essential to sustaining that peace. NATO-managed demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of the KLA—despite difficulties²⁹—ultimately proved manageable.³⁰
- **Governance:** The UN-led transitional governance structure for Kosovo offers a potential model for Gaza, particularly if such a structure for Gaza offers a clear exit strategy.³¹

²⁷ Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, RAND Corporation, MR-1351-AF, January 1, 2001, pp. 8–9.

²⁸ Hosmer, 2001, p. 9.

²⁹ Nathalie Duclos, “The DDR in Kosovo: Collision and Collusion Among International Administrators and Combatants,” *Institut des Sciences sociales du Politique*, Vol. 4, No. 1, July 20, 2015, p. 43.

³⁰ Duclos, 2015, p. 43.

³¹ Philip S. Kosnett, “Planning for Postwar Gaza: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Jerusalem Strategic Tribune*, July 2024.

- **Economics:** Reconstruction of critical infrastructure damaged in the fighting was a focus of international aid agencies,³² although establishment of economic governance and technical assistance was also a focus of these efforts.³³
- **Social and physical infrastructure:** The legitimacy of the NATO-led Kosovo Force was enhanced by its efficacy in managing refugees and IDPs and its ability to protect Serbian and other minority groups remaining in Kosovo.³⁴ Its operations and presence enabled humanitarian organizations to deliver vital food, shelter, medical aid, and other relief supplies throughout Kosovo.
- **International actors:** Robust and diverse international support—from, e.g., the United States, NATO, the EU, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, and the UAE—helped reach and sustain the settlement. Support from non-NATO entities was critical, including the deployment of personnel in support of the peacekeeping force and reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.³⁵

Case Study 3: East Timor Independence

A civil war broke out in East Timor in August 1975 as competing political parties fought to control the future of the former Portuguese colony that had been promised—in May 1974—its right to self-determination.³⁶ Indonesia took advantage of this instability to launch a military invasion of the

³² James Earnest and Carolyn Dickie, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction—A Case Study in Kosovo,” PMI Research and Education Conference, July 18, 2012.

³³ Samuel Skogstad, Thomas Bertone, Art Dimas, Lawrence Long, and Joseph Anderson, *Evaluation of the USAID/Kosovo Economic Reconstruction Project*, United States Agency for International Development, November 2003, p. 33.

³⁴ NATO, 2023.

³⁵ Michael B. Bishku, “Recognize Kosovo? A Middle East Dilemma?” Middle East Forum, 2024.

³⁶ Government of Timor-Leste, “Timor-Leste: History,” webpage, 2024.

small nation and thus consolidate its control over all of Timor;³⁷ a provisional East Timor government established by Indonesia voted in July 1976 for integration of the nation into Indonesia. Following Indonesian annexation, the East Timorese were subjected to torture, executions, and mass starvation, and more than 25 percent of the population was killed.³⁸

Although the international community never accepted Indonesia's annexation of East Timor,³⁹ and Indonesia faced an ongoing insurgency,⁴⁰ progress toward East Timor independence did not gain momentum again until the late 1990s. The momentum was a consequence of a combination of geopolitical shifts—e.g., the end of the Cold War made the United States more willing to put greater pressure on Jakarta—and the Asian financial crisis, which put increased pressure on Suharto's government.⁴¹

Negotiations beginning in 1998 among the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal resulted in a UN-led process to oversee an East Timor referendum for independence. Overwhelming support for independence in an August 1999 vote was met with violence,⁴² with Indonesia-backed mobs killing an estimated 1,000–2,000 people and an Indonesia military operation displacing hundreds of thousands.⁴³ Facing significant international pressure, the Indonesian government consented to the deployment of the Australia-led multinational International Force East Timor the following month (in September 1999) to restore order.

³⁷ James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga R. Timilsina, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, RAND Corporation, MG-304-RC, 2005, p. 151. The eastern half of the island of Timor became a Portuguese colony in the 16th century, while the Netherlands colonized the western half. Indonesia had succeeded the Dutch in governing the western half.

³⁸ Dobbins, Miller, et al., 2013, p. 129.

³⁹ Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, *Situation in East Timor: Hearing Before the Political Affairs Committee*, Doc. 8534, September 20, 1999.

⁴⁰ Dobbins, Miller, et al., 2013, pp. 130–131.

⁴¹ Dobbins, Miller, et al., 2013, p. 128.

⁴² Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, p. 152.

⁴³ Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, pp. 152–157, 166–168.

In October 1999, the interim UN Transitional Administration in East Timor was formed to prepare the territory for independence.⁴⁴ This UN administration was to function as the government of East Timor for an “interim period,” having “overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor” with the power to “exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice.”⁴⁵ East Timor finally achieved independence in 2002,⁴⁶ although the UN would deploy forces again from 2006 to 2012 and still maintains a persistent political mission.⁴⁷

The violent and multidecade struggle for East Timor independence has some similarities to the historical Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution process. For one, internal political infighting among the East Timorese meant that there was initially not a credible partner for peace,⁴⁸ although this situation changed with the establishment of the National Council of Timorese Resistance in 1988.⁴⁹ Territorial integrity and the search for sovereignty were powerful motivators, which had initially maneuvered Indonesia’s leadership into annexing East Timor and made Jakarta particularly opposed to letting East Timor go,⁵⁰ even though East Timor did not have any broader cultural significance to Indonesians. International interest was similarly a significant initial impediment to independence, as East Timor’s communist

⁴⁴ Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, pp. 153, 160. However, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor only took over responsibility for security from the International Force East Timor in February 2000.

⁴⁵ Dobbins, Miller, et al., 2013, p. 126; Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, pp. 158, 160.

⁴⁶ Markus Benzing, “Midwifing a New State: The United Nations in East Timor,” *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Vol. 9, Vol. 1, 2005.

⁴⁷ Dobbins, Miller, et al., 2013, p. 150; United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, “Mandate,” webpage, 2005.

⁴⁸ John Pike, “CNRT Timorese National Resistance Council,” Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program, September 22, 1999; Robert Lawless, “The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 16, No. 10, 1976.

⁴⁹ Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, pp. 156–157.

⁵⁰ Grayson J. Lloyd, “The Diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations and the International Community,” in James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares, eds., *Out of the Ashes*, ANU Press, 2003, pp. 79, 85.

and pro-independence movement was seen by the United States as sympathetic to China and possibly a “domino” in the great-power competition.⁵¹

Several relevant lessons emerge from the history of UN and international support to East Timor in the years immediately following independence in 1999:

- **Security:** The success of the international force in stabilizing East Timor has been attributed to its size relative to the population—with nearly 150 international civilian police for each 100,000 East Timorese.⁵² And although DDR was never fully implemented for either Indonesian-aligned or East Timorese militias,⁵³ this did not imperil the peace.⁵⁴ A greater threat was deficiencies in the formal armed forces, whose efficacy was undermined by inadequate professionalization and which resulted in political crisis and violence in 2006.⁵⁵
- **Governance:** The UN mission enjoyed relative success in institution-building because it was granted plenary powers to secure and govern the territory, the territory was comparatively small, the operation was well-resourced, and the effort had strong international backing.⁵⁶ However, while the mission tried to foster an inclusive, democratic cul-

⁵¹ Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, p. 151; Dobbins, Miller, et al., 2013, p. 128.

⁵² Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, p. 163; Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict*, RAND Corporation, MG-374-RC, 2005, p. 185.

⁵³ Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, p. 163.

⁵⁴ Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, p. 164.

⁵⁵ Dobbins, Miller, et al., 2013, p. 139. For more on the crisis, see Cynthia Brady and David G. Timberman, *The Crisis in Timor-Leste: Causes, Consequences and Options for Conflict Management and Mitigation*, United States Agency for International Development, November 2006; Jovana Carapic and Oliver Jutersonke, *Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: The Case of Dili, Timor-Leste*, Urban Tipping Point, May 2012; and Matthew B. Arnold, “Challenges Too Strong for the Nascent State of Timor-Leste: Petitioners and Mutineers,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2009.

⁵⁶ Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, p. 176.

ture, it failed to address regional and political differences that eventually proved to be the provenance of future, violent instability.⁵⁷

- **Economics:** While international funding and UN-provided technical assistance played an important role in rebuilding East Timor,⁵⁸ the Australian-led development of the Timor Gap oil fields has proved critical to East Timor's economy.⁵⁹ Approximately 90 percent of government revenue is derived from the state's Petroleum Fund.
- **Social and physical infrastructure:** Most governing institutions—and the judicial sector in particular—were turned over before the East Timorese were prepared to effectively manage these functions.⁶⁰ The UN facilitated the return of refugees, meeting refugees at the East Timor border to “ensure that the returning refugees were indeed civilians, verify that they were returning voluntarily, provide transportation to their village of origin, and provide repatriation bonuses.”⁶¹
- **International actors:** Even though Indonesia never negotiated with East Timor, it acquiesced to independence because it could not resist pressure from the United States, Australia, and the broader international community.⁶²

⁵⁷ Carapic and Jutersonke, 2012, pp. 23–26.

⁵⁸ Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, pp. 172–173; Dobbins, Miller, et al., 2013, pp. 134–135, 142–143.

⁵⁹ Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, p. 173; Dobbins, Miller, et al., 2013, p. 141.

⁶⁰ Dobbins, Miller, et al., 2013, pp. 145–146.

⁶¹ Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, et al., 2005, pp. 166–167.

⁶² Helen Davidson, “US Knew Indonesia Intended to Stop East Timorese Independence ‘Through Terror and Violence,’” *The Guardian*, August 28, 2019; Brad Simpson and Varsha Venkatasubramanian, *U.S. Sought to Preserve Close Ties to Indonesian Military as It Terrorized East Timor in Runup to 1999 Independence Referendum*, National Security Archive, August 28, 2019.

Case Study 4: Camp David Accords

Military conflict between Egypt and Israel began on May 15, 1948—the day after the end of the British Mandate—when Egyptian Forces joined the Arab League in invading the newly established state of Israel.⁶³ During the first week of what would become known as the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Arab League succeeded in securing the “Arab areas of central Palestine”—the Arab League’s primary objective—while avoiding pressures to “invade the territory allotted to the Jewish State.”⁶⁴ However, following a ceasefire that solidified Arab military gains, Egypt led the Arab League in a return to fighting that began a series of major military setbacks for the Arab nations. In 1949, when the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement was finally signed, Egypt was left with control of only the Gaza Strip.⁶⁵

Simmering conflict between Egypt and Israel would erupt into large-scale military action four times over the next 25 years, including the 1956 Suez Crisis, the Six-Day War (also known as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War), the Arab-Israeli War of Attrition (1969–1970), and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. The numbers of Egyptian and Israeli casualties across these 25 years of fighting were large, including the deaths of nearly 40,000 Egyptian military personnel (~0.1 percent of the total population) and approximately 3,500 Israeli military personnel killed (~0.2 percent of the total population).⁶⁶

The multitude of internationally brokered efforts from 1948 to 1973 failed to produce lasting peace between Egypt and Israel. A breakthrough was only achieved when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat—following several months of back-channel communication initiated by newly elected Israeli

⁶³ Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, “Cablegram Dated 15 May 1948 Addressed to the Secretary-General,” 1948.

⁶⁴ Avi Shlaim, “Britain and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Summer 1987.

⁶⁵ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “The Arab-Israeli War of 1948,” webpage, undated-a.

⁶⁶ Associated Press, “Casualties of Mideast Wars,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 8, 1991; Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001*, Random House, 1999; Jerome Slater, “Just War Moral Philosophy and the 2008–09 Israeli Campaign in Gaza,” *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 2, Fall 2012.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin—traveled to Jerusalem in November 1977 to address the Israeli Knesset and affirm his commitment to peace.⁶⁷ Sadat’s commitment to peace was mirrored by Begin, who proved willing to change his deeply held convictions about Israel’s biblical borders and about the relationship between land and security, and U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who was willing to “lose the presidency for the sake of genuine peace in the Middle East.”⁶⁸

Despite the obvious geographic overlap, the conflict that preceded the Camp David Accords differed in several fundamental ways from the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Foremost perhaps was the presence of credible and empowered leaders who could commit to peace.⁶⁹ The second is that territorial claims were not central to the conflict, and, in fact, the Sinai provided a natural territorial buffer.⁷⁰ The one degree of significant similarity was the internationalization of the conflict, as both the Arab League and the Soviet Union were opposed to the accords.

The enduring success of the Camp David Accords offers insights on possible components of a durable peace between the Israelis and Palestinians:

- **Security:** The Multinational Force and Observers is widely seen as the centerpiece of the success of the accords.⁷¹ The prominent role of the U.S. military in this mission and its “precise and unambiguous mandate” have been identified as critical to its success.⁷²

⁶⁷ Mark Regev, “Looking Back at Egypt’s Anwar Sadat’s Historic Jerusalem Visit, 45 Years Ago,” *Jerusalem Post*, November 24, 2022.

⁶⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981*, Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1983.

⁶⁹ Michael Yaffe, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, and Robert Barron, “Half Right and Still Waiting,” *Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, Winter 2019.

⁷⁰ Yaffe, Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, and Barron, 2019.

⁷¹ Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, March 26, 1979; Protocol to the Treaty of Peace, August 3, 1981; Yaffe, Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, and Barron, 2019.

⁷² H. Steven Blum, “America’s Military Commitment in the Sinai Is Important to Regional Stability,” *Military Times*, March 16, 2020.

- **Governance:** The oversight mechanisms established by the accords and enforced by the United States have been critical to sustained peace.⁷³
- **Economics:** U.S. economic assistance to both Egypt and Israel in the wake of the Camp David Accords—the rationale of which was to “cement Egypt-Israel peace”⁷⁴—is believed to have contributed to the success of the accords.⁷⁵
- **Social and physical infrastructure:** Social services—such as relief to Egyptians displaced by the fighting—were not a component of the Camp David Accords.
- **International actors:** While Sadat and Begin set the conditions for the peace accords, President Carter’s mediation was a “necessary condition” for the success of these accords to break an impasse in Egyptian-Israeli bilateral negotiations.⁷⁶

Case Study 5: The Troubles (Northern Ireland)

The Troubles was an “irregular war” in Northern Ireland that killed an estimated 3,500, about half of whom were civilians,⁷⁷ across three decades of fighting.⁷⁸ The conflict was irregular in that it was fought primarily between

⁷³ Barron, Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, and Yaffe, 2019.

⁷⁴ Robert Satloff and Patrick Clawson, “U.S. Economic Aid to Egypt: Designing a New, Pro-Growth Package,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 7, 1998.

⁷⁵ Jeremy M. Sharp, *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service, RL33003, updated May 2, 2023; Henry F. Jackson, “Egypt and the United States After Sadat: Continuity and Constraints,” *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, Vol. 12, No. 3/4, 1982.

⁷⁶ William B. Quandt, “Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, No. 3, 1986; Adel Safty, “Sadat’s Negotiations with the United States and Israel: From Sinai to Camp David,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1991.

⁷⁷ CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet), “Malcolm Sutton: An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland,” webpage, undated.

⁷⁸ The term *irregular war* is one of the terms that has been used to describe the fighting (“Special Branch Officer’s Insider View of Northern Ireland’s ‘Secret War,’” *News Letter*, November 12, 2016).

paramilitary forces aligned with different political and sectarian elements within Northern Ireland. A key point of contention was the future political status of Northern Ireland: The predominantly Catholic nationalists and republicans wanted Northern Ireland to leave the UK and join the Republic of Ireland instead, while the predominantly Protestant unionists and loyalists favored remaining part of the UK.

British Army peacekeepers deployed to Northern Ireland in 1969, although these forces struggled initially to effectively manage the violence and increasingly found themselves as antagonists in the conflict.⁷⁹ A series of high-profile political initiatives similarly proved unsuccessful; each of these efforts—the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, and the 1993 Downing Street Declaration—included explicit participation by both the Republic of Ireland and the UK.⁸⁰

Breakthrough in the conflict came with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, a negotiated agreement between the Republic of Ireland, the UK, and eight different Northern Ireland political entities. The United States had a prominent role in these negotiations, with Senator George Mitchell's role as the chair of the negotiations described as "central to the success of the process."⁸¹ The agreement proved to be resilient to spoilers, including a splinter group that organized the deadliest attack of the conflict just months after the agreement was signed.⁸² However, full implementation of the agreement would take nearly a decade, and some of the paramilitary organizations linked to the conflict still exist.⁸³

The three-decade-long history of the Troubles has substantial overlap with the three core challenges in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first

⁷⁹ National Army Museum, "The Troubles," webpage, undated; Brian A. Jackson, "Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a 'Long War': The British Experience in Northern Ireland," RAND Corporation, RP-1247, 2007.

⁸⁰ Jeff Wallenfeldt, "The Anglo-Irish Agreement and Downing Street Declaration," *Britannica*, last updated September 17, 2024.

⁸¹ John Coakley, "Ethnic Conflict and Its Resolution: The Northern Ireland Model," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2003, p. 42.

⁸² Colleen Sullivan, "Omagh Bombing," *Britannica*, last updated September 19, 2024.

⁸³ Charles Landow and James McBride, "Moving Past the Troubles: The Future of Northern Ireland Peace," Council on Foreign Relations, February 16, 2024.

challenge was that there were not clear partners for peace in Northern Ireland, which was evident in the intransigence of key antagonists in the conflict to abide by political negotiations, despite the collaboration of Dublin and London. The second challenge was that there were mutually incompatible territorial claims, although in Northern Ireland the concerns were more about the political alignment of the territory rather than who had the right to live there. The third challenge was the internationalization of the conflict, as the paramilitary forces in Northern Ireland received significant international financial and technical assistance.

The rocky road to the Good Friday Agreement and its eventual success offer several insights about the path toward a durable peace between the Israelis and Palestinians:

- **Security:** The availability of a proficient military force led to the mitigation of the violence among opposed parties. However, this mission—which would prove to be the British Army’s longest continuous campaign—would impose an enduring cost on the force.
- **Governance:** The institutional format for governing Northern Ireland agreed to in the Good Friday Agreement—a consociational (or power-sharing) assembly delineated by identity and allegiance to the unionist or nationalist sides—has proved important to the enduring success of the agreement. This format has subsequently created challenges: Intercommunal disagreements prevented the formation of a government in Northern Ireland for a total of almost nine years between 1999 and 2023.⁸⁴
- **Economics:** U.S. involvement in resolving the Troubles was anchored—initially—in efforts to improve the economy of Northern Ireland, and George Mitchell explicitly linked economics and peace in concluding that “economic prosperity will flow from and contribute to lasting peace.”⁸⁵

⁸⁴ John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

⁸⁵ Kathleen P. Lundy, “Lasting Peace in Northern Ireland: An Economic Resolution to a Political and Religious Conflict,” *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2001.

- **Social and physical infrastructure:** Addressing the health and psychosocial impacts of the conflict has been central to both local and international efforts to ensure the stability of the peace.⁸⁶
- **International actors:** While local leaders who represented significant portions of Northern Irish politics and society played a critical role in the process,⁸⁷ international leaders with credibility and a commitment to peace—especially the U.S. President, the UK Prime Minister, and the Irish Taoiseach—proved critical to the success of the agreement.

Case Study 6: Kashmir Conflict

The Indian-administered, Muslim-majority Kashmir region has been an ongoing source of friction between India and Pakistan since the region decided—in 1947—to join India rather than remain an independent entity.⁸⁸ In 1949, after two years of initial fighting over the region,⁸⁹ the two nations agreed to a UN-supervised ceasefire that split Kashmir.⁹⁰ Tensions over the

⁸⁶ As one example, see Lisa A. Ghigliazza, “Children, Trauma, and the Troubles: Northern Ireland’s Social Service Response,” *McNair Scholars Research Journal*, Vol. 1, 2008.

⁸⁷ Stacie E. Goddard, “Brokering Peace: Networks, Legitimacy, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 3, September 2012, pp. 512–513. Goddard explicitly compares the Good Friday Agreement with failed Israel-Palestine peace talks, noting that “if brokers are to be used in [Israel-Palestine], they must be allowed to secure their legitimacy with extremists, however unsavory that might be” (Goddard, 2012, p. 513).

⁸⁸ Center for Preventive Action, “Conflict Between India and Pakistan,” Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, updated April 9, 2024; Anand Mohan, “The Historical Roots of the Kashmir Conflict,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1992.

⁸⁹ Among Indian forces, it is estimated that that there were 1,104 killed and 3,152 wounded during the first war over Kashmir; see Rajya Sabha, “Indian Soldiers Killed in Various Wars and Operations,” Government of India Press Information Bureau, December 5, 2001.

⁹⁰ Agreement Between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan Regarding the Establishment of a Ceasefire Line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (Karachi Agreement), July 27, 1949; United Nations Peacekeeping, “India-Pakistan Background,” webpage, undated.

region continued, and, following several rounds of unsuccessful international mediation,⁹¹ Pakistani troops launched a cross-border attack in 1965 that killed 6,000 on both sides.⁹² Fighting over the region continued during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971—even though that conflict focused on what is now Bangladesh—and the late 1980s saw the emergence of a Pakistani-supported insurgency (which, at times would receive direct support from Pakistani armed forces)⁹³ that would ultimately contribute to the deaths of more than 50,000 over the next three decades.⁹⁴

There have been four major attempts at ceasefires since the late 1980s, with the two countries most recently—in 2021—reaffirming their commitment to the previously agreed ceasefire terms and line of control.⁹⁵ However, there has been limited progress toward a lasting solution to the conflict.⁹⁶ Pakistan demands that the future of the Muslim-majority Kashmir be determined by a popular referendum, which India has rejected.⁹⁷ However, India recently—in summer 2024—agreed to allow regional elections in Kashmir that will give it partial autonomy, reversing a 2019 decision to change Kashmir’s status from semi-autonomous to a “union territory.”⁹⁸

⁹¹ Mohan, 1992; Bulbul Ahmed, “India and Pakistan Fought 3 Wars over Kashmir—Here’s Why International Law Falls Short to Solve This Territorial Dispute,” *The Conversation*, August 24, 2021.

⁹² K. Alan Kronstadt, *Kashmir: Background, Recent Developments, and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service, R45877, 2020.

⁹³ One prominent example was the 1999 Kargil War (Bruce Riedel, “How the 1999 Kargil Conflict Redefined US-India Ties,” Brookings Institution, July 24, 2019; Kronstadt, 2020).

⁹⁴ Human Rights Watch, “Kashmir: UN Reports Serious Abuses; India, Pakistan Should Accept Findings, Ensure Justice,” July 10, 2019; “As Kashmir’s Hindus Face Targeted Killings, Hundreds Flee Valley,” *Al Jazeera*, June 2, 2022.

⁹⁵ Christopher Clary, *The 2021 India-Pakistan Ceasefire: Origins, Prospects, and Lessons Learned*, United States Institute of Peace, 2024.

⁹⁶ International Crisis Group, *Raising the Stakes in Jammu and Kashmir*, Asia Report 310, August 5, 2020; Clary, 2024.

⁹⁷ “Kashmir Profile,” webpage, BBC News, December 19, 2023.

⁹⁸ Aijaz Hussain, “The First Election in a Decade Is Planned in Indian-Controlled Kashmir. Here’s What to Know,” AP World News, August 30, 2024.

Incompatible territorial claims are at the heart of the Kashmir conflict. While Pakistan maintains its argument that the Muslim-majority region should never have become part of India and has a right to self-determination, this argument is not recognized by India. And the complexity of the territorial issue for India is amplified by the region's strategic importance to India's economy.⁹⁹ As a consequence, there is arguably no credible partner on the Indian side, where the Kashmir conflict is treated as a domestic insurgency rather than an international issue to be negotiated with Pakistan. However, despite China controlling a portion of the Kashmir region, the conflict has only a limited international character and has been primarily manifested as an Indian-Pakistan conflict.

The lack of meaningful progress in the Kashmir conflict suggests that the mechanisms deployed to resolve this conflict—such as the “unarmed military observers” of the UN Military Observer Group responsible for observing, reporting, and investigating reports of ceasefire violations¹⁰⁰—are too weak, by themselves, to drive meaningful progress toward a resolution. And although the UN Security Council may have issued explicit guidance about the conflict, which included an explicit mandate for a public referendum to determine Kashmir's future,¹⁰¹ this guidance is not binding without the ability to enforce. In India's case, which is not so dissimilar from Israel's, they simply see this 1948 guidance as “outdated.”¹⁰²

Case Study 7: Nagorno-Karabakh

Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh—which began in earnest in 1991—ended in 2023 when all ethnic Armenians were displaced from the enclave located

⁹⁹ Shawn Snow, “Analysis: Why Kashmir Matters,” *The Diplomat*, September 19, 2016.

¹⁰⁰ United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, “Background,” webpage, undated.

¹⁰¹ “Kashmir Remains Disputed, UN Reminds India,” *Dawn*, August 5, 2021.

¹⁰² Ghulam Nabi Fai, “Kashmir and the UN Security Council,” Anadolu Agency, December 9, 2020.

within the borders of Azerbaijan.¹⁰³ The conflict began following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when ethnic Armenians—with support from the newly independent Republic of Armenia—seized control of the enclave in fighting that killed an estimated 30,000. Low-level violence in the aftermath of this initial fighting persisted until 2016, when an Azerbaijani surprise offensive seized significant territory in the region and “emboldened” the Azerbaijani leadership.¹⁰⁴ A series of military victories over the next five years culminated in a nearly complete blockade of the civilian population in the region, which left the civilian population “almost entirely deprived” of essential goods (e.g., water, fuel, food) and ultimately triggered the mass emigration of an estimated 120,000 Armenians.¹⁰⁵

Efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were a persistent theme throughout the conflict, though largely ineffective. The Minsk Group—established in 1992 by the predecessor of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to spearhead efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict¹⁰⁶—accomplished little during its more-than-32-year lifespan.¹⁰⁷ And although Russia (a co-chair of the Minsk Group) was able to negotiate ceasefires twice (in 1994 and 2020) and deployed peacekeeping forces in 2020, it was unable to prevent the blockade of the region that ultimately ended the conflict.

Territorial contestation was at the heart of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While both the Republic of Armenia and Karabakh Armenians insisted on retention of Armenian control or independent statehood, Baku was at

¹⁰³ Although the Republic of Artsakh dissolved itself following its defeat in 2023, the conflict is an ongoing case as bilateral peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia continue into 2024 (Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Armenia Says It’s Ready for Peace Deal If Azerbaijan Shows Political Will,” Reuters, March 2, 2024).

¹⁰⁴ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Conflict—Azerbaijan: Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh),” webpage, undated.

¹⁰⁵ Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian, “A ‘Frozen Conflict’ Boils Over: Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Future Implications,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 18, 2024.

¹⁰⁶ Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “OSCE Minsk Group,” webpage, undated.

¹⁰⁷ Robert M. Cutler, “The Minsk Group Is Meaningless,” *Foreign Policy*, July 23, 2021.

most willing to offer self-rule within Azerbaijan.¹⁰⁸ The internationalization of the conflict also undoubtedly prolonged the conflict by supplying both sides with arms,¹⁰⁹ with Russia, France, and Iran supporting Armenia, and Turkey and Israel supporting Azerbaijan.¹¹⁰ The Azeris proved willing and able to play the long game, hoping that Armenia and Karabakh Armenians would eventually lose Russia's support and that energy wealth would allow Azerbaijan to build up its military.¹¹¹ As with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, domestic politics undermined the emergence of leaders willing to negotiate seriously toward peace—this was particularly the case for Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev, who leveraged the conflict to enhance his domestic legitimacy.¹¹²

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was ultimately resolved through the indirect expulsion of the enclave's entire population. This expulsion came in the wake of a military campaign that killed more than 3 percent of the total population of the enclave and a civilian blockade that left the remaining population few options. Armenia now has the daunting social and economic task of integrating 100,000–120,000 refugees.

Given the ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh,¹¹³ it is difficult to call the outcome “peaceful.” However, based on the cessation of violence, Azerbaijan's military victory could be the beginning of durable, “peaceful” relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. It is an example of

¹⁰⁸ International Crisis Group, *Digging out of Deadlock in Nagorno-Karabakh*, December 20, 2019.

¹⁰⁹ Ani Chkhikvadze, “Armenians Wonder Who to Trust After Lost Wars,” *Foreign Policy*, March 16, 2024; Thomas de Waal, “Prisoners of the Caucasus: Resolving the Karabakh Security Dilemma,” *Carnegie Europe*, June 16, 2016.

¹¹⁰ David Ignatius, “A Cry for the Refugees of Emptied Nagorno-Karabakh: ‘We Are Nobody,’” *Washington Post*, March 11, 2024; de Waal, 2016.

¹¹¹ Global Witness, “Oil Firms Bankroll Azerbaijan's Warring Regime with Billions in Fossil Fuel Money,” press release, November 8, 2023.

¹¹² Philip Gamaghelvan, “Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics, Scholarship,” *International Negotiation*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2010, pp. 11–12; James F. Collins, “Nagorny Karabakh: Halting a Slide to Conflict,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, March 28, 2011.

¹¹³ David J. Scheffer, “Ethnic Cleansing Is Happening in Nagorno-Karabakh. How Can the World Respond?” *Council on Foreign Relations*, October 4, 2023.

how peace can be achieved premised on a resounding military victory that the loser accepts, though there are points that must still be negotiated.¹¹⁴

Conclusion

In addition to offering specific insights to guide the development of a pragmatic road map to peace, the five cases of successful resolution to protracted and seemingly irreconcilable conflicts suggest two key elements to constructing durable peace arrangements: individual leadership and international pressure. And the importance of international pressure—demonstrated by the risks created when it is not effectively applied—is highlighted by the two cases of failed peace efforts.

The Egypt-Israel and Northern Ireland cases highlight the importance of individual leaders' personal and political commitment to peace in negotiating an end to the conflict—leaders such as Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, Tony Blair, and Bertie Ahern. Both cases also highlight the role that outside individuals can play—Jimmy Carter in the Egypt-Israel case and Bill Clinton and George Mitchell in the Northern Ireland case. Individual leadership is also about bringing *all* the right individuals to the table. In Northern Ireland, paramilitary organizations were initially excluded from negotiations, but the Good Friday Accords succeeded because of their eventual inclusion. At Dayton, the United States mustered all players in the Bosnia dispute.

The East Timor case highlights the importance of international pressure but also demonstrates how geopolitical changes can contribute to the success of peace processes. Several years after the end of the Cold War, the United States was finally willing to pressure Indonesia—its anticommunist partner—to let East Timor go.

¹¹⁴ As of February 2024, these points include (1) the demarcation of the border, (2) the kinds of international guarantees and dispute resolution mechanisms required to sustain the peace, and (3) the possibility of a transit route through Armenia connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan (Thomas de Waal, "In the Caucasus, Another Year of War or Peace," *Carnegie Europe*, February 13, 2024; Kirill Krivosheev, "Landmark Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Treaty Inches Closer," *Carnegie Politika*, January 23, 2024).

The unity of the international community is also important to how effective international pressure is. Russia and China's tacit acceptance of Western pressure on Bosnia-Herzegovina led to a more stable outcome there, while Russian and Chinese opposition means that Kosovo's international standing remains precarious.

These findings suggest that constructing a durable Israel-Palestine peace will be difficult, because the conflict appears to lack current leaders committed to peace and because it is unlikely—given geopolitical events—that meaningful international pressure will be brought to bear. Absent these critical ingredients, Israel might seek to preserve its interests in the stalemate as India has done in Kashmir, simply refusing to acknowledge competing claims for Kashmir. Or it might follow the path of Azerbaijan, which pursued a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh while the world was distracted by geopolitical events unfolding in Ukraine and Gaza. Either outcome would be the antithesis of an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Furthermore, it may not be enough that Israel negotiates only with the Palestinians that they favor; if the Northern Ireland or Bosnia cases are any indication, a peace that can hold will require negotiating with all the relevant parties—including paramilitary groups with which the Israelis may prefer to not negotiate.

But not all hope is lost: Peace can be achieved even if leaders are unwilling to negotiate—much as Indonesian leaders were only willing to negotiate with the Portuguese and not the East Timorese. But this may require the kind of international pressure that the United States and Europe brought to bear on Serbia over Kosovo and that the United States and Australia brought to bear on Indonesia over East Timor.

A Road Map to a Durable Peace

As set out in Chapter 1, our goal in this report is to assess whether the current conflict in Gaza, and the unprecedented fatalities and destruction that have resulted from it, could unlock a path to a real and durable peace. In addition to examining the inherent obstacles to peace between Israelis and Palestinians, in Chapter 3 we examined how such obstacles (and others) were confronted (or not) in other conflicts. We looked at fostering leadership for peace in Northern Ireland and the Camp David accords, how incompatible territorial claims were mediated in Balkan conflicts, and how international pressure (or lack thereof) led to conflict resolutions in East Timor and Nagorno-Karabakh.

In this chapter, we aim to identify pathways to a durable peace between Israelis and Palestinians *in the present circumstances* and in light of the destructiveness of the Gaza war—a durable peace that leads to a political process that does not result in another war. We do not set out a detailed negotiating plan for achieving such a durable peace. That is a task for diplomacy. We seek to set out the principles and an achievable combination of short-, medium-, and longer-term actions that could be combined to achieve the hinge point in history envisaged earlier.

Because the lack of security between societies and peoples has been so much a factor in the present Gaza conflict, our road map begins with security. How could reliable security for Israelis and Palestinians be created in Gaza and in the West Bank? What kind of international intervention would be required? How could terrorism be managed, and how could efforts be put in place to avoid new radicalization? The first section of this chapter (Pathway A) explores these challenges, especially in the aftermath of a Gaza ceasefire.

Long-term security cannot succeed without fair and equitable governance, and support for governance mechanisms cannot be sustained in the face of corruption and outside of the rule of law. Accordingly, the second section of this chapter (Pathway B) examines how to achieve new governance mechanisms. Because Israel is a functioning democracy (though under extraordinary pressure), the focus of the analysis here is on the Palestinian side. What can be done to move beyond Oslo arrangements and to build a new governing structure sustainably dedicated to peace, security, prosperity, and dignity? How can the conditions be set for a “second state,” a sovereign state for the Palestinian people, in the wake of the destruction of so much in Gaza and in light of renewed violence between settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank?

There can be no sustainable long-term systems of governance and security without economic growth and reconstruction. Growth will give populations hope for the future and engender support for new governance approaches. By the same token, there can be no durable economic growth without security and governance. Investors will not invest, individuals will not commit to acquiring marketable skills, and trade with other states will be insufficient. The third section of this chapter (Pathway C) sets out the short-, medium-, and long-term measures for creating prosperous, growing Israeli and Palestinian economies, linked by trade and investment to the rest of the region and to the world.

The social challenges of a durable peace are huge. Large communities of IDPs will need rebuilt or new homes; housing, power, water, sanitation, and other infrastructure will need to be built. Education models must be redesigned to foster the skills needed for a thriving economy and cooperation and coexistence among people. Health infrastructure, including hospitals and staff, will need to be re-created, and the enormous mental health needs of a traumatized population must be addressed (Pathway D, the fourth section in this chapter).

In the context of a decisive swing from war to peace in this most vexing of international conflicts, it is necessary for the international community to step forward to provide substantial assistance to provide interim security, support emerging governance structures, and cover the costs of economic and social restoration (Pathway E, the fifth and final section in this chapter).

Such international support will be vital to building a durable peace, but it is no substitute for real and sustained local engagement in the process, design, experimentation, and implementation.

Pathway A: Restoring and Sustaining Security for Palestinians and Israelis

Following the devastation and trauma of the October 7 attack and consequent war in Gaza, arrangements that provide for growing and sustainable security for both Palestinians and Israelis will be foundational to any post-Gaza efforts aimed at forging a durable peace. A durable peace will require a Palestinian state that is committed to peace and renounces Hamas, PIJ, and other violent Palestinian extremist organizations. The state must also have the capacity and capabilities to protect its citizens while preventing violence against Israel. A durable peace will also require that Israel protect Israeli citizens while recalibrating the Israeli security approach to prevent settlers from perpetuating violence or conducting illegal activities against Palestinians. Achieving these mandates will require effective coordination between the two states, particularly given the multitude of internal and external actors seeking to disrupt peace.

Embarking on this path will be supremely challenging: The security environment for Palestinians and Israelis is starting from a place of dire humanitarian need, lack of safety, severe mistrust, multiple spoiler forces, and a dearth of institutional legitimacy. While the ultimate objective is a Palestinian state that can provide for its own security and coordinate with Israel on shared security, the Palestinians will not be prepared to assume security for years to come. Instead, there is an immediate need to reform and retrain the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF), beginning in the West Bank and extending to Gaza, and establish a multinational coalition authority (led by an international high representative) to mobilize a security force comprising international, regional, and local actors that is capable of assuming interim security responsibility in Gaza (with support from a core of PASF personnel until the PASF can take more responsibility for security) and an advisory and training group to bolster capability- and capacity-building efforts for the PA's Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Palestinian forces in the West Bank.

Building and sustaining Palestinian and Israeli security is necessary for addressing the three challenges outlined in Chapter 2.

- Pursuing viable, effective security arrangements for Palestinian and Israeli civilians in the near term can build trust and legitimacy on both

sides, paving the way for more-credible leadership that can leverage the progress in the security realm to cooperate in pursuing a negotiated permanent settlement.

- Successful, cooperative efforts to secure Israelis against the reemergence of terrorist and other threats in Gaza and the West Bank—preventing the possibility of “another October 7”—and to secure Palestinians from the threats of destructive Israeli security tactics and settler violence (in concert with improvements in food, health, and economic security) can ease the security concerns that help motivate each side’s competing territorial claims.
- In the context of a political future horizon for Palestinians, it becomes possible to foresee that serious involvement in security arrangements of outside actors with “skin in the game”—especially Western and Arab states that could contribute security forces, training capacity, intelligence, and finances in the context of a defined peace-negotiation process—could help deter and deflect efforts by such potential international spoilers as Iran and Hezbollah, whose anti-Israel policies and rhetoric have been predicated in part on lack of hope among Palestinians.

Background

The road to any future Israel-Palestine peace agreement will confront multifaceted challenges in Gaza and within the West Bank, each posing unique threats to long-term stability. Even if Hamas and other Palestinian extremist groups in Gaza lose substantial military capacity and leadership, their organizations and ideologies will remain an underground threat in Palestinian areas. Elsewhere in the region, those groups’ call for the destruction of Israel will remain a common cause with such groups as Hezbollah and the Houthis, supported by Iran. The Palestinian security forces that are dedicated to providing security and rule of law in the West Bank—and that could be expected to take over security in postwar Gaza—are bloated and ineffective, and they lack credibility with the Palestinian people and the international community. On the other side of the ledger is an array of security challenges from sometimes-violent Israeli settler groups who are opposed to durable peace or Palestinian sovereignty and who are seeking

control of Gaza and even Israeli annexation of the West Bank, as well as Israeli government security practices in the West Bank that stifle the Palestinian population and feed extreme animosity toward Israel.

Even after Israel concludes major combat operations in Gaza, Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups will likely retain some sort of residual presence there and in the West Bank.¹ PIJ remains a powerful spoiler within Gaza despite its relatively limited numbers,² as demonstrated by its pivotal role in previous rocket attacks that triggered Israeli reprisals,³ and there are others (e.g., Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade,⁴ the Lions' Den⁵) that could also continue to act as security threats.⁶ Any reconciliation between Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or PA that reduces these threats would help the security situation, but that should not provide the basis for security planning. Moreover, external spoilers—and particularly Iran—may seek to upend any future peace agreement and scuttle negotiations toward that end through continued support of Palestinian terrorist groups.

The PASF was established in 1995 to fulfill Palestinian responsibilities under the Oslo Accords and was tasked with providing “internal security” and “public order” for nearly all Palestinian areas in the West Bank and

¹ And even if Israel kills or captures all of Hamas's original fighters, the organization will still persist. Hamas—as with other complex terrorist groups—likely will show the ability to reconstitute over time.

² The United States intelligence community assessed that PIJ had roughly 1,000 members as of February 2023 (National Counterterrorism Center, “Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ),” webpage, February 2023a).

³ “Israel's Prime Target: What Is Palestinian Islamic Jihad?” *Al Jazeera*, May 11, 2023.

⁴ Counter Terrorism Guide, “Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB),” webpage, September 2022.

⁵ Matthew Miller, “Sanctioning Violent Palestinian Group in the West Bank,” press release, U.S. Department of State, June 6, 2024a.

⁶ See National Counterterrorism Center, “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” webpage, November 2022a; National Counterterrorism Center, “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC),” webpage, December 2022b; and National Counterterrorism Center, “Palestine Liberation Front (PLF),” webpage, August 2023b.

Gaza.⁷ When established, the PASF was one of the largest police forces in per capita terms in the world,⁸ and it remained so on the eve of the October 7 violence. But the PASF has not been able to successfully accomplish its mission of providing security for Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank. This is particularly evident within the 19 Palestinian refugee camps throughout the West Bank,⁹ a number of which provide a safe haven for Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, PIJ, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. The PASF in Gaza—which did little to deter attacks against or resist Israeli forces in the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, or to prevent the rise of counter-PA warlordism there¹⁰—has been inactive in Gaza since

⁷ Annex I (Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements) of the September 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip detailed the PA's security mandate such that the Palestinians assumed responsibility for "internal security and public order" in all of Area A and "public order" in Area B. An estimated 96,000 Palestinians in Area C remained under Israeli security control under the 1995 agreement (Ravi Bhavnani, Dan Miodownik, and Hyun Jin Choi, "Violence and Control in Civil Conflict: Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 1, October 2011).

⁸ When the PASF was established in 1995, 18,000 policemen were authorized for Gaza (one policeman per 55 residents) and 12,000 for the West Bank (one policeman per 141 residents). The police-to-population ratio has equalized across the West Bank and Gaza: In Gaza, the force expanded over time by one-fourth—from 18,000 to 22,600—and the police-to-resident ratio fell to 1:93, while the force nearly tripled in the West Bank—from 12,000 to 32,000—with the police-to-resident ratio rising to 1:88. Our estimates of the police-to-resident ratio are based on population data (for 1997) from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, "Estimated Population in the Palestine Mid-Year by Governorate, 1997–2026," webpage, May 26, 2021). These data indicate a total population of 995,522 for Gaza and 1,787,562 for the West Bank. Our estimates for the West Bank are only for Areas A and B, which are estimated to have accounted for 94 percent of the population in 1995 (Bhavnani, Miodownik, and Choi, 2011). In the West Bank, this Palestinian Police force assumed responsibility for "internal security and public order" in all of Area A and "public order" in Area B.

⁹ United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), "Where We Work," webpage, undated.

¹⁰ The former point is from Gal Luft, "Palestinian Military Performance and the 2000 Intifada," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 4, December 2000; and Nur Masalha, "Political Violence, Military Conflict, and Civil Unrest in Palestine: The Palestinian Police, The Fatah Tanzim, and the 'Al-Aqsa Intifada,'" Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, 2003. The latter point is from Khalil Shikaki, "The Future of Palestine," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 6, November/December 2004.

Hamas's electoral victory in 2006, although some 19,000 PASF police still received a salary at the time of the October 7 violence.¹¹

In the West Bank—despite nearly two decades of American-led training and support that have generally improved the PASF's capabilities—the PASF faces multiple dilemmas that have undermined its legitimacy with the Palestinian people and its efforts to meet its security commitments.¹² Palestinian security forces have been plagued by scandals—including accusations of torture and corruption¹³—and have been undermined by Israeli settler attacks on Palestinian civilians, frequent incursions by the IDF into the most populated areas of the West Bank, lack of geographic contiguity, and intermittent or unpredictable salaries caused by Israel's periodic withholding of tax revenue from the PA.¹⁴

More fundamentally, these forces suffer from a legitimacy crisis: Much of the Palestinian public views the forces as collaborators with Israel. Israelis view them as largely weak and ineffectual in pursuing such terrorist organizations as Hamas, PIJ, and other illegally armed groups and also see the PASF as an arm of a government that incites the Palestinian population against Israel and rewards the families of “martyrs” who have conducted violent attacks against Israelis.¹⁵

On the Israeli side, there are increasing numbers of Jewish extremist groups that pose an obstacle to peace and security. Today, there are about 700,000 Jewish settlers in the West Bank—spread across 146 official and 144

¹¹ Daniel Byman, “Can the Palestinian Authority Govern Gaza? How to Revitalize the PA for Postwar Rule,” *Foreign Affairs*, January 4, 2024a.

¹² Miriam Berger, “What to Know About Palestinian Security Forces and Their Role in West Bank,” *Washington Post*, July 11, 2023; “After Israeli Raids, Palestinian Police Struggle to Reassert Control in Terror Hotbed,” *Times of Israel*, August 18, 2023.

¹³ Berger, 2023.

¹⁴ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “UN Experts Alarmed by Rise in Settler Violence in Occupied Palestinian Territory,” November 10, 2021.

¹⁵ Berger, 2023; “After Israeli Raids, Palestinian Police Struggle to Reassert Control in Terror Hotbed,” 2023.

unauthorized settlements.¹⁶ Since October 7, settlers have taken advantage of Israel's right-wing government and focus on Gaza to establish dozens of new West Bank outposts and connecting roads, often pushing Palestinian civilians out of their homes and land.¹⁷ While the majority of the settlers are peaceful, analysts from Israel's internal security agency—the Shin Bet—estimate that several hundred have engaged in recent violence against the Palestinians in the West Bank.¹⁸ These individuals typically act with impunity, with only 7 percent of attacks leading to criminal charges.¹⁹ Settler violence is at an all-time high. According to Israeli human rights groups, in 2023 (the most violent full year to date, with 794 violent incidents), Jewish extremists were responsible for the deaths of ten Palestinians, the destruction of dozens of homes, and hundreds of other incidents of violence and intimidation.²⁰ Creation of any viable Palestinian state—even under a drawing of the map most favorable to Israel—may mean moving as many as 200,000 of the settlers or else placing them under Palestinian authority, both of which would be expected to cause an uptick in violence.²¹

Finally, there is an open question as to what extent Israeli security forces turn a blind eye to, or even collude with, Jewish extremists in the West Bank and whether these forces, in turn, will police this problem without strong direction from the Israeli government.²² At the same time, there is the question of whether Israeli security forces will ever gain the trust and support of the Palestinian public. Even before October 7, Israel used a variety of tactics to combat terrorism—from running random checkpoints in the West Bank

¹⁶ John Hudson and Karen DeYoung, "White House Reverses West Bank Policy, Calling Israeli Settlements Illegal," *Washington Post*, February 24, 2024.

¹⁷ Hudson and DeYoung, 2024.

¹⁸ Neomi Neumann, "Jewish Extremist Violence in the West Bank Could Trigger a Second Front," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 16, 2023.

¹⁹ "Israeli Settler Attacks Against Palestinians," *Al Jazeera*, March 3, 2023.

²⁰ Agencies and Times of Israel Staff, "2023 'Most Violent' Year for West Bank Settler Attacks, Watchdog Says," *Times of Israel*, January 1, 2024.

²¹ David Ignatius, "In the West Bank, I Saw How Peace Will Require Confrontation with Israel," *Washington Post*, December 16, 2023.

²² Yagil Levy, "Lines Increasingly Blurred Between Soldiers and Settlers in the West Bank," *Foreign Policy*, November 9, 2023.

to demolishing Palestinian militant homes as part of a policy of collective punishment for terrorist acts. Israel claimed that these tactics were necessary for its security; critics argued that they were heavy-handed.²³ Given the devastation of the war in Gaza and increasingly destructive Israeli counterterrorism operations in West Bank population centers, Palestinians will likely be even less trusting of Israeli security forces than ever before.

Security Components of a Road Map to a Durable Peace

A durable peace requires that security is guaranteed to all Israelis and Palestinians. While the ultimate objective is a Palestinian state that can provide for its own security and can coordinate with Israel on shared security, the Palestinians will not be prepared to fully assume full security control for many years to come. The immediate and near-term challenges to Israeli and Palestinian security—not the least of which are the humanitarian and recovery needs of Palestinians in Gaza and the trauma of Israelis reeling from the October 7 massacre and the IDF's failure to protect them—will not wait for deployment of a competent Palestinian force. And Israel likely would consider ceding security control of Gaza and/or in the West Bank only if it could be sure that the future security force would aggressively pursue suspected terrorists. While the PASF has demonstrated some capability to address threats in collaboration with Israel, a complex set of both internal and external challenges has stifled its capacity, will, and resolve. Thus, a new predominantly Arab multinational security force (MSF), governed by a multinational coalition authority supported by international, regional, and local actors, will be necessary to assume security control in Gaza for an interim, conditions-based period. The coalition authority should also invigorate a robust training and advisory effort for a Palestinian security force drawing from the existing PASF in the West Bank and Gaza,²⁴ coordinated

²³ Nicholas Casey and Joshua Mitnick, "Israel Revives Demolitions of Palestinian Homes," *Wall Street Journal*, November 19, 2014.

²⁴ We use the term *PASF* when referring to the future Palestinian security force. Whatever the name of a new Palestinian security force might be, it will need to include personnel from the PASF. These forces have been Leahy-vetted and have core capabilities

by the existing U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC), until a more permanent, effective Palestinian force can be established that is acceptable to Palestinians, Israelis, and the international community.

Table 4.1 details the sequence of security components of a road map to a durable peace. The components described as “short term” are those that

TABLE 4.1

Security Components of the Road Map to a Durable Peace

Security Component	Short Term	Medium Term	Long Term
1. Secure humanitarian aid and reestablish emergency services in Gaza	X		
2. Establish a multinational coalition authority, transfer security control in Gaza to a predominantly Arab multinational security force (MSF), and expand advisory and training support in the West Bank	X		
3. Mandate legal and operational actions to stop settler violence against Palestinian civilians and property in the West Bank and enforce the rule of law equitably	X		
4. Build an effective, legitimate Palestinian security force		X	
5. Institute a demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) program for Gazan and West Bank Palestinian militants		X	
6. Recalibrate the Israeli approach to security in the West Bank		X	
7. Change the PA's approach to Palestinian violence and incitement against Israel		X	
8. Enhance coordination between Israeli and Palestinian security forces		X	
9. Transition security control in Gaza and the West Bank to forces of a Palestinian state			X

that should be built on. As the U.S. experience in Iraq demonstrated, disbanding the force could create a cadre of trained but disaffected and idle individuals who could become a violent antigovernment force.

must begin immediately or within six months of the end of hostilities or permanent ceasefire in Gaza: Establishing the multinational coalition authority and the transition of security responsibility from the IDF to the MSF is a precondition for financial support from the international community. Those components described as “medium term” begin or occur between six months and three years of the end of hostilities or permanent ceasefire and are focused on reshaping security and coordination for Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank and transforming security and coordination in Gaza. The main “long term” component focuses on transitioning security control to a revitalized Palestinian security force for the Palestinian state.

It must be noted that a number of the security components outlined here—and, indeed, the very idea of a two-state solution—are not acceptable to the Israeli right-wing parties upon which the Netanyahu government at the time of writing relies to maintain its mandate. Thus, the plan laid out below may not be feasible without a change in government in Israel. Israel must buy in to the changes in security approaches proposed here. Similarly, with help from the international community, the Palestinians will need to take responsibility for eliminating terrorist threats and altering their own security approaches; they cannot outsource the risk and resolve involved in the steps proposed here.

Short-Term Security Components

Security Component 1: Secure Humanitarian Aid and Reestablish Emergency Services in Gaza

Realistically, the safety and security of displaced and in-residence Palestinian civilians in Gaza—including civil defense and humanitarian assistance—will be Israel’s responsibility until a capable interim security force is fielded—both before and following any ceasefire. The IDF, as an invading power in Gaza, has a responsibility under international law to lead

in providing security for the enablement of humanitarian goods into and within Gaza.²⁵ This is not happening now.²⁶

Israel, in conjunction with international humanitarian aid groups, must ensure provision for Gazans' most basic needs. This means not only facilitating adequate aid for 2.2 million people, but also securing the aid against terrorist and criminal efforts to steal or redirect it. Israel must devote considerable resources to ensuring the flow and distribution of aid, protecting borders, and preventing smuggling of weapons until it can transfer security responsibilities—both in populated areas and in border regions of Gaza—to an agreed-upon, competent security force. As the United States learned in Iraq and as has already happened in Gaza in areas cleared by the IDF and assumed secure, dismantling a governing entity creates a vacuum that, if not filled, will be fertile ground for reconstitution of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal groups.²⁷ As Israel takes on this responsibility, it will also seek to significantly strengthen its security along its border with Gaza and to eliminate threats emanating from the territory to ensure that Israeli citizens displaced from nearby communities can safely return and rebuild.

In addition, a stable system of emergency services must be reestablished for Gazan Palestinians. The most immediate security needs are what the PA categorizes as civil defense forces. The war has impacted almost every pillar of Gaza emergency services, including medical, search and rescue, fire response, and emergency field medical services and ambulances. Establishing a centralized emergency services and civil defense capability that can coordinate directly with the IDF in the immediate term is essential. On humanitarian grounds, it is essential to allow these elements to gain access to areas that the IDF deems secure to search for the remains of unaccounted-for Palestinians and to coordinate for the evacuation, security, and medical

²⁵ See International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law Databases, "Rule 55: Access for Humanitarian Relief to Civilians in Need," webpage, undated; and Refugees International, "Scorecard: Israel Fails to Comply with U.S. Humanitarian Access Demands in Gaza," Issue Brief, November 12, 2024.

²⁶ International Committee of the Red Cross, undated; and Refugees International, 2024.

²⁷ David French, "Israel Is Making the Same Mistake America Made in Iraq," *New York Times*, April 7, 2024.

treatment of the injured who are unable to gain access to immediate and higher-level medical care. Such efforts can begin to establish the basis of a secure and peaceful society.

Security Component 2: Establish a Multinational Coalition Authority, Transfer Security Control in Gaza to a Predominantly Arab Multinational Security Force (MSF), and Expand Advisory and Training Support in the West Bank

Restoring security to Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel will require an expansive coalition of states and international organizations providing border, maritime, and internal security forces to safeguard civilians, ensure territorial integrity, protect freedom of navigation, and foil smuggling of illegal weapons and materiel. Coordinating these multilateral efforts will require a new, inclusive multinational coalition authority (led by an international high representative), drawing support from the United States, the G7, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and other Arab countries, as well as the PA. This coalition authority would provide oversight, manage resources, and set a strategic vision for security efforts in Gaza and the West Bank.

Along with other regional and international actors, the coalition authority members will be expected to contribute critical resources; provide command, intelligence, and logistics functions; deploy forces; and provide technical assistance to execute operational and training missions. These missions are discrete but complementary, allowing contributors to support some but not all missions, depending on their resources, expertise, and interests.

The multinational coalition authority would mandate an MSF to provide security in Gaza led by the United States, but the preponderance of operational command and security personnel must be from Arab countries with U.S. and Western enabling support, including intelligence and logistics. Arab allies must demonstrate deep commitment to supporting establishment of security for Palestinians in Gaza. Initially, Palestinians associated with the PASF would be in advisory, intel, community interface, and some security roles. This force would enable a phased Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and would serve as a bridge between Israeli and Palestinian security responsibility there. The coalition authority would also designate a Multi-

national Advisory and Training Group (MATG) to support the USSC as primary coordinating authority in building Palestinian security institutional capacity through embedding at the ministerial and subordinate PASF command levels.

The training and equipping of Palestinian forces would also be expanded. The purpose would be to improve the capacity of the MoI and PASF to command, manage, and operate to effectively provide security and rule of law in Gaza and the West Bank and to rebuild their legitimacy. Changes to Israeli and Palestinian approaches to security in the West Bank will have to accompany this effort (see Security Components 6 and 7 later in this section). Following from the lessons of the successful intervention of multinational forces in East Timor, the MSF would need to be large in relation to the population of Gaza.

The security, financial, and diplomatic leadership and contributions of Arab allies to the MSF will be critical to its constitution and successful operation in securing Gaza after Israeli withdrawal and in building Palestinian security forces. Setting a course toward a desired political horizon—one that includes establishment of an effective, legitimate PA and Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza living side by side with Israel—is a prerequisite for those allies' participation.²⁸ Without this commitment to a two-state solution and a framework for negotiation—by the United States and international actors and, especially, by the Palestinians and Israelis themselves—these regional powers will be less likely to put their “skin in the game.” Such a commitment will underscore the temporal, phased nature of the MSF, whose mandate would sunset as Palestinian security forces and institutions take greater security and governance responsibility in the West Bank and Gaza and as negotiations for a second state proceed.

With this as prerequisite, Arab states would be actively involved in the MSF and MATG in developing the security institutions and security forces that would be responsible for securing the Gaza Strip and would reinforce what has already been accomplished by Jordan and the USSC in the West Bank. They would also contribute gendarmerie forces to support and work

²⁸ See, for example, “UAE Reportedly Willing to Join Multinational Force for Gaza Reconstruction After the War,” *Haaretz*, July 20, 2024.

alongside emerging Palestinian security forces and institutions in providing security to Palestinians in Gaza as Israeli forces withdraw, with U.S. and other international stakeholders in the background providing enablers (such as logistics and intelligence). The MSF would also provide border security on the Gaza side of the border with Israel and Egypt, a mission that was key to minimizing the disruptive impact of militias in the East Timor case.

Within the institutional capacity-building framework defined by the MATG and USSC, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Kuwait, and others can contribute significant advisory talent to security sector reform in support of the MoI and the security and justice sector writ large for the Palestinian government, with the assignment of specific roles and scope of financial and force contributions to be negotiated. Given Egypt's extensive border with the Gaza Strip, the MSF will need to work closely with Israel to address the decades-long existence of smuggling routes and methods into Gaza that enabled Hamas to build its military capacity. With U.S. help, trust will have to be reestablished between Egypt and Israel, but future cooperation that includes intelligence-sharing, borders and customs coordination, and economic cooperation is essential.

U.S.-facilitated coordination between Israel and the MSF in Gaza will be critical. With the help of the USSC, the MSF would establish tight coordination mechanisms with the IDF, Shin Bet, and other Israeli security forces. This will be critical for intelligence-sharing, border security (which Israel will likely reinforce extensively on its side of the border with Gaza), and logistics. Israel also will continue to insist on the right to respond to terrorist threats emanating from inside Gaza. This must be done in the context of the mandate of the MSF and in consultation and coordination with it and the PASF. The IDF's activities in Gaza would be limited to counterterrorism operations to forestall threats to Israel's citizens and sovereignty and would support PASF-Arab coalition efforts to guarantee security for Palestinians in Gaza.

Security Component 3: Mandate Legal and Operational Actions to Stop Settler Violence Against Palestinian Civilians and Property in the West Bank, and Enforce the Rule of Law Equitably

Settler violence is at an all-time high since the events of October 7, 2023: There have been, on average, 20–25 incidents per week of settler violence against Palestinians in the West Bank.²⁹ Settlers have provoked and shot Palestinians, forced them from their land, and destroyed millions of dollars' worth of private property, including burning olive groves and other crops. These acts of violence, often left unchecked by Israeli authorities and nearby IDF soldiers, are assessed to be the catalyst for violent protest by West Bank Palestinians, according to U.S. Embassy Jerusalem reporting.³⁰ Violent settlers have been mobilized into regional reserve units, blurring the lines between authorized security activity and unauthorized armed activities against Palestinian civilians.

To progress toward a durable peace, the Israeli government should demonstrate that it will hold settlers accountable for illegal activity and prevent them from intimidating and committing violent acts against Palestinians, destroying property and expelling them from their land, and establishing rogue settlements and connecting roads on that land. In Areas B and C, where the PASF is prohibited from operating, the Israel Police, the IDF, and the Israel Security Agency must protect Palestinians from this illegal and terrorist activity. Acts of settler violence must be investigated, and Israeli law enforcement and its judiciary must convict and sentence settlers found guilty of unlawful acts and acts of terrorism. Moreover, Israel must act to immediately remove illegal settlements and—where settlers have forced Palestinians out of their homes, businesses, and lands—to reinstate those Palestinians. As emphasized above, the current Israeli government—with extremist parties in control of some Israeli security forces—is not likely to sign up for a crackdown on settler violence. The conditions on the

²⁹ USSC, “Security Update (April 2024),” Situation Report, U.S. Embassy, Jerusalem, Israel, April 2024a.

³⁰ USSC, “Security Update (August 2024),” Situation Report, U.S. Embassy, Jerusalem, Israel, August 2024b.

ground must be changed through international pressure and/or a change in government.

Medium-Term Security Components

Security Component 4: Build an Effective, Legitimate Palestinian Security Force

Palestinians, with help through the multinational coalition authority from the international community and even Israel, should undertake a robust, multiyear effort to expand and train a fully vetted Palestinian security force, based on the PASF (whether under the PA or a new technocratic government), with responsibility for both Gaza and the West Bank. In 2022, RAND researchers, in coordination with the Palestinian MoI, conducted a comprehensive review of the PASF force structure within the West Bank and Gaza. Prior to October 7, the PA MoI counted some 54,000 PASF personnel in the West Bank and Gaza, claiming that there were 22,600 PASF personnel in Gaza and 32,000 in the West Bank. The challenge before—and, even more so, after—October 7 is validating and vetting Gaza PASF personnel.

Building the PASF in Gaza must begin from the ground up. The size of the PASF will need to be expanded while initiatives are undertaken to recruit, restructure the force, weed out corruption, and revamp retirement policies. As noted above, by embedding a heavy infusion of advisors and trainers in the MoI and subordinate commands, the MATG would help the Palestinians build the capacity of their security institutions, root out corruption, and establish the conditions for an expanded, more-capable Palestinian security force. Every PA security institution within the West Bank and Gaza will require a significant advisory effort and a funding stream that is stable and ensures unfettered payment of salaries and provision of equipment and sustainment.

A revitalized PASF operating in the West Bank can serve as the nucleus for the future PASF in Gaza and would provide advisors and forces—to include local, vetted Gazans, some of whom are still PASF members—to work alongside the MSF operating in Gaza until it is able to fully assume security responsibilities. The PASF in the West Bank has well-established command headquarters and training institutions and, most importantly, has gone through the Leahy vetting process required to receive U.S. secu-

city force assistance.³¹ Initial deployments in concert with the MSF could include a civil defense command and civil police to support security of humanitarian assistance, as well as professionals with experience in West Bank district coordination offices to coordinate with Israeli security forces.

The Palestinian government, supported by the MSF, USSC and MATG, and Israel, will need to adopt a stringent and comprehensive vetting regime akin to Leahy vetting to identify Gaza Palestinians who can confidently serve within Gaza PASF security institutions and throughout the Gaza ministries necessary to effectively govern and secure the Palestinian population through rule of law. Of equal importance is using this process to identify Palestinians within Gaza who fail the vetting process. Those identified as unfit for employment in the security services could contribute to recovery and rebuilding in other ways—e.g., construction, aid distribution. Conversely, those individuals identified as enduring threats to the stability and security of the Palestinian territories and of Israel may require more restrictive and monitored dispositions, to include detention and prosecution.

At the same time, Israel and the Palestinian government, with support from the international community through the multinational coalition authority and the USSC-led MATG, must work to enable the PASF to reassert its security responsibility in the West Bank. Beginning in spring 2023 and increasingly so after October 7, Israel has largely prevented the PASF from conducting its day-to-day responsibilities in Areas A and B of the West Bank. Israeli forces have carried out thousands of operations not coordinated with the PASF against known and suspected terrorists within the West Bank. Over time, the PASF should be allowed to operate to the full extent of MoI authority to operate effectively against illegally armed Palestinian groups—and even violent Israeli settlers in concert with Israeli security forces—and reestablish credibility with the Palestinian populace. Going forward, the PASF must be given the necessary training and equipment to be able to conduct high-risk counterterrorism operations, and the Palestinian government must demonstrate that the rule of law applies throughout all territory under its jurisdiction and security responsibility. The interna-

³¹ *Leahy vetting* is a process required by the U.S. Congress to ensure that military assistance is not provided to forces where there is credible information that these forces have committed human rights abuses.

tional community can buttress this effort by sanctioning leaders of settlers' groups for illegal activities and violence.³² Ultimately, the PASF will need to be capable of taking over security responsibilities from Israel in Areas A and B, and potentially C, depending on negotiations for a durable peace settlement.

In the longer term, reestablishment of joint land and maritime border security between Israel and Gaza will require bilateral and multilateral agreements to allow for deployment of the MSF and coordination centers for Palestinian, Egyptian, and Israeli personnel. A renewed joint concept for operating and manning borders and crossings for Gaza and the West Bank will need to be developed. To effectively address the enduring threat of terrorist and other illegally armed groups in Gaza and the West Bank, Israel should allow the MATG to develop and equip a Palestinian counterterrorism police force capable of addressing current and future terrorist threats. This capability exists within the West Bank civil police, but the command and forces must be provided the necessary education, training, and experience to effectively counter terrorist organizations within Palestinian borders.

Security Component 5: Institute a Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) Program for Gazan and West Bank Palestinian Militants

To rebuild the Palestinian security institutions within Gaza and strengthen them in the West Bank, a key ongoing responsibility of the PASF, with help from the MSF and IDF, is the disarmament of Palestinians who are not associated with the PASF or police. The systematic clearing of buildings and other structures, uncovering of arms and explosives caches, and sweep of the underground tunnel complex across Gaza will continue to reveal war materiel well beyond anything that would be needed to equip the future Gazan police, emergency services, and border and crossing security forces to protect the Palestinian people. All of these materials must be located, turned in through amnesty or seizure, and destroyed. The same is true for

³² "US Imposes Sanctions on Extremist Israeli Settlers in West Bank," *The Guardian*, August 28, 2024.

the armed illegal groups in the West Bank to ensure that the PASF has primacy in security there too.

However, Gaza is the more immediate concern. The key point here is that all illegal and unaccounted-for weapons must be removed from Gaza. This helps ensure that every weapon and piece of equipment going to the PASF in Gaza is registered and accounted for by an objective party, such as the MSF.

The MSF will have to oversee the demobilization of Hamas, PIJ, and other terrorist and armed groups in Gaza and the West Bank, along with a demobilization plan that enables reintegration of former militants into Palestinian society so that they can contribute in a constructive way to rebuilding.³³ Additionally, a pathway to a Palestinian state could further convince some former militants that there is a viable alternative to continued resistance. On the other hand, some hardliners will not deradicalize or demobilize, and there may be no alternative to their detention. The case of East Timor—where a DDR program was initiated but leadership on both sides failed to enforce commitments made—provides an example of an (unsuccessful) demobilization effort from which to draw lessons. On the other hand, the program in Kosovo to disband the KLA provides an example of how militants might be demobilized and redirected into alternative, more-helpful vocations, such as unarmed civil response. The advisory assistance and participation of such Arab countries as Saudi Arabia and Egypt would be extremely helpful, in light of their experience in rehabilitating and reintegrating individuals who had been members of violent extremist organizations.³⁴

Security Component 6: Recalibrate the Israeli Approach to Security in the West Bank

The way in which the Israeli security and intelligence services have operated in the West Bank historically, and within Gaza since the onset of the current war, must change if there is to be any chance for reconciliation and endur-

³³ Brad Lendon, “How Does Hamas Get Its Weapons? A Mix of Improvisation, Resourcefulness and a Key Overseas Benefactor,” CNN, October 12, 2023.

³⁴ See, for example, Christopher Boucek, “The Saudi Process of Repatriating and Reintegrating Guantanamo Returnees,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 1, No. 1, December 2007.

ing security for Israel and within the Palestinian territories. Israelis must change their approach to how the IDF and other security services operate and interact with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, especially in parallel with enhancements to PASF training and operations. Besides preventing and prosecuting settler violence, this changed approach means stopping the practice of collective punishment, minimizing the level of destruction to Palestinian infrastructure and buildings, and eliminating actions that undermine Palestinian security forces and institutions. It also means allowing more freedom of movement for Palestinian civilians, and especially for the PASF, to enable them to meet mutual security objectives. The Israelis must devise less-intrusive, destructive concepts for ensuring the security of their citizens in the West Bank and behind the Green Line and must do so in close collaboration with the United States, the MATG, and the PASF. If finding a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in Israel's strategic, long-term interests, then the way Israel approaches security in the West Bank must be overhauled.

The razing of Palestinian homes and destruction of personal property is a long-standing approved practice by the Israeli Minister of Defense, condoned by the Israeli Cabinet and the Israeli Supreme Court,³⁵ and implemented by the IDF.³⁶ The purpose is punitive: to destroy any residential dwelling in which an individual accused of violence against Israeli civilians and the IDF resides or resided. If the residential dwelling is believed to be home to an immediate family or extended family of the Palestinian detained or arrested, the IDF will destroy the residence without regard for the immediate or long-term impacts on the families and their sentiment toward Israel.³⁷ This doctrine of destroying private property arguably does more to undermine any potential cooperation between the Palestinian pop-

³⁵ Orly Rachmilovitz, "The Israeli Supreme Court on Military Demolition of Palestinian Homes," *Versa: Opinions of the Supreme Court of Israel*, Cardozo School of Law, January 17, 2016.

³⁶ Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, "Israel's Demolition of Palestinian Homes: A Fact Sheet," webpage, April 20, 2021.

³⁷ Robert Goldman, "Analysis: International Law and the Israeli Government's Planned Destruction of Palestinian Assailants' Family Homes," *PBS News Hour*, February 5, 2023.

ulation and Israeli security forces than any other IDF tactic or technique. Stopping it would send an important message to the Palestinians that Israel will rely on the Palestinian government, rather than coercion and retribution, to apply the rule of law.

Although we present this as a medium-term step, the development of new security concepts should begin as soon as possible. The timing for implementing changes to the Israel approach will likely depend also on the PASF taking more security responsibility and on the following recommendation on the PA's approach to Palestinian violence and incitement. Ceasing the destruction of Palestinian property early on would be a sign of Israeli seriousness in changing the security landscape in the West Bank.

Security Component 7: Change the PA's Approach to Palestinian Violence and Incitement Against Israel

The PA or a new governance entity (as discussed in the upcoming Pathway B section) must change the status it gives to Hamas, PIJ, and other terrorist organizations and illegally armed groups operating in the West Bank and Gaza by declaring them illegal as long as they demand violent action and Israel's destruction. An essential element of any unification of the Palestinian movement must be acceptance by all members of the idea that armed conflict with Israel is not in the interests of the Palestinian people, such that further armed resistance counts as opposition to the Palestinian movement's aspirations for statehood. Any groups that do not disavow Israel's destruction should be considered outside the legal framework of Palestinian self-determination. An interim constitution (as described later, in the Pathway B section) that focuses on Palestinian statehood rather than on eliminating Israel can provide an opportunity to reemphasize the illegality of terrorist groups. In addition, the Palestinian government must cease payments to families of Palestinian "martyrs" and prisoners incarcerated by Israel for terrorist activity and must work to weed out corruption in the PASF and regain legitimacy and trust from Palestinian civilians. The international legitimacy of President Abbas, the PA, and the Palestinian MoI is undercut when illegally armed groups roam freely in the West Bank administrative zones of Area A. Like IDF incursions within the West Bank administrative zones of Areas A and B, allowing this illegal activity contributes to undermining the authority of the PA and the PASF. Palestinian city mayors

and district governors cannot actively parade with illegally armed groups or look the other way and expect to be viewed as legitimate by Israel, Palestinian civilians, and the international community. Taken in concert with Israeli actions to cease collective punishment, Palestinian efforts to stop rewarding terrorist groups will demonstrate Palestinian government commitment to the rule of law.

The Palestinian government must establish laws that declare these groups terrorist organizations and enforce the rule of law against both terrorist organizations and other illegally armed groups operating in the West Bank and throughout the Gaza Strip. The United States declared Hamas a foreign terrorist organization in 1997.³⁸ The United States and some European governments will face severe limitations on their ability to work with the PA to rebuild and reshape Gaza if Hamas has governing or decision-making authority there or if Hamas retains the ability to rearm and continue to attack Israel. The PA, as well as several Arab states and the international community, has walked a tightrope of separating these organizations' political branches from their militant armed counterparts carrying out terrorist and criminal activity. Israel has been culpable in this approach by allowing more than \$1.2 billion flow to Hamas in Qatar and Gaza since 2015.³⁹ Like the PA itself, these Arab states, some of whom have also provided financial and political support to Hamas, must commit to legally outlawing groups pursuing violent action and the destruction of Israel—both in their own countries and in supporting UN Security Council efforts toward this end.

Security Component 8: Enhance Coordination Between Israeli and Palestinian Security Forces

As Israel and the PA cease practices that prove counterproductive to security and mutual trust, the security services on both sides must expand security cooperation to guarantee the rule of law in the West Bank and Gaza. The IDF and the PASF must be transparent and coordinate their intelligence-gathering operations and operational targeting of terrorists operating in the West Bank and in Gaza. In the late 1990s, the coordination between

³⁸ U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” webpage, undated-b.

³⁹ Mark Mazetti and Ronen Bergman, “‘Buying Quiet’: Inside the Israeli Plan That Propped Up Hamas,” *New York Times*, December 10, 2023.

the two forces was robust and conducted more openly, and, in some cases, the IDF and PASF provided mutual support during counterterrorist operations. Since 2005 and the end of the Second Intifada, security coordination between the PASF and the IDF has continued in the West Bank, but the PA does not overtly advertise daily security cooperation because the Palestinian population in the West Bank views it as conspiring with the enemy.⁴⁰ The PASF and the IDF operate separate district coordination offices throughout the West Bank. For the PASF, these offices are used to notify the IDF when there are requests for PASF emergency services or law enforcement support outside of Area A. Both the PASF and IDF offices serve as a focal point for notification and response if settlers commit acts of violence against Palestinians and for all other security incidents requiring PASF or Israeli notification and potential response.

This level of coordination must continue, but it must be more robust, with better communications and, ideally, integrated security forces. Moreover, there will need to be more transparency about Israeli-Palestinian security coordination for both the Palestinian and Israeli publics. At a minimum, there could be an exchange of liaison officers operating within the district coordination offices within all governates in the West Bank, eventually replicating the concept in Gaza as the PASF is developed and deployed in Gaza.

Longer-Term Security Component

Security Component 9: Transition Security Control in Gaza and the West Bank to Forces of a Palestinian State

Over the longer term, and in conjunction with a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and establishment of a Palestinian state, security control of Gaza and agreed areas of the West Bank would transition from the MSF (Gaza) and Israeli forces (West Bank) to complete control of the Palestinian state. In addition, necessary coordination mechanisms between Israeli and Palestinian security institutions and border security, maritime security, counterterrorism, and intelligence forces would be in place—likely

⁴⁰ Jacob Magid, “PA Announces Halt to Security Coordination with Israel; US Cautions Against Move,” *Times of Israel*, January 26, 2023a.

involving Jordanian and Egyptian security entities as well. Tight coordination between Palestinian, Israeli, and multinational peacekeeping forces would also be established in the event that an agreement provides for contributions from international security entities (e.g., with regard to the status of Jerusalem or for any corridor between the West Bank and Gaza).

Concluding Remarks

Reestablishing and sustaining security for Palestinians and Israelis will be a fundamental condition for negotiating and successfully completing a comprehensive peace and a two-state solution to the conflict. In laying out the elements of a holistic security plan, we have sought to address not only the direct consequences of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent IDF war against Hamas and other terrorist groups in Gaza, but also the more systemic problems in the security structures and practices on both sides that have presented obstacles to building the legitimacy and trust needed for productive engagement toward a durable peace.

Pathway B: Governance

The long-term durability of the second state will depend on ensuring that there is a trajectory toward Palestinian self-governance of the West Bank and Gaza.⁴¹ The importance of this self-governance for a long-term peace was recognized by some Israeli officials early in the Gaza War, who highlighted the criticality of a “moderate Palestinian governing body that enjoys broad popular support and legitimacy.”⁴² In his address to the U.S. Congress in July 2024, Prime Minister Netanyahu said, “Gaza should have a civilian administration run by Palestinians who do not seek to destroy Israel.”⁴³ Although it will take time to fully achieve the “direct, free and general political elections” envisioned under Oslo,⁴⁴ a pathway toward such an electoral process remains central to both the domestic and international viability of any Palestinian state.

Governance of Gaza following the cessation of hostilities will need to be managed by a multinational coalition authority that can ensure that Hamas does not return to power. Simultaneously, the Palestinians will need to develop a technocratic government that is (1) committed to peace and security, (2) representative of the diverse communities in the West Bank and Gaza, and (3) acceptable to the international community. Serving as a transitional government, this administrative body will be critical to coordinating immediate postconflict reconstruction and relief efforts while laying the foundation for a more legitimate, responsible, and accountable Palestinian leadership to emerge. Neither Fatah nor Hamas meets these conditions, and, without new leadership, a durable peace will remain elusive.

⁴¹ Leila Farsakh, “The Question of Palestinian Statehood,” *Boston Review*, June 5, 2024; Mkhaimar Abusada, Zaha Hassan, Sanaa Alsarghali, Nathan J. Brown, Imad Alsoos, Vladimir Pran, and Nur Arafah, *Governing Gaza After the War: Palestinian Debates*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 9, 2024.

⁴² Anna Schecter, “Inside the Effort to Create a Far-Reaching U.S.-Saudi-Israeli Pact to End the War,” NBC News, January 18, 2024.

⁴³ “Full Text, Netanyahu’s 2024 Address to Congress,” 2024.

⁴⁴ United Nations Security Council, “Letter Dated 8 October 1993 from the Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” October 11, 1993.

A multinational coalition will serve as a caretaker authority, empowering this transitional Palestinian technocratic government while also helping to develop the next generation of Palestinian leaders necessary to guarantee the peace. Such Palestinian leaders must be able to publicly pledge to support a permanent peace, make sincere commitments to nonviolence and neighborly relationships with the State of Israel, and develop and ratify a Palestinian constitution that can provide the basis for transition to statehood.

Background

A key tenet of the Oslo Accords was that the “Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles.”⁴⁵ The years following Oslo saw some progress toward this objective, although internal resistance to the type of democratic reforms necessary slowed this progress significantly. In 2007, all progress toward coordinated Palestinian self-governance ended following the violent seizure of Gaza by Hamas, resulting in what has proved an irreconcilable split between the Fatah-governed West Bank and Hamas-governed Gaza.

The PLO—the entity recognized by the UN as the government of the State of Palestine—established the PA in 1994 to function as an interim government in the West Bank and Gaza until a democratically elected government could be established.⁴⁶ The Palestinians elected a democratic parliament, the PLC, in 1996. The PLC’s efforts faced resistance from PLO leadership, who delayed subsequent elections,⁴⁷ resisted efforts at internal reform,⁴⁸ and took five years to approve an “interim” and “provisional” Palestinian constitution (the Palestinian Basic Law) drafted by the PLC.⁴⁹ A

⁴⁵ United Nations Security Council, 1993.

⁴⁶ United Nations Security Council, 1993.

⁴⁷ Nathan J. Brown, *The Palestinian Reform Agenda*, United States Institute of Peace, December 1, 2002, pp. 39–40.

⁴⁸ Brown, 2002, p. 14.

⁴⁹ Brown, 2002, p. 20. The description as “interim” is from Nathan J. Brown, *The Third Draft Constitution for a Palestinian State: Translation and Commentary*, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, October 2003, p. 1. For another detailed discussion of the Palestinian politics of the drafting of the constitution within the context

separate “constitutional committee”—established directly by the PLO and operating independently of the PLC—promulgated a draft constitution in 2003 that would have accompanied a declaration of Palestinian statehood.⁵⁰ However, without a pathway toward Palestinian statehood, this constitution was never considered for ratification.

Presidential elections held in 2005—and boycotted by Hamas—selected Mahmoud Abbas, the Fatah and PLO chairman, to replace Yasser Arafat (the first-ever Palestinian president). But parliamentary elections the following year, in January 2006, gave Hamas a parliamentary majority. Although Fatah, Hamas, and most other Palestinian political organizations had formally recommitted themselves to the PLO,⁵¹ talks to create a national unity government proved unworkable.

Progress toward coordinated governance of the West Bank and Gaza definitively ended in June 2007,⁵² when the military wing of Hamas seized control of Gaza in what was described by Palestinian President Abbas as a “bloody coup.”⁵³ The June 2007 “coup” came in the wake of months of internecine violence, in part attributable to the U.S. use of a Palestinian proxy to undermine Hamas’ control in Gaza.⁵⁴ The coup was triggered by Hamas’s concerns that the Abbas-controlled PA Presidential Guard was preparing to

of the Palestinian Basic Law, see Emilio Dabed, “A Constitution for a Nonstate: The False Hopes of Palestinian Constitutionalism, 1988–2007,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 2, Winter 2014.

⁵⁰ The third draft of this constitution was promulgated in 2003 (Brown, 2003).

⁵¹ “Text of the Declaration by Palestinian Groups After Meeting in Cairo,” *Haaretz*, March 18, 2005.

⁵² Margret Johannsen, Ziad AbuZayyad, Karima El Ouazghari, Judith Palmer Harik, Anat Kurz, and Jamil Rabah, “The Reconciliation of Hamas and Fatah: Smoothing the Way to the Middle East Conference by Contributing to Peace and Security in the Region,” Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East, *Policy Brief for the Middle East Conference on a WMD/DVS Free Zone*, No. 3, December 2011.

⁵³ “Palestinian President Rips Hamas’ ‘Bloody Coup,’” CNN, June 22, 2007.

⁵⁴ David Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell,” *Vanity Fair*, March 3, 2008.

seize control of Gaza.⁵⁵ Since the coup, the West Bank and Gaza have been governed separately.

The West Bank has been governed by the PA under the leadership of Abbas but without an elected parliament, as had been envisaged by the Palestinian Basic Law. On the eve of the Gaza War, the PA was facing a number of “existential threats;”⁵⁶ these threats included large popular support for militant groups operating within the West Bank and outside PA control;⁵⁷ ongoing financial problems that had triggered public-sector strikes;⁵⁸ and the loss of a popular mandate, with a majority of West Bank Palestinians supporting the dissolution of the PA.⁵⁹ In addition, the PA was preparing for a leadership transition in which it was widely believed that President Abbas would pick his successor rather than turn to elections to select a new president.⁶⁰

Gaza has been governed by Hamas since its June 2007 seizure of the territory. PA employees living and working in Gaza—who still depended on the Abbas government for salaries—were forbidden from continuing in their previous roles under Hamas control. Hamas filled the resulting gaps in schools, hospitals, and security forces with “members and party affiliates.”⁶¹ This “staff-replacement policy” had a variety of negative impacts that included education, which experienced a “sharp deterioration in student performance . . . [and] provided Hamas with an opportunity to promote

⁵⁵ “Hamas Coup in Gaza: Fundamental Shift in Palestinian Politics,” *Strategic Comments*, Vol. 13, No. 5, 2007.

⁵⁶ The term *existential threats* is from Oxford Analytica, *The Palestinian Authority Faces Existential Threats*, August 17, 2023.

⁵⁷ Alaa Lahlouh, *Armed Groups in Northern West Bank: The Beginning of an Armed Intifada or the Seeds of an Internal Palestinian Conflict?* Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, August 2023.

⁵⁸ Walid Ladadweh, *Public Sector Strikes: Causes and Treatment*, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, September 2023.

⁵⁹ 52 percent supported dissolution on the eve of the Gaza war (PCPSR, 2023).

⁶⁰ International Crisis Group, *Managing Palestine’s Looming Leadership Transition*, February 1, 2023.

⁶¹ Tamer Qarmout and Daniel Béland, “The Politics of International Aid to the Gaza Strip,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 4, Summer 2012, p. 38.

its Islamic social and ideological agenda,” and a loss of legitimacy of Gazan courts.⁶²

Since 2007, there have been a multitude of failed international efforts to reconcile the Fatah-dominated PA and Hamas and form a national unity government. These included an Egyptian-brokered reconciliation in 2011;⁶³ a Qatar-brokered reconciliation in 2012, which was also supported by Egypt;⁶⁴ a second Egyptian-sponsored reconciliation in 2014 that was to build from the previous reconciliation efforts;⁶⁵ and a 2017 process that was also brokered by Egypt.⁶⁶ However, the durability of the most recent reconciliation effort, brokered by the Chinese in July 2024, amid the violence of the ongoing war remains to be seen.⁶⁷

The Palestinians will ultimately determine *how* they will be governed by drafting and ratifying a constitution. At present, however, there is no Palestinian entity prepared to govern in the West Bank and Gaza once a ceasefire is reached. Most importantly, perhaps, is that neither the PA nor any of the existing political parties have credibility among the Palestinian people—in April 2024, only 11 percent of West Bank Palestinians and 44 percent of Gaza Palestinians supported a national unity government controlled by either the existing PA or a political party.⁶⁸

⁶² Qarmout and Béland, 2012, p. 39.

⁶³ Jimmy Carter, “Support the Palestinian Unity Government,” *Washington Post*, May 3, 2011.

⁶⁴ Jodi Rudoren and Fares Akram, “Palestinians Sign Deal to Set Up Elections,” *New York Times*, May 20, 2012.

⁶⁵ Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation Agreement, April 23, 2014.

⁶⁶ “Palestinian Factions Hamas and Fatah End Split on Gaza,” BBC, October 12, 2017.

⁶⁷ Jack Jeffery, Tia Goldenberg, and Huizhong Wu, “Rivals Hamas and Fatah Sign a Declaration to Form a Future Government as War Rages in Gaza,” AP World News, July 23, 2024.

⁶⁸ PCPSR, “Public Opinion Poll No (91),” webpage, March 5–10, 2024a.

Governance Components of a Road Map to a Durable Peace

A durable peace requires a trajectory toward Palestinian self-governance of the West Bank and Gaza. While the ultimate objective is a freely elected Palestinian democratic government that is committed to living in peace alongside Israel and respects an internationally recognized Palestinian constitution, history has demonstrated that such an outcome is unlikely without Israeli and international recognition of a Palestinian state. Reestablishing credible local governance initially under the legal oversight of a multinational coalition authority as a precursor to a technocratic government should instead set the conditions for Palestinian statehood and, eventually, a constitution and the final status agreement with Israel necessary for statehood.

Table 4.2 summarizes the key governance components of the road map to a durable peace. These components are sequenced based on their immediacy of need and practicability. Those identified as “short term” should be implemented immediately after the security environment is stabilized, and those identified as “medium term” and “long term” would follow, build-

TABLE 4.2
Governance Components of the Road Map to a Durable Peace

Governance Component	Short Term	Medium Term	Long Term
1. Establish a multinational coalition authority as caretaker in Gaza	X		
2. Reconstitute and rebuild local governance structures in Gaza	X		
3. Establish a Palestinian technocratic transitional government		X	
4. Convene a national Palestinian reconciliation process		X	
5. Draft an interim constitution		X	
6. Convene elections in Gaza and the West Bank			X
7. Negotiate final status agreements with Israel			X

ing on previous successes and ensuring that progress toward Palestinian self-governance is sustained. The remainder of this section discusses each component in detail.

Governance Component 1: Establish a Multinational Coalition Authority as Caretaker in Gaza

Following the cessation of hostilities, there will be an immediate need to establish a centralized authority to administer Gaza.⁶⁹ Such an authority must be capable of guaranteeing access to essential services (medical, sewer, water, energy, trash removal), providing security, coordinating the activities of international organizations, managing reconstruction, and setting conditions for further development.⁷⁰

In the near and medium term, the PA lacks “the capacity to take over administration of Gaza” and lacks credibility among Gazans, Israelis, and the international community.⁷¹ The Israeli government presented an initial concept in February 2024 in which Israeli security forces would “maintain an indefinite freedom to operate” throughout Gaza and all services would be administered by “unaffiliated Palestinian clan leaders” under Israeli direction.⁷² The Israeli concept assumed that administrative functions would be financed by other Arab nations, although these nations have remained steadfast that they would not provide financial support without progress toward an independent Palestinian state.⁷³

⁶⁹ This characterization of the immediate need is from Keith Dayton, James F. Jeffrey, Eran Lerman, Robert Silverman, and Thomas S. Warrick, *Plan for Postwar Gaza*, Wilson Center, 2024. Much of the discussion in this section is from that report, although our recommendation in the third paragraph of this section on who should administer is a bit more nation-agnostic.

⁷⁰ Dayton et al., 2024, p. 4.

⁷¹ Dayton et al., 2024, pp. 2–3, 15. Quote is from p. 15.

⁷² Jacob Magid, “Netanyahu Presents Post-War Plan to Cabinet, Aims for ‘Local Officials’ to Govern Gaza,” *Times of Israel*, February 23, 2024.

⁷³ Jacob Magid, “UAE: ‘Viable Two-State Solution Plan’ Needed Before We Commit to Rebuilding Gaza,” *Times of Israel*, December 13, 2023b.

A multinational coalition authority—anchored by the United States, though with participation from Arab, European, and other international partners—will be critical to effectively administer Gaza and to set conditions for necessary economic, governance, and security reform. This coalition authority (led by an international high representative) must have legal authority to preserve law and order and must be postured to directly contract Gazans to provide essential services. The coalition authority should also begin to reconstitute Palestinian “ministries” to mirror those currently in the West Bank.⁷⁴

Governance Component 2: Reconstitute and Rebuild Local Governance Structures in Gaza

The multinational coalition authority will be responsible for overall administration and governance of Gaza, but it lacks familiarity with the local context and key players. In addition to its important security and deradicalization functions discussed in the preceding section (Pathway A), the coalition authority must begin the slow process of reconstituting Gaza’s ministries and agencies. To do so, it will need to cultivate relationships with community stakeholders and rebuild local governance structures to help manage and coordinate efforts on the ground.

This process should begin with reestablishing Gaza’s municipal councils (one for each of Gaza’s five governorates) to help manage local affairs; communicate their population’s most urgent needs; and help coordinate relief, assistance, and security operations in their areas. In its early days, the multinational coalition authority will face many challenges, especially outside the major population areas, where its visibility and operational reach are likely to be more limited. Even with experienced officials from a coalition of Western and Arab states, this authority is unlikely to enjoy deep or broad ties across Gazan society, limiting its effectiveness in some areas or communities. Local municipal councils can help mitigate these weaknesses and serve essential mediating roles, enabling relief efforts by sharing their local expertise, providing information on where the needs are greatest, helping

⁷⁴ Dayton et al., 2024, pp. 42–43.

identify new problems as early warning signs emerge, and informing more-efficient and targeted assistance and outreach.

Following a ceasefire, these councils (or some similar local structure) will likely be critical to post-conflict governance, providing an indispensable linkage between the multinational coalition authority and residents of Gaza. Over time, these councils may become more formalized as electorally representative (of Gazans committed to peace) and accountable local bodies. In crafting their future constitution, should Palestinians adopt a national governance structure with greater local autonomy, these councils could provide the backbone of such a decentralized system. Although such institutional choices remain far in the future, as this decades-long conflict has shown (most notably in the baggage of the Oslo process), systems put in place today can quickly build institutional inertia, making future choices path-dependent.

Governance Component 3: Establish a Palestinian Technocratic Transitional Government

Establishing an interim Palestinian technocratic government is likely to be a necessary first step in forming the new Palestinian state.⁷⁵ Such an approach has been proposed by Egypt, Qatar, and the Palestinians themselves as a mechanism to provide three core governance requirements—humanitarian support, economic reforms, and preparation for elections—until conditions are appropriate for Palestinian elections.⁷⁶ Critically, this interim technocratic government would be committed to durable peace with neighbors and responsible for governance in both Gaza and the West Bank.⁷⁷

Such an interim technocratic government should be established through a national dialogue process that is convened and managed by the Arab countries of the region—particularly Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—though with financial and technical support from the United States,

⁷⁵ Summer Said and Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Israeli War Cabinet Meets to Consider Egyptian Proposal to End War in Gaza,” *Wall Street Journal*, December 25, 2023.

⁷⁶ Patrick Wintour, “Qatar and Egypt ‘Will Help Form New Palestinian Technocratic Government,’” *The Guardian*, February 27, 2024a.

⁷⁷ Wintour, 2024a.

the EU, and China. This blend of international support will ensure that all Palestinians are represented among those selected to manage the technocratic government. The technocratic transitional government will also provide the support necessary to minimize Israeli intervention while preventing the participation of Palestinian individuals who pose a terrorist or other security threat.

The use of interim technocratic governments to reestablish governance has become common throughout the Middle East,⁷⁸ although technocratic rule following political transformation is also a long-standing global phenomenon.⁷⁹ The most recent examples are in Lebanon and Iraq, where technocratic governments were established following national protests in late 2019,⁸⁰ although the recent political challenges in Tunisia—which has experienced democratic backsliding after nearly a decade of technocratic rule⁸¹—offers a cautionary tale.⁸²

Governance Component 4: Convene a National Palestinian Reconciliation Process

Building a viable Palestinian state over the long term will depend on more than just reconstituting institutions and delivering effective governance in Gaza—it will also require national reconciliation between the communities of the West Bank and Gaza. Although separated by geography and politics, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza share not only a common history but also a political future within a “second state” alongside Israel. Often

⁷⁸ David Kenner, “How to Be a Middle East Technocrat,” *Foreign Policy*, June 15, 2020.

⁷⁹ See, for example, Miguel Angel Centeno, “The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy,” *Theory and Society*, Vol. 22, June 1993.

⁸⁰ Nancy Ezzeddine and Beatrice Noun, *Iraq and Lebanon’s Torturous Paths to Reform*, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December 2020.

⁸¹ Andrew Carboni, “Non-Party Ministers and Technocrats in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia,” *Journal of North African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2022.

⁸² Tunisia’s current president, Kais Saïed—responsible for the democratic backsliding—ran his political campaign, in part, on the idea that these technocratic governments should not be in charge (“Kais Saïed: ‘Le gouvernement de technocrates est un grand mensonge et une grande manipulation!’” *Espace Manager*, July 29, 2014).

overlooked in the current conflict with Israel, Fatah and Hamas's vicious rivalry has left the Palestinian nation politically riven and bereft of unified leadership. Most recently, Hamas's horrific attacks of October 7 led directly to the conflict that has resulted in widespread destruction and suffering in Gaza and dislocation in Israel.

Sustaining peace over the long term may depend on reconciling these intra-Palestinian disputes by rebuilding trust and cooperative exchange between the West Bank and Gaza. If Palestinians cannot reconcile their internal grievances and move forward with shared purpose and commitment to peace, their state project is sure to fail, begetting new internal violence, empowering spoilers, and reigniting conflict with Israel.

Reconciliation processes complement post-conflict institutional design by "improving both horizontal relationships, between people and groups in society, and vertical relationships between people and institutions."⁸³ This process should prioritize community-level engagement (e.g., education programs, reintegration efforts, collaborative exchanges and conferences) to help establish the conditions necessary to sustain a peace agreement by "developing the working relationships necessary for its successful implementation."⁸⁴ These working relationships "generate the atmosphere within which good governance can thrive"⁸⁵ by repairing the bonds between citizens necessary to rebuild trust in the state.⁸⁶ Although such nation-building efforts take time and are not likely to be fully achieved in the near term, beginning this process during the transitional period is critical to laying the foundation for a unified Palestinian state. In the near and mid-term, these efforts will also support more-immediate needs in the transition by empowering local communities to play a more active role in subsequent negotiations and conferences around constitutional design.

⁸³ Rachel Clogg and Michelle Parlevliet, "Reconciliation Is Not Only Possible but Needed in All Stages of Conflict," *Conciliation Resources*, June 2021.

⁸⁴ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook*, 2003, p. 3.

⁸⁵ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003, p. 3.

⁸⁶ UN, "Reconciliation Must Evolve to Reflect Growing Complexity of Today's Conflicts, Participants Stress During Day-Long Security Council Open Debate," UN Security Council meeting, November 19, 2019.

Governance Component 5: Draft an Interim Constitution

An interim Palestinian constitution—anchored in the need to “develop stronger institutions”—would provide a needed pathway to establish coherent governance over the West Bank and Gaza.⁸⁷ The drafting of such an interim constitution would (1) “place Palestinians at the center of governance questions,” (2) make concrete the commitment to peace and security, (3) prevent capture by spoilers, and (4) facilitate coherence in Palestinian engagement with the international community.⁸⁸

Although previous efforts to draft a Palestinian constitution proved ill-fated, and an effective interim Palestinian constitution would necessitate addressing many of the existing governance challenges,⁸⁹ historical evidence suggests that such an approach can be beneficial. Interim constitutions have been used in nine post-conflict contexts and have been found to “allow for greater constitutional legitimacy, sophistication, flexibility, and effective peace-building.”⁹⁰

Governance Component 6: Convene Elections in Gaza and the West Bank

Having drafted an interim constitution that includes new institutional rules for representative and inclusive government, convening free and fair elections is a crucial next step toward a second state. The first post-conflict elections will be critical to legitimating the transitional process and institutionalizing norms around fair competition and accountability. The timing and sequencing of post-conflict elections can have a profound effect on the prospects of a new democratic state, and the international community should be

⁸⁷ Nathan J. Brown and Sanaa Alsarghali, “Why an Interim Constitution Could Help Palestine: The Domestic and International Payoffs,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 8, 2024.

⁸⁸ Brown and Alsarghali, 2024.

⁸⁹ Brown and Alsarghali, 2024.

⁹⁰ Caitlin Goss, *The Nature of Interim Constitutions: A Comparative Analysis*, Merton College, 2015, p. iv. Those countries with interim constitutions are Poland, Hungary, Albania, South Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Sudan, Thailand, and Nepal.

well advised to resist short-term biases and pressures to rush the process; “premature post-conflict elections” may leave “insufficient time for democratic forces to emerge.”⁹¹

Future elections, however, are indispensable to the transition toward statehood. Although Palestinian communities have been emphasized at various points along this road map (e.g., empowering local governance structures, conducting reconciliation efforts), not until this latter stage does the population enjoy broader agency over selecting their political leaders, a step essential to democratic rule. Such a step is obviously not without risk, as seen in 2006, when Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections and proceeded to form a government without Fatah, setting off years of intra-Palestinian infighting and recurrent conflict with Israel. If rushed, elections could reinforce existing cleavages and reproduce pre-conflict power structures by reinstalling Fatah or Hamas leaders, who have historically subverted meaningful competition. If boycotted by major stakeholders or viewed as broadly illegitimate, the elections risk undermining the entire transition process and the eventual transfer of power from the multinational coalition authority and technocratic government.

Although electoral design choices and international monitoring can help mitigate these risks,⁹² they can never be fully eliminated; however, forestalling these elections indefinitely may pose an even greater risk to peace and stability. Over time, as Palestinian frustration mounts and international patience wanes, the likelihood of conflict recurrence will grow just as the prospect of a second state wanes.

Governance Component 7: Negotiate Final Status Agreements with Israel

The last step in this governance road map—negotiating final status agreements with Israel—represents the culmination of the previous steps and is a necessary endpoint for Palestinians if they are to be invested in and

⁹¹ Benjamin Reilly, “Timing and Sequencing in Post-Conflict Elections,” in Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown, eds., *Building Sustainable Peace: Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding*, Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 73.

⁹² Reilly, 2016.

committed to the peace process. In practice, many of the key dimensions of these talks will likely be explicitly negotiated or implicitly decided well in advance. After all, key aspects of Palestinian statehood (e.g., the ineligibility of militant groups in elections and post-conflict governance and security structures) will be determined before any official final status talks commence between Israel and the newly empowered Palestinian leadership.

But crucial to these talks is the central role and unimpeachable legitimacy of that new Palestinian leadership in the context of reconstruction and the revival of hope for the future. Having been popularly elected, these new leaders will serve as the formal representatives of the Palestinian people, enjoying legitimacy from Gaza to the West Bank, and will be internationally recognized as having the authority to negotiate for Palestine's future. Such conditions are necessary to ensuring a credible commitment to peace.

Pathway C: Economics

The Oslo Accords emphasized the “mutual benefit of cooperation” in economic issues,⁹³ with both sides tacitly acknowledging at the time that “private sector Palestinian development is . . . a precondition to the success of the peace process.”⁹⁴ This idea of an “economic peace”—in which economic benefits create a powerful incentive for peacemaking—has also been at the foundation of recent peace proposals.⁹⁵

Although history has demonstrated that economic factors are insufficient by themselves to bring peace, sustained Palestinian economic growth will be critical in enabling a durable peace by increasing hope among Palestinians for an improved future.⁹⁶ The Palestinian economy has been stagnant for more than a decade—average annual per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth was -0.6 percent during 2013–2022⁹⁷—and senior Palestinian leaders have indicated that the West Bank had reached nearly

⁹³ United Nations Security Council, 1993.

⁹⁴ Mel Levine, “Palestinian Economic Progress Under the Oslo Agreements,” *Fordham International Law Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1995.

⁹⁵ The idea of an economic peace is typically anchored in the concept of close relations between the Israelis and Palestinians, as demonstrated by both the Kerry Plan and Kushner Plan (Raja Khalidi, “The Debate About Kerry’s Economic Initiative: Pitfalls, Benefits, and Risks,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3, Spring 2014; Ibrahim Shikaki, “An Economic Analysis of Kushner’s Failed Plan,” Arab Center Washington DC, July 3, 2019). These political perspectives have been buttressed by empirical evidence, as the confidence of both Israelis and Palestinians in their political leadership is strongly correlated with individual assessments of the future economic prospects of their economy (Jodi Nachtwey and Mark Tessler, “The Political Economy of Attitudes Toward Peace Among Palestinians and Israelis,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 2, April 2002). However, there are increasing concerns that this economic “convergence” is both impossible and has distortionary impacts on the Palestinian economy (see, for example, Ibrahim Shikaki, “‘Economic Peace’ with Israel Won’t Help Palestinians,” *Foreign Policy*, June 2, 2021).

⁹⁶ Historical international evidence indicates that economic growth is a contributor to enhanced well-being (Richard A. Easterlin, *Happiness and Economic Growth: The Evidence*, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 7187, January 2013).

⁹⁷ Authors’ analysis based on World Bank Group, “GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %)—West Bank and Gaza,” webpage, undated.

maximal economic activity in 2023 given existing constraints.⁹⁸ Reversing this trend and overcoming existing constraints could potentially do much to overcome existing impediments to peace.

A well-resourced reconstruction program, robust private financing, and a sound economic strategy can and should be a core component of establishing a durable peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. Historical examples demonstrate that economic factors can be critical for sustaining peace but are rarely decisive in beginning a peace process. The Camp David Accords offer a prominent example of this: Egyptians insist that the prospect of obtaining U.S. economic assistance was not a central reason for Sadat's trip to Jerusalem.⁹⁹ But the decades of U.S. economic assistance are widely attributed as a key factor in the success and endurance of the peace.¹⁰⁰

Background

In the three decades since Oslo, the Palestinian economy has struggled to deliver the economic dividends promised in the accords. The hope of Oslo was that a close economic partnership would facilitate economic convergence, allowing the Palestinian economy to catch up with the Israeli economy in terms of per capita GDP. However, that “hoped-for convergence” never happened.¹⁰¹

The disappointing economic record is illustrated in Figure 4.1, which compares per capita economic growth between the Israeli and Palestinian economies.¹⁰² While the Palestinian economy has grown at roughly the same rate as that of Israel's in the years since Oslo—with per capita GDP in


⁹⁸ Senior Palestinian leader, discussion with RAND researcher, summer 2023.

⁹⁹ This observation has been attributed to then-Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy in Safty, 1991.

¹⁰⁰ E.g., Scott Lasensky, “Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American Foreign Aid,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 2004.

¹⁰¹ UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *Report on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People: Developments in the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2022.

¹⁰² This figure focuses on per capita GDP adjusted for cost of living, which we assess using the World Bank's measure of purchasing power parity, as the high cost of living imposed on the Palestinians by the customs envelope is a key challenge facing the Pal-

FIGURE 4.1**Israeli and Palestinian Economic Growth Since the Oslo Accords**

SOURCE: Adapted from World Bank, "GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant 2017 International \$)—West Bank and Gaza, Israel, United States," World Development Indicators Database, undated.

both economies growing by roughly 50 percent during the 1995–2019 time frame¹⁰³—the linking of the two economies under Oslo has failed to deliver on its promise of allowing the Palestinians to “catch up,” and the relative gap between Israeli and Palestinian income has instead expanded signifi-

estinian economy (e.g., Numan Kanafani, “The Cost of Living Crisis in the West Bank,” *Middle East Research and Information Project*, Winter 2012).

¹⁰³ Unlike the Israeli economy, which recovered rapidly from the coronavirus pandemic, per capita GDP in the Palestinian economy had not fully recovered by the beginning of the war.

cantly.¹⁰⁴ The gap in per capita GDP between the Israelis and Palestinians was \$23,000 in 1995—at that time, GDP per capita in Israel was \$27,000, compared with just \$4,000 for the Palestinians. That gap rose to \$39,000 in 2022—with the Israeli per capita GDP nearly eight times larger than the Palestinian per capita GDP.

The Palestinian economy was ravaged by conflict during this time frame, affecting output, productivity, and investment. The Second Intifada (2000–2005), the 2014 Gaza War, and the most recent Gazan War greatly damaged Palestinian economic assets and prospects. However, the economy also suffers from a variety of internal and externally imposed dysfunctions.

The internal dysfunction is, in large part, a function of Palestinian political stagnation that has resulted in one of the worst business climates on the globe.¹⁰⁵ Alongside this internal dysfunction, Israeli-imposed restrictions on access to land, water, and movement of goods and people have had devastating economic consequences.¹⁰⁶ These restrictions have resulted in a “lopsided dependence on Israel” in which Israel accounts for more than 70 percent of Palestinian trade, while trade with the Palestinians accounts for only 3 percent of Israeli trade.¹⁰⁷

By contrast, Israel has an internationally competitive technology sector and is benefiting from a partial opening to the Arab world through the Abraham Accords. However, the Israeli economy, while robust in comparison with that of the Palestinians, also shows signs of fragility. Prominent challenges include a high cost of living, which in 2011 triggered widespread protests during the “cottage cheese revolts;”¹⁰⁸ a rapidly growing number

¹⁰⁴ Sebastien Dessus, *A Palestinian Growth History, 1968–2000*, World Bank, 2003.

¹⁰⁵ World Bank, *Doing Business 2020: West Bank and Gaza*, 2020a.

¹⁰⁶ For a review, see C. Ross Anthony, Daniel Egel, Charles P. Ries, Craig A. Bond, Andrew Liepman, Jeffrey Martini, Steven Simon, Shira Efron, Bradley D. Stein, Lynsay Ayer, and Mary E. Vaiana, *The Costs of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, RAND Corporation, RR-740-1-DCR, 2015, pp. 34–46.

¹⁰⁷ UNCTAD, 2022.

¹⁰⁸ Sharon Wrobel, “Israel’s Cost of Living the Highest Among OECD Countries in 2022, Data Shows,” *Times of Israel*, August 27, 2023.

of economically unproductive citizens (the Haredim);¹⁰⁹ and international campaigns to restrict investment in the Israeli economy.¹¹⁰ Because Israel is a small country without significant natural resources (apart from recent gas discoveries), Israel's economic future will be dependent on its international trade and investment relationships with the rest of the world.

Economic Components of a Road Map to a Durable Peace

A durable peace will require a large and sustained economic effort and coherent strategy to complement and extend the security, governance, social, and international aspects described in other sections of this chapter to ensure that citizens of the State of Israel—and a state of Palestine to be built—rebuild the damages of war and have what it takes to thrive in the 21st century global economy. As much as the other aspects, a successful economic recovery effort begins with effective leadership committed to such a peace and generous international support.

The economic strategy therefore will need to work in parallel with the strategies for security and governance, and it will need strong, sustained support from the international community. And long before a sovereign, effective Palestinian state can assume full governance and security responsibilities for the West Bank and Gaza, some extant economically restrictive policies should be changed.

Table 4.3 summarizes the key economic components of the road map to a durable peace. These components are sequenced based on their immediacy of need and practicability. Those identified as “short term” should be implemented immediately after the security environment is stabilized; those identified as “medium term” or “long term” would follow, building on previous successes and ensuring that economic growth is sustained. The remainder of this section discusses each component in detail.

¹⁰⁹ Naomi Feiner, “Q&A: Integrating the Haredim Is Critical for Israel's Economy and Society,” Russell Berrie Foundation, January 31, 2024.

¹¹⁰ For a discussion, see Dany Bahar and Natan Sachs, “How Much Does BDS Threaten Israel's Economy?” Brookings Institution, January 26, 2018.

TABLE 4.3
Economic Components of the Road Map to a Durable Peace

Economic Component	Short Term	Medium Term	Long Term
1. Facilitate a commercial trade corridor between the West Bank and Gaza	X		
2. Capitalize and support the Palestinian banking system	X		
3. Rebuild power, water, and roads as an emergency priority	X		
4. Create regional opportunities for Palestinian laborers		X	
5. Establish international linkages for Palestinian banks		X	
6. De-shekelize the Palestinian economy		X	
7. Support and develop effective economic governance		X	
8. Establish a mechanism for compensating resettling West Bank settlers		X	
9. Launch public-private financing facilities		X	
10. Establish conditions and begin development of the Gaza Marine gas fields		X	
11. Establish Palestinian freedom of movement within the West Bank and between the West Bank and Gaza		X	
12. Negotiate trade and economic agreements between the new Palestinian state and the EU, the United States, and the UK			X
13. Build and open a Palestinian international airport and seaport			X
14. Complete a West Bank–Gaza link			X

Economic Component 1: Facilitate a Commercial Trade Corridor Between the West Bank and Gaza

The near- and medium-term reconstruction requirements of Gaza will likely exceed the capacity and capability of existing transport modalities. In particular, it is unlikely that Israel will allow Egyptian-Palestinian trade to return to its pre-conflict status given the suspected role of Egyptian officials in facilitating the flow of material that allowed the October 7 attacks.¹¹¹

Establishing a Gaza–West Bank commercial corridor would provide a mechanism for meeting these reconstruction requirements and for establishing the economic connectivity between Gaza and the West Bank necessary for the viability of a Palestinian state. While the more comprehensive Gaza–West Bank transport infrastructure envisioned in previous diplomatic agreements (e.g., a tunnel with a high-speed railway for movement of people) would occur later, there are existing proposals that could be readily adapted to rapidly build a connecting roadway—such a roadway need only be 44 kilometers in length.¹¹² This link would allow the international security force (see Section A in this chapter) to provide security oversight of imported material while advancing needed economic connectivity.

Economic Component 2: Capitalize and Support the Palestinian Banking System

A functional private banking system is critical for restarting the local economy in a post-conflict setting.¹¹³ Historical evidence suggests that support for local private financing is a necessary complement to donor-financed

¹¹¹ Yaakov Lappin, “The Implications of Rafah’s Cross-Border Tunnels,” *Jewish News Syndicate*, 2024.

¹¹² Examples: (1) United States Agency for International Development, *AE Services for the Transportation Feasibility for Linking the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, March 2006, and (2) the 2016 Road and Transportation Master Plan proposed a national territorial corridor between Tarqumiyah near Hebron and Beit Hanoun in the northern portion of the strip (Systematica, “Road and Transportation Master Plan of West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2013–2016,” webpage, undated).

¹¹³ Tony Addison, Philippe Le Billon, and S. Mansoob Murshed, “Finance in Conflict and Reconstruction,” *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 13, No. 7, October 2001; Tony Addison, Alemayehu Geda, Philippe Le Billon, and S. Mansoob Murshed,

reconstruction efforts.¹¹⁴ Private financing provides a critical mechanism for investment in the new enterprises necessary to support sustained economic growth.¹¹⁵

In the early stages of the durable peace, capitalizing and ensuring effective oversight of Palestinian private banks will be critical for both effective post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza and growth of the private economy in the West Bank.¹¹⁶ Although the existing private banking system has proven itself to be resilient to a variety of political and economic shocks, the banks are not structured or sufficiently well-capitalized to support the major expansion of private investment necessary to drive economic activity.¹¹⁷

Economic Component 3: Rebuild Power, Water, and Roads as an Emergency Priority

The war in Gaza has shattered the infrastructure necessary to effectively deliver humanitarian assistance and restart the economy. Although there are a multitude of reconstruction requirements, Gaza's priorities should be focused in three domains: (1) reestablishing the power grid, (2) ensuring access to fresh water and the provision of sanitation, and (3) rebuilding a minimum viable road infrastructure.

Power: The damage to the Gazan power grid—with more than 60 percent of feeder lines destroyed as of March 2024¹¹⁸—has disrupted access to

“Reconstructing and Reforming the Financial System in Conflict and ‘Post-Conflict’ Economies,” *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2005.

¹¹⁴ John B. Taylor, “Reconstruction of Iraq’s Banking Sector,” press release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 10, 2003; Jordan Schwartz, Shelly Hahn, and Ian Bannon, *The Private Sector’s Role in the Provision of Infrastructure in Post-Conflict Countries*, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, August 2004.

¹¹⁵ Shatz et al., 2023.

¹¹⁶ Osama Hamed, *Government Borrowing and Liquidity and the Stability of the Palestinian Banking System*, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), November 2017.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, *2023 Investment Climate Statements: West Bank and Gaza*, undated-a.

¹¹⁸ World Bank, European Union, and United Nations, *Gaza Strip Interim Damage Assessment: Summary Note*, March 29, 2024, p. 15.

clean water across Gaza because its wells and desalination capabilities are both dependent on power.¹¹⁹ Restoring this power grid, which estimates suggest could reach 50 percent of prewar functionality within 50 days and 100 percent within 180 days, should be an immediate priority to ensure access to clean water.

Water and sanitation: Bombing and demolition appears to have wrecked particular havoc on water connections, with nearly 60 percent of “water infrastructure and assets . . . destroyed or partially damaged” as of March 2024.¹²⁰ The challenge for the sector’s restoration is immense—by March 2024, Gazans were receiving only 3–7 liters per capita daily; an estimated 50–100 liters is necessary to meet basic health requirements.¹²¹

Roads within Gaza: The Gazan road infrastructure has been severely impacted: 92 percent of primary roads across Gaza have been damaged or destroyed.¹²² As of March 2024, the World Bank estimated \$358 million in damages to the transportation sector.¹²³ Debris clearance and removal from streets and intersections, along with the restoration of underground water and wastewater infrastructure before resurfacing, is a prerequisite to restoring the logistics for reconstruction. Furthermore, easing ongoing access restrictions and opening closed crossings will be needed for the continuous importation and movement of humanitarian aid.

Economic Component 4: Create Regional Opportunities for Palestinian Laborers

Palestinian employment opportunities in Israel have been a core component of the Palestinian economy for decades. Guaranteeing Palestinian access to the Israeli labor market was a key component of the Paris Protocol, as more

¹¹⁹ UNOCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel—Reported Impact | Day 180,” infographic, April 3, 2024b; Oxfam, *Treading Water: The Worsening Water Crisis and the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism*, Oxfam Briefing Paper, March 2017.

¹²⁰ World Bank, European Union, and United Nations, 2024, p. 15.

¹²¹ World Bank, European Union, and United Nations, 2024, p. 1.

¹²² World Bank, European Union, and United Nations, 2024, p. 15.

¹²³ World Bank, European Union, and United Nations, 2024.

than 40 percent of the Palestinian labor force was then employed in Israel.¹²⁴ Although the relative importance of employment opportunities in Israel has fallen since the 1990s, by one estimate more than 190,000 Palestinians were working in Israel or an Israeli settlement during fall 2023,¹²⁵ immediately before the Gaza war, accounting for an estimated 16 percent of total Palestinian income.¹²⁶ Although there will undoubtedly continue to be employment opportunities for Palestinians in Israel following the war, these opportunities will likely be fewer, still subject to the disruptive “closure system,”¹²⁷ and increasingly low-skilled.

Creating regional employment opportunities for Palestinian laborers—both low-skilled jobs like those previously offered by Israel and higher-skilled jobs—would create needed economic opportunities and, if managed effectively, would accelerate the integration of the new Palestinian state into the regional economy. Closures enacted by Israel as a result of the war in Gaza disrupted the employment of Palestinians who had been working in Israel or West Bank settlements, including approximately 150,000 West Bank Palestinians and nearly 20,000 Gazans (equivalent to 11 percent of the Palestinian labor force).¹²⁸ These estimates provide a sense of the number of workers that the region might be able to employ productively.

¹²⁴ Anthony et al., 2015, p. 20.

¹²⁵ This includes 147,000 West Bank Palestinians working in Israel, 25,000 West Bank Palestinians working in Israeli settlements, and 18,500 Gazan Palestinians working in Israel (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS): Labour Force Survey Results,” webpage, April 30, 2024; “Shortage of Palestinian Workers at Israeli Building Sites Leaves Hole on Both Sides,” *Times of Israel*, April 4, 2024).

¹²⁶ Waleed Habas and Ismat Quzmar, “The Future of Palestinian Employment in the Israeli Labour Market in Light of Political and Economic Realities,” Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), 2022.

¹²⁷ The “closure system” refers to the ability of Israel to place restrictions on Palestinian laborers working in Israel based on political or security developments (see Anthony et al., 2015, pp. 20–21).

¹²⁸ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024; “Shortage of Palestinian Workers at Israeli Building Sites Leaves Hole on Both Sides,” 2024.

Economic Component 5: Establish International Linkages for Palestinian Banks

Correspondent bank relationships—which “underpin international trade, remittances, and financing of humanitarian work”¹²⁹—are critical precursors to establishing a Palestinian economy that can interact directly with the world. Currently, the Palestinian banking system relies on Israeli¹³⁰—and, to a lesser extent, Jordanian—correspondent banks for international connectivity. This imposes direct economic costs on the Palestinian economy,¹³¹ and, as a consequence of restrictions imposed by the Bank of Israel and some Israeli correspondent banks, it hinders both the “liquidity management and . . . profitability of Palestinian banks” while increasing risks of money laundering and terrorism financing.¹³² These challenges are exacerbated by a lack of continuity in the Israeli correspondent banking relations with Palestinian banks.¹³³

Establishing direct correspondent banking relationships has long been a focus of the Palestinian Monetary Authority, often with international technical and other support.¹³⁴ Building on this analytic and technical work to begin establishing direct correspondent banking relationships would begin to lay the foundation for the direct finance linkages necessary to allow Palestinians to interact directly, economically, with the rest of the globe.

¹²⁹ World Bank, “Are Global Banks Cutting Off Customers in Developing and Emerging Economies?” May 1, 2018.

¹³⁰ The customs envelope created by the Paris Protocol established a system in which all international correspondent banking relationships were maintained by Israeli banks (International Monetary Fund, *West Bank and Gaza: Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*, August 26, 2016).

¹³¹ Anthony et al., 2015, p. 24.

¹³² Karen Coulibaly, *West Bank and Gaza: Selected Issues*, International Monetary Fund, September 16, 2022.

¹³³ World Bank, *Economic Developments in the Palestinian Territories*, November 24, 2020b; International Monetary Fund, *West Bank and Gaza: Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*, April 10, 2017.

¹³⁴ See, for example, Palestinian Monetary Authority, *Annual Report 2017*, September 2018; and World Bank, 2020b.

Economic Component 6: De-Shekelize the Palestinian Economy

Proposals for a Palestinian currency date to the very earliest years of the Oslo Accords. The Paris Protocol formalized the Israeli shekel as legal tender in the West Bank and Gaza,¹³⁵ which economists believed would facilitate the effective integration of the Israeli and Palestinian economies (which was the intent of the Paris Protocol).¹³⁶ However, at the time, some analysts—arguing about the benefits of an independent currency—believed that the denial of a Palestinian currency reflected an Israeli “desire to deny the Palestinians anything which could be considered ‘a symbol of national independence.’”¹³⁷

In 2018, the PA began planning to replace the Israeli shekel as part of broader disengagement plans from Israel.¹³⁸ Shortly after being sworn in, Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh announced in 2019, “We are not forced to remain dependent on the shekel.”¹³⁹

Even though an independent Palestinian currency may not be immediately desirable, and may in fact be risky,¹⁴⁰ immediate steps should be taken to de-shekelize the Palestinian economy and remove this policy lever that Israeli politicians have frequently used to punish the Palestinians.¹⁴¹ Analysis conducted during the Second Intifada suggests that a Palestinian

¹³⁵ Protocol on Economic Relations Between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO, signed in Paris, April 29, 1994 (Paris Protocol).

¹³⁶ A. Arnon and A. Spivak, “Sovereignty and Economic Development: The Case of Israel and Palestine,” *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 111, No. 472, June 2001.

¹³⁷ Adel Al-Zagha, “A Monetary Alternative for the Palestinian Economy: A Palestinian Currency,” *Middle East Forum*, March 1996.

¹³⁸ Khaled Abu Toameh, “PA to Form Plan for Extensive ‘Disengagement’ from Israel,” *Times of Israel*, February 6, 2018.

¹³⁹ Shatha Hammad, “A Palestinian Pound? ‘Impossible’ Without Full Independence, Say Economists,” *Middle East Eye*, July 8, 2019.

¹⁴⁰ Hammad, 2019.

¹⁴¹ Mohammed Samhour, “Decoding the Current Palestinian Financial Crisis,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019.

currency pegged to the euro may be the best alternative,¹⁴² although dollarization has also been proposed in the interests of price and economic stability.¹⁴³ In either case, a currency board that limits the monetary policy authority of the Palestinian state will likely be a necessary near-term requirement.

Economic Component 7: Support and Develop Effective Economic Governance

As the Palestinian economy emerges from the war in Gaza and the customs envelope that has inhibited the West Bank's economic development, it will have to manage two core problems. The first is low economic productivity, a challenge that has plagued the Palestinian private sector for decades and which history suggests may be a more severe economic problem than the physical damage from the war.¹⁴⁴

The second is managing a rapid expansion of private investment: Previous research suggests that total new investment needs during the first decade could total \$80 billion. This would represent a massive increase in investment. Average annual foreign direct investment in the Palestinian economy averaged just \$200 million during 2013–2022,¹⁴⁵ so annual investment would have to increase by approximately 40-fold to achieve this flow.¹⁴⁶

In the wake of World War II, external technical assistance was critical in helping Western European nations manage analogous challenges as they rebuilt infrastructure and revitalized their economies. This included

¹⁴² David Cobham, "Alternative Currency Arrangements for Palestine," University of St. Andrews, revised December 2003.

¹⁴³ Alan Karnovitz, Sonia Moldovan, and R. D. Menelaws, "An Assessment of Alternative Monetary Regimes for a Future Palestinian State: Dollarization Versus a National Currency," United States Agency for International Development, May 2010.

¹⁴⁴ Michela Giorcelli, "Closing the Productivity Gap with the US: Causes and Consequences of the European Recovery Program," *Economic History*, 2019, p. 125.

¹⁴⁵ World Bank, "World Development Indicators: Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, Current US\$)," 2024.

¹⁴⁶ The \$80 billion total in new investment implies annual investment of \$8 billion, which is 40 times larger than the \$200 million average over the past decade.

the Marshall Plan's Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), which managed the distribution of U.S. assistance among post-World War II European nations.¹⁴⁷ Core to the ECA was a network of offices in each European capital—staffed by well-connected individuals with corporate backgrounds—who coordinated assistance and related policy initiatives among the nations.¹⁴⁸ Alongside the ECA was the Technical Assistance and Productivity Program, which focused on improving European management practices but also provided financing for purchasing technologically advanced equipment.¹⁴⁹

Economic Component 8: Establish a Mechanism for Compensating Resettling West Bank Settlers

The establishment of a second state is likely to require relocating 100,000–200,000 Israeli settlers who are currently living in communities in the West Bank that are east of the security barrier.¹⁵⁰ Available data suggest that 25–50 percent of settlers in settlements to the east of the security barrier would be willing to relocate if provided compensation.¹⁵¹ The remainder would likely need to be forcibly evicted, as was the case for the one-third of Israeli settlers in Gaza who were unwilling to voluntarily relocate.

During 2004–2005, an estimated two-thirds of Israeli settlers living in Gaza voluntarily relocated to Israel in exchange for a compensation pack-

¹⁴⁷ United States Government Manual, “Economic Cooperation Administration,” 1948.

¹⁴⁸ Michael J. Hogan, *Blueprint for Recovery*, U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany, The Marshall Plan Investment in Peace—50th Anniversary, 1997.

¹⁴⁹ James M. Silberman, Charles Weiss, and Mark Dutz, “Marshall Plan Productivity Assistance: A Unique Program of Mass Technology Transfer and a Precedent for the Former Soviet Union,” *Technology in Society*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1996; Giorcelli, 2019, p. 125.

¹⁵⁰ The lower-bound estimate is from Gabrielle Rifkind, *Pariahs to Pioneers*, Oxford Research Group, May 2010. The upper-bound estimate is attributed to Daniel Seidemann in Patrick Wintour, “Two-State Solution Would Mean Relocating 200,000 Settlers, Says Israeli Lawyer Who Has David Cameron’s Ear,” *The Guardian*, December 17, 2023.

¹⁵¹ Jonathan Ferziger, “Removing West Bank Settlers Would Cost \$10 Billion: Group,” Bloomberg, March 18, 2014; Scott Wilson, “Some West Bank Settlers Looking for a Way Out,” NBC News, August 11, 2005.

age that ultimately cost approximately \$300,000 per settler.¹⁵² For decades, the Israeli government has examined the possibility of offering comparable compensation packages to West Bank settlers who are willing to relocate from settlements east of the security barrier.¹⁵³ In fact, a draft bill from 2005 would have required the Israeli government to “buy settlers’ homes if a peace agreement [was] reached with the Palestinians.”¹⁵⁴ Establishing such a mechanism will prove critical to enabling the successful and peaceful relocation of settlers.

Economic Component 9: Launch Public-Private Financing Facilities

Access to financing—for productive economic enterprises and other activities—is widely recognized as a critical ingredient in facilitating sustained economic growth in a Palestinian state.¹⁵⁵ In particular, this financing can support the private-sector-led growth necessary for medium- to long-term sustained economic growth.

The Enterprise Funds—established by the U.S. Agency for International Development at the end of the Cold War to support the development of market-based economies of formerly Soviet bloc countries—offer an example of the potential benefits, and challenges, of such an approach.¹⁵⁶ The Funds deployed \$1.2 billion in U.S. government financing across 19 countries via a public-private modality that allowed the Funds to “make direct

¹⁵² The estimate of two-thirds is from “Withdraw to Move Forward,” editorial, *Denver Post*, August 10, 2005. The cost per settler is from Anthony et al., 2015, p. 185.

¹⁵³ Linda Gradstein, “Israel Drafts Relocation Plan for Some Settlers,” NPR, December 8, 2005; Jonathan Lis, “Israel Mulling Compensation for West Bank Settlers Willing to Move,” *Haaretz*, February 20, 2014.

¹⁵⁴ Wilson, 2005.

¹⁵⁵ Office of the Quartet, “The Initiative for the Palestinian Economy: An Overview,” webpage, undated-b.

¹⁵⁶ For a discussion of the challenges, see Jess Ford and A. H. Huntington, III, *Enterprise Funds’ Contributions to Private Sector Development Vary*, U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1999; and Steve Eastham, David Cowles, and Richard Johnson, *The Enterprise Funds in Europe and Eurasia: Successes and Lessons Learned*, U.S. Agency for International Development, September 12, 2013.

equity investments and loans to a wide range of private enterprises” while also introducing new financial products, including “home mortgage lending, mortgage securitization, credit cards, mezzanine financing, equipment leasing, and investment banking.”¹⁵⁷ Critically, the Funds are also credited as triggering a “demonstration effect” that resulted in an additional \$6.9 billion in private capital “based on the convincing value proposition of the Funds.”¹⁵⁸

Economic Component 10: Establish Conditions and Begin Development of the Gaza Marine Gas Fields

The Gaza Marine gas fields, once developed, would meet Gazan energy needs and provide export revenues equivalent to 1 percent of Gaza’s prewar GDP for 20 years.¹⁵⁹ Although the fields were first discovered in 1999, development was initially delayed by an Israeli demand that the “gas should come ashore on its territory” and that surplus gas not used by the Palestinians should be sold to Israel “at below market price.”¹⁶⁰ Security concerns following Hamas’s electoral victory in 2007 contributed to further delays.¹⁶¹

International support—particularly from the United States—will likely be necessary to set the conditions necessary to begin development of Gaza Marine, as evidenced by the prominent role of the United States in a comparable process between Israel and Lebanon.¹⁶² On the eve of the Gaza war, Israel provided provisional support for the development of Gaza Marine

¹⁵⁷ Eastham, Cowles, and Johnson, 2013, p. 6.

¹⁵⁸ Eastham, Cowles, and Johnson, 2013, pp. 5–6.

¹⁵⁹ “Gaslighting Gaza: Israel’s Deceptive Extraction Approval Prioritizes Economics over Politics,” *The Cradle*, August 1, 2023; the source for generating \$2.7 billion in revenue across 20 years is Mona Sukkarieh, “Between Tales and Facts: The Long Saga of Gaza Marine,” Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs, February 2024.

¹⁶⁰ Quotes are from Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, “Israel’s War for Gaza’s Gas,” *Le Monde diplomatique*, November 28, 2012. See also Sukkarieh, 2024.

¹⁶¹ Ahmed, 2012.

¹⁶² Robert Barron, Mona Yacoubian, and Hesham Youssef, “Could the Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Deal Be a Game-Changer?” United States Institute of Peace, October 13, 2022.

by Egypt's state-owned gas company.¹⁶³ This Egyptian-Palestinian development approach may provide the most advantageous path for developing Gaza Marine, although international investment and oversight may also be required to accelerate effective development of the gas fields.

Economic Component 11: Establish Palestinian Freedom of Movement Within the West Bank and Between the West Bank and Gaza

Israeli-imposed restrictions limit the movement of Palestinians (1) within the West Bank and (2) between the West Bank and Gaza. Within the West Bank, movement between major population centers is inhibited by dense urban development, complex topography, and security checkpoints, dramatically increasing commute times and reducing the efficacy of emergency services. Furthermore, prohibited roads and those under Israeli control in Area C prevent Palestinians from rehabilitating or improving associated utilities without a permit.¹⁶⁴ Movement between the West Bank and Gaza requires crossing Israel, giving Israel de facto authority over the extent of internal Palestinian connectivity, impacting not only daily life but extended family and community ties.¹⁶⁵

Within the West Bank, there have long been capacity limits to north-south traffic, with numerous business encroachments and other bottlenecks

¹⁶³ Egypt, Israel, and the PA have reached an agreement to develop Gaza's offshore gas field, marking a rare collaboration aimed at harnessing energy resources to boost the region's economy (Nayera Yasser and Michael Georgy, "Egypt Is Set to Take Part in Developing Gaza's Offshore Gas Field: Officials," Reuters, October 12, 2022; Shereif Barakat, "Israel Joins Egypt and Palestine in Rare Partnership to Develop Gaza Gas Field," *Egyptian Streets*, June 19, 2023).

¹⁶⁴ There are early indications that the Netzarim Corridor could similarly be under Israeli control and used to split the internal movements of Gaza. For a discussion, see Loveday Morris, Evan Hill, Samuel Granados, and Hazem Balousha, "What Israel's Strategic Corridor in Gaza Reveals About Its Postwar Plans," *Washington Post*, May 17, 2024.

¹⁶⁵ Applied Research Institute—Jerusalem, "The Instigation of Apartheid Roads Era: Israel Blocks Palestinian Movement Inside West Bank Governorates," October 17, 2023; Applied Research Institute—Jerusalem, *Assessing the Impacts of Israeli Movement Restrictions on the Mobility of People and Goods in the West Bank*, 2019.

on Road 60 and other local streets. Furthermore, the fragmented urban development and decentralized nature of planning means that opportunity for public transportation in the existing fabric is tenuous.

Instead, in line with the 2016 National Road and Transportation Master Plan, connectivity and mobility among the communities of the unified Palestinian state could be ensured through a phased approach relying on a new (toll) road and a light and/or heavy rail network to the east, first connecting Ramallah–al Bireh and Nablus, followed by extensions north and south to Jenin and Hebron, respectively. A third phase would connect Jericho and the West Bank International Airport and would build a link from the West Bank to Gaza, likely along the proposed road right of way. Each new rail station—constructed at a distance from the historic core of each population center—would serve as the hub for a local bus line that connects the station to the population center; as a distribution node for electricity, water, and telecommunication utilities; and as a focal point for new transit-oriented residential and commercial activity.¹⁶⁶

The notion of “safe passage” for Palestinians between Gaza and Jericho has been a key component of diplomatic discussions since Oslo. With a proposed network of Palestinian highway and rail corridors between main cities, not only will there need to be a special emphasis on improving efficiency and capacity at border crossings, but the new Palestinian connections also must not impinge on freedom of movement between Israeli towns, such as Kiryat Gat and Sderot, or other communities to be rebuilt in the Western Negev.¹⁶⁷ This may require the development of new concepts—for example, the Trans Israel Highway and Highway 34 alignments include railway connections that would require either bridges or tunnels to cross. In other places, there may be pinch points with existing infrastructure (such as Highway 35 between Beit Guvrin and Tarqumiyah) or available land (such as between Erez and Beit Hanoun). With careful consideration, the linkage may eventually be an economic boon for both Israel and Palestine with

¹⁶⁶ This vision of internal connectivity is based on Doug Suisman, Steven N. Simon, Glenn E. Robinson, C. Ross Anthony, and Michael Schoenbaum, *The Arc: A Formal Structure for a Palestinian State*, RAND Corporation, MG-327-2-GG, 2005.

¹⁶⁷ Government of Israel, “Prime Minister’s Office—Tekuma Authority Joint Announcement,” press release, April 17, 2024.

the development of trade and greater investment stability in industrial and agricultural facilities.

Economic Component 12: Negotiate Trade and Economic Agreements Between the New Palestinian State and the EU, the United States, and the UK

Beginning in 1967, the West Bank and Gaza were integrated into an “involuntary, one-side, impure, customs union” with Israel that dramatically restricted the ability of the Palestinians to trade with the world.¹⁶⁸ The Paris Protocol—rather than establishing an agreement that would give the Palestinians control over their international borders, as was preferred by the Palestinian negotiators—formalized this customs union. At the time, Israeli negotiators had threatened to “discontinue Palestinian entrance to the Israeli labor market” if any outcome other than the customs union was achieved.¹⁶⁹ This “uneven” customs union, while offering the Palestinians the benefit of preferential access to the Israeli market, has “severely hampered” the development of the Palestinian economy.¹⁷⁰

Ensuring that the new Palestinian state has direct access to international markets, which will provide it access to needed imports and allow the development of export-oriented sectors, will be critical for development of a functional economy. This will require ensuring that the Palestinian state has control over its international borders, which may require replacing the existing customs union with Israel with a preferential trade agreement, and establishing free trade agreements with the EU, the UK, and the United States.¹⁷¹ Security oversight for Palestinian imports (e.g., dual-use materi-

¹⁶⁸ The quote is from Arie Arnon, Israel Luski, Avia Spivak, and Jimmy Weinblatt, *The Palestinian Economy: Between Imposed Integration and Voluntary Separation*, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia (Book 60), Brill Academic Publishers, 1997, p. 88. See Anthony et al., 2015, pp. 37–39, for a detailed literature review.

¹⁶⁹ Arie Arnon, “Israeli Policy Towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Economic Dimension, 1967–2007,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 4, 2007, pp. 584–585.

¹⁷⁰ The analysis and quoted text are from World Bank, *Unlocking the Trade Potential of the Palestinian Economy*, 2017.

¹⁷¹ This vision of internal connectivity for goods is based on White House, *Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People*, January

als) should be monitored by a U.S.-EU task force led by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to provide assurance to the Israelis.

Economic Component 13: Build and Open a Palestinian International Airport and Seaport

International connectivity is central to national economic vitality in the modern age, with the unimpeded movement of goods and people one of the most important ingredients in economic growth. Currently, all Palestinian exports must move by road and pass through an Israeli “commercial crossing” before being shipped internationally, and all imported goods must do the same.¹⁷² This dramatically increases trade costs and “severely hampers” the competitiveness of the Palestinian economy.¹⁷³ In addition to impeding the transport of goods, travel into the West Bank by individuals holding any type of foreign passport—including Palestinians with dual nationality—for any activity other than tourism is restricted by Israel,¹⁷⁴ which imposes significant economic costs on Palestinians.¹⁷⁵

Ensuring that the new Palestinian state has direct and unimpeded access to both an airport and a seaport is critical to the future competitiveness of the Palestinian economy. This is not a new idea; this emphasis on international connectivity was also a feature of the Oslo Accords. But the challenge has always been one of implementation.

In the near term, airport access can be facilitated by establishing a free-trade zone with Jordan that would provide the Palestinians access to an airport for unimpeded export of their goods; seaport access could be expanded through directed international efforts to provide oversight and improve efficiency at ports at Aqaba, Haifa, and Ashdod.¹⁷⁶ However, in the

2020, pp. 12–14, 26–27.

¹⁷² World Bank, 2017, pp. 35–46.

¹⁷³ World Bank, 2017, pp. 35–46.

¹⁷⁴ Human Rights Watch, “West Bank: New Entry Rules Further Isolate Palestinians,” webpage, January 23, 2023.

¹⁷⁵ See Anthony et al., 2015, pp. 41–42, for a discussion.

¹⁷⁶ White House, 2020, pp. 12–14, 26–27.

medium and longer term, the international community will need to facilitate the construction, opening, and management of a Palestinian airport and seaport. In both the near and longer term, the MSF will need to assume responsibility for border security, instituting and enforcing procedures that guarantee security while facilitating the free flow of goods and people.¹⁷⁷

Economic Component 14: Complete a West Bank–Gaza Link

Connectivity and mobility between the communities is critical to the economic viability of a Palestinian state, allowing Palestinians to interact with one another and ensuring all Palestinian enterprises equal access to the Palestinian and global economies. One approach for ensuring this connectivity is an extensive public transit network, ideally anchored by an interurban rail line with stops near the eight major population centers in the West Bank and three stops in Gaza. This network would facilitate rapid movement of goods and people throughout the country.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Dayton et al., 2024, pp. 50–51.

¹⁷⁸ This vision of internal connectivity is based on Suisman et al., 2005.

Pathway D: Rebuilding Gaza's Physical and Social Infrastructure

In addition to the security, broad-based governance, and economic strategies outlined above, achieving a durable peace will require meeting urgent humanitarian needs and rebuilding Gaza's social and physical infrastructure. Experts have deemed the physical damage to the Gaza strip unprecedented for a conflict of this length.¹⁷⁹ Gaza's social infrastructure is severely damaged as well. Over 90 percent of Gaza's population has been displaced from their homes, many multiple times.¹⁸⁰ Housing, utilities (such as energy, water, and communication), and other infrastructure have suffered high levels of damage and destruction, as have essential services, particularly health care and education.¹⁸¹

A durable peace will require sound approaches to meeting humanitarian needs, the addressing of longer-term concerns in these specific sectors, well-coordinated international assistance programs, local engagement, and a sophisticated and phased plan to guide rebuilding. Ad hoc solutions accounting only for short-term needs while neglecting longer-term planning would likely undermine stability over time and aggravate postwar tensions. Furthermore, it is difficult to envision significant investment in the longer-term rebuilding of Gaza, beyond meeting humanitarian needs, without resolution to the security, governance, and economic challenges described in other sections.

As in previous sections, our discussion identifies priorities for short-, medium-, and longer-term actions to ensure that physical and social structures are rebuilt and contribute to stability and a durable peace. Successfully rebuilding a well-functioning society and achieving a durable peace will require careful and detailed spatial planning for integrating the reconstruction of physical and social infrastructure into sustainable communities.

¹⁷⁹ Julia Frankel, "Israel's Military Campaign in Gaza Is Among the Most Destructive in History, Experts Say," Associated Press, December 21, 2023.

¹⁸⁰ Ibrahim Dahman, Tim Lister, and Eugenia Yosef, "Almost Entire Population in Gaza Now Displaced Amid Fresh Israeli Offensive," CNN, July 6, 2024.

¹⁸¹ World Bank, European Union, and United Nations, 2024.

Background

Prior to the war, Gaza was a lively yet socioeconomically fragile enclave of 140 square miles—smaller than many European, U.S., and global cities—inhabited by 2.23 million people.¹⁸² It faced multiple development challenges: Electricity was available for only half of the day, poverty rates exceeded 80 percent, over 45 percent of the working-age population and more than half of young graduates were unemployed, and income per capita was half that in the West Bank.¹⁸³ The population was very young—with children under the age of 18 making up nearly half of Gaza’s population—but well educated; nearly all children ages 6–15 were enrolled in basic education, and 85 percent of older girls and 66 percent of older boys were enrolled in high school.¹⁸⁴ Gaza’s health care system met basic health care needs despite an insufficient health workforce, insufficient medical supplies and medicines, and reliance on international assistance. The system was also facing a slow rebuilding process after damages inflicted to housing and other structures after the 2014 and 2021 wars with Israel.¹⁸⁵

The war has resulted in massive trauma to Gaza’s civilian population: deaths and injuries, a degraded health care system, food insecurity and poverty, halted education and harm to children, displacement and destruction of housing, utility destruction, and pervasive rubble and explosive hazards. Gaza’s infrastructure damage from the war is extensive and will take many years to repair and rebuild. Northern Gaza has suffered the most, but damage permeates the entire Gaza strip.

An estimated 90 percent—approximately 1.9 million—of all Gazans were displaced from their homes during the first nine months of the war,¹⁸⁶ with the majority in camps made up of hastily erected tents without proper

¹⁸² United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Developments in the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, September 11, 2023.

¹⁸³ Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Socio-Economic Indicators on the Impact of the Israeli Occupation on Gaza Strip, 2023,” press release, October 16, 2023a.

¹⁸⁴ Linah Mohammad, “Children Make Up Nearly Half of Gaza’s Population. Here’s What It Means for the War,” NPR, October 19, 2023.

¹⁸⁵ United Nations Development Programme, *Gaza War: Expected Socioeconomic Impacts on the State of Palestine*, May 2024.

¹⁸⁶ UNOCHA, “Reported Impact Snapshot | Gaza Strip,” infographic, July 24, 2024d.

access to potable water, health care, a networked sewage system, or solid waste management.¹⁸⁷ Damage to housing accounted for over 70 percent of the total damage to infrastructure,¹⁸⁸ with nearly 20 percent of housing in Gaza destroyed completely and nearly 75 percent in total damaged in some way.¹⁸⁹

Food insecurity is widespread,¹⁹⁰ with almost the entire population experiencing acute food insecurity at crisis level or higher and potentially half a million people or more at a level classified as “catastrophic.”¹⁹¹ Economic activity has also slowed to a crawl, with two-thirds of total employment lost, further impoverishing households.¹⁹²

All formal education ceased in November 2023—disrupting the education of 610,000 K-12 children and 87,000 college students—and the school infrastructure has been badly damaged; more than 70 percent of schools require full reconstruction or major rehabilitation, and all 12 universities were either destroyed or damaged.¹⁹³ There is also developmental damage to children from trauma, with more than 1 million children in need of mental health and psychosocial support.¹⁹⁴ These challenges are compounded by

¹⁸⁷ Wafaa Shurafa and Julia Frankel, “In the Searing Heat of the Gaza Summer, Palestinians Are Surrounded by Sewage and Garbage,” Associated Press, June 27, 2024.

¹⁸⁸ UNRWA, *UNRWA Situation Report #133 on the Situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Including East Jerusalem*, September 3, 2024.

¹⁸⁹ Our estimates are based on total damages from Anera and data from the United Nations Human Settlements Programme indicating a total of approximately 400,000 housing units in Gaza before the war (Anera, “Adequate Housing Is Under Attack in Gaza,” April 18, 2024; United Nations Human Settlements Programme, *Preliminary Report on the Status of the Development of the Efforts to Reconstruct the Human Settlements in the Gaza Strip*, April 2, 2024).

¹⁹⁰ Jeremy Konyndyk and Jesse Marks, *Untangling the Reality of Famine in Gaza*, Refugees International, September 2024.

¹⁹¹ UN, “New Famine Alert for Gaza Where Families Go Days Without Food,” June 27, 2024c.

¹⁹² International Labour Organization, “Palestinian Unemployment Rate Set to Soar to 57 Per Cent During First Quarter of 2024,” March 18, 2024.

¹⁹³ UNOCHA, 2024d.

¹⁹⁴ UNOCHA, 2024d.

nutritional deficits from acute food insecurity, which may cause long-term damage to the cognitive development of Gazan children.¹⁹⁵

Almost the entire health system will need to be repaired or rebuilt. That includes infrastructure, equipment, the workforce, availability of medicines, dental care, and primary care. Of particular importance will be dealing with the massive trauma that has been experienced by almost all Palestinians in Gaza and providing them with necessary mental health services. Once the fighting stops, the health challenges faced in the immediate term, medium term, and long term will be immense and challenging.

Table 4.4 summarizes the key physical and social components of the road map to a durable peace. These steps assume security and functioning governance, as described earlier in this report.

Physical and Social Component 1: Enable Provision of Immediate Shelter, Food, Water, Education, Health Care, Power, and Other Urgent Needs

The first order is addressing immediate humanitarian needs. UNOCHA has established a Gaza response coordination structure with “clusters” focused on protection; water, sanitation, and hygiene; nutrition; emergency telecommunications; education; health; food security; shelter; logistics; cash; humanitarian access; and advocacy and communications.¹⁹⁶ UNRWA serves many roles, including the distribution of assistance. Aid agencies have vast experience and expertise in implementing humanitarian responses, and our recommendation here involves supporting them in their work and facilitating distribution by removing barriers.

Throughout the war, multiple barriers have prevented sufficient delivery of humanitarian assistance: lengthy Israeli inspections on aid trucks, limits on numbers of aid trucks, airstrikes, limited entry points, blocks by Israeli

¹⁹⁵ UN, “Gaza: Children Are Starving Amid Persistent Aid Access Obstacles, Warn UN Agencies,” May 31, 2024b; Ruby Mellen, Artur Galocha, Lauren Weber, David Ovalle, and Hajar Harb, “Gaza Is Going Hungry. Its Children Could Face a Lifetime of Harm,” *Washington Post*, April 4, 2024.

¹⁹⁶ UNOCHA, “Coordination Structure,” webpage, undated.

TABLE 4.4

Physical and Social Components of the Road Map to a Durable Peace

Physical and Social Component	Sector	Short Term	Medium Term	Long Term
1. Enable provision of immediate shelter, food, water, education, health care, power, and other urgent needs	All	X		
2. Conduct a detailed damage assessment, create a recovery plan, and establish clear governance and authorities for the social sectors	Planning	X	X	
3. Develop an efficient approach to importing construction materials while addressing Israel's dual-use concerns	Planning	X	X	
4. Mitigate rubble and unexploded ordnance	All	X	X	
5. Provide shelter and rebuild communities through incremental urbanism	Housing	X	X	X
6. Implement a health care reconstruction plan	Health		X	X
7. Establish community mental health services	Health		X	X
8. Rebuild and reform the education system	Education		X	X
9. Transition to longer-term development and prosperity	All			X

protestors, and lawlessness within Gaza.¹⁹⁷ A September 2024 joint press release from 15 aid organizations described shortages of materials because of Israeli restrictions on the entry of food, medicine and medical supplies,

¹⁹⁷ Nadeen Ebrahim, "Why Only a Trickle of Aid Is Getting into Gaza," CNN, February 11, 2024; Matthew Miller, "Sanctioning Israeli Group for Disrupting and Destroying Humanitarian Aid to Civilians," press release, U.S. Department of State, June 14, 2024b.

fuel, and tents. For example, despite the high levels of displacement, tents for only 25,000 were admitted from May through September 2024.¹⁹⁸

A key step is developing improved agreements, processes, and security for the logistics of humanitarian assistance in Gaza through coordination among the United States, the IDF, multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations in charge of humanitarian aid provision. A broad list of items required for humanitarian shelter and other purposes are categorized as dual use by Israel and therefore prohibited.¹⁹⁹ Adequate provision of humanitarian assistance requires improved processes for enabling the entry of important items needed by Gazans; the United States should work with the government of Israel to develop expedited processes for admitting needed humanitarian supplies into Gaza.

We highlight a few of the most urgent needs.

Food, water, and sanitation: Providing sufficient nutritious food to IDPs, many of whom have lacked access to adequate food for months, is essential. Distribution sites across Gaza must be safe, secure, and readily accessible—for example, through centralized kitchens operated by UNRWA and World Central Kitchen.²⁰⁰ Safe drinking water must be provided, along with emergency latrines, showers, drainage strategies, disinfection materials, and hygiene kits, to prevent further spread of disease.²⁰¹

Communications: Coordinating aid requires special efforts, given the near-total destruction of existing communication infrastructure. Temporary measures, such as reliable very high frequency repeaters²⁰² and micro-

¹⁹⁸ Norwegian Refugee Council, “Israel’s Siege Now Blocks 83% of Food Aid Reaching Gaza, New Data Reveals,” press release, September 16, 2024.

¹⁹⁹ Transitional Shelter Assistance—Technical Working Group-Gaza, *1st Draft Gaza Shelter Response—Technical Guidance (Oct 2023 Escalation)*, Catholic Relief Services, Shelter Cluster, Norwegian Refugee Council, International Organization for Migration, Save the Children, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, We World, Palestine Housing Council, and CARE, March 2024.

²⁰⁰ Bernd Debusmann Jr., “What Is World Central Kitchen—the Non-Profit Group Struck in Gaza?” BBC News, April 2, 2024.

²⁰¹ UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Needs and Response Update | 19–25 March 2024,” March 29, 2024a.

²⁰² UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Needs and Response Update | 26 March–01 April 2024,” April 5, 2024c.

wave backup systems to Egypt,²⁰³ can provide the initial backbone, supplemented with restored mobile systems. Eventually, higher-bandwidth lines to Israel should be restored.

Energy: Restoration of energy is key to all other aid distribution and is particularly key for health care. Solar panels, batteries, generators, and fuel can help establish power to homes and businesses; microgrids can service community hubs until electrical trunk cables can be reconnected to major infrastructure and the distribution system can be rebuilt.

Health care: Providing immediate emergency services for those wounded in the war and meeting the basic public health needs of Gaza are paramount. Public health approaches have a greater long-term effect on the level of health of a society than curative medicine. In this context, this means providing potable water, sanitation, vaccination for children, and basic maternal childcare. Agencies providing services should make a special effort to find and utilize Palestinian health workers, nurses, and doctors to assist in establishing a functioning system moving forward.

Education: Temporary school facilities should be established immediately with Gaza's teacher workforce (most of whom are themselves displaced) and should be organized for education provision. Land should be identified where tents, prefabricated buildings, or other facilities can be set up quickly, recognizing that it will be years before permanent school buildings will be available. All students have missed more than one year of school, face physical health and psychosocial problems, and are living in rudimentary conditions.

These extraordinary circumstances call for development of a special curriculum for K-12 schooling for the first year back. The curriculum should draw on materials from neighboring countries where school curricula do not include radicalized content, with inputs for school-based, group approaches for addressing the psychosocial needs of children during war. In the medium to longer term, Gaza's schools will need a new curriculum that is integrated with the curriculum in the West Bank, is based on high-quality standards, provides skills that meet the needs of the labor market, is politically neutral, and provides psychosocial support.

²⁰³ Adam Rasgon, "These Workers Are Risking Their Lives to Restore Gaza's Phone Network," *New York Times*, March 13, 2024.

Physical and Social Component 2: Conduct a Detailed Damage Assessment, Create a Recovery Plan, and Establish Clear Governance and Authorities for the Social Sectors

Precursor steps to reconstruction will be needed: a damage assessment, a recovery plan, and a reconstruction governance structure.

A rapid detailed damage assessment should be conducted that includes physical structures, roads, neighborhoods, utilities, and the status of the workforce of key sectors (health care, education, and construction trades, for example). All areas and all sectors (e.g., water, electricity, transportation systems, health, education, sanitation) should be incorporated. The UN, the World Bank, and the EU undertook an interim assessment in March 2024, but a more detailed assessment is necessary of which specific buildings are habitable, which could be habitable with short-term repairs, and which need extensive repairs or reconstruction. Damage assessments rely on an extensive workforce of engineers and other inspectors, and planning should begin now to enable these steps; not having the capacity to complete this step quickly has significantly delayed postdisaster reconstruction in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.²⁰⁴

A recovery and reconstruction plan will also be needed that comprehensively defines problems, draws on available data, considers stakeholder considerations, and lists and prioritizes needed actions. Large disaster recovery efforts in the United States have effectively drawn on comprehensive planning efforts.²⁰⁵

There will need to be a clear governance structure for recovery and reconstruction to meet the specific challenges within each social services

²⁰⁴ Shelly Culbertson, John Bordeaux, Italo A. Gutierrez, Andrew Lauand, Kristin J. Leuschner, Blas Nuñez-Neto, and Lisa Saum-Manning, *Building Back Locally: Supporting Puerto Rico's Municipalities in Post-Hurricane Reconstruction*, Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center operated by the RAND Corporation, RR-3041-DHS, 2020.

²⁰⁵ Central Office for Recovery, Reconstruction and Resiliency and Governor of Puerto Rico, *Transformation and Innovation in the Wake of Devastation: An Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico*, August 2018; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, *Approval of State of Texas Action Plans for Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Funds*, May 1, 2018.

sector. Rebuilding such sectors as education and health will require detailed planning; equally important will be clear governance and authority to oversee and implement the plan. This will require coordinating and adjudicating differences among a variety of actors, including donor governments, multilateral organizations, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, Palestinian civil society, the IDF, the PA, and the government of Israel. Earlier studies highlight the importance at the sector level of not only a clear plan but also clear governance with a single person with agreed-on authority, such as a UN official, to implement plans across various actors. The history of failed or slow reconstruction efforts, with multiple actors pursuing objectives that were uncoordinated, duplicative, or at cross-purposes, is long. For instance, in Kosovo after the war, the lack of a clear management structure and skills inhibited the implementation of a health care plan.²⁰⁶ Other lessons-learned analyses indicate that consultation with local communities should be rich and sustained.

Physical and Social Component 3: Develop an Efficient Approach to Importing Construction Materials While Addressing Israel's Dual-Use Concerns

A central aspect of reconstruction governance will be developing and implementing new rules related to the import of construction materials. Israel has long restricted construction and other materials deemed *dual use* into Gaza; dual-use items are viewed as having both civilian and military purposes. These items include concrete and timber, materials that continue to be restricted during the fighting.²⁰⁷ Previous dual-use approaches failed in two key ways: They failed to prevent construction materials from being used in the building of Hamas's tunnels and also failed in enabling civilian reconstruction in a timely way. Both goals are important to address.

²⁰⁶ Seth G. Jones, Lee H. Hilborne, C. Ross Anthony, Lois M. Davis, Federico Giroi, Cheryl Benard, Rachel M. Swanger, Anita Datar Garten, and Anga R. Timilsina, *Securing Health: Lessons from Nation-Building Missions*, RAND Corporation, MG-321-RC, 2006.

²⁰⁷ Transitional Shelter Assistance—Technical Working Group-Gaza, 2024.

The Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM) established after the 2014 Gaza War was intended to support the rebuilding of Gaza by creating mechanisms for communication among the PA, Israel, and the UN, with an emphasis on easing inspections and the flow of construction materials into Gaza. The glacially slow reconstruction of destroyed housing and other buildings has been attributed to the GRM's procedures for dual-use inspections.²⁰⁸ If construction materials are only allowed into Gaza at the same rate as after previous conflicts, according to UN estimates, it will take 80 years to rebuild the destroyed housing from the current war, not even including the damaged housing.²⁰⁹ An Oxfam report described the dual-use approaches as “collective punishment under the pretext of security.”²¹⁰ The Office of the Quartet concluded,

The dual-use lists and the procedures by which they are put into practice create numerous complications that delay import times and raise costs for Palestinian importers. A fundamental review of the dual-use goods lists and procedures is needed. Israel has legitimate security concerns, and Palestine has legitimate economic needs.²¹¹

Physical and Social Component 4: Mitigate Rubble and Unexploded Ordnance

As of July 2024, there were 40 million tons of rubble and debris in Gaza, laced with unexploded ordnance, other hazardous substances, and human remains.²¹² The UN estimates that rubble removal alone—a precursor to reconstruction—may take 15 years with a hundred trucks, could require massive landfill sites from 620 to 1,200 acres, and could cost \$500 million to

²⁰⁸ Sultan Barakat and Firas Masri, *Still in Ruins: Reviving the Stalled Reconstruction of Gaza*, Brookings Doha Center, August 2017.

²⁰⁹ Serra Utkum Ikiz, “Gaza Needs 80 Years to Restore All the Fully Destroyed Housing Units, UNDP States,” *Parametric Architecture*, May 9, 2024.

²¹⁰ Oxfam, *Right to Live Without a Blockade: The Impact of Israeli Access and Movement Restrictions on the Gaza Economy*, Oxfam Factsheet, June 2022.

²¹¹ Office of the Quartet, “Dual-Use Lists,” webpage, undated-a.

²¹² United Nations Environment Programme, *Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Gaza: Preliminary Assessment of Environmental Impacts*, 2024.

600 million.²¹³ Because at least 10 percent of ordnance fired by Israel does not explode, some 6,000–9,000 pieces of unexploded Israeli ordnance are interlaced with the debris.²¹⁴ Mitigating the unexploded ordnance as part of the debris clearance process will be a complex, dangerous, and costly endeavor. It will also require technological solutions and a specially trained and imported workforce working in coordination with the IDF, which will be unlikely to allow Gazans to undertake this work because of security concerns.²¹⁵

Physical and Social Component 5: Provide Shelter and Rebuild Communities Through Incremental Urbanism

Given the large scale of civilian displacement and housing destruction, there will need to be multiple approaches to shelter. These approaches will include the return of some to their former homes even if partially destroyed; moving in with family and friends with intact homes; and sheltering in public buildings, such as schools and houses of worship. Alongside these options, it is likely that tent camps and caravans will be needed for several hundred thousand people, both immediately and for several years.

Even though camps are built under the planning assumption that they are temporary, they often endure for decades and develop into restrictive urban slums that complicate the well-being of communities over time.²¹⁶ Given the levels of destruction across all sectors, tents or caravans will be a requirement. Gazans may be living in these locations for many years to come as rubble removal, explosive hazard mitigation, and reconstruction occur.

²¹³ UN, “Gaza at ‘Most Dangerous’ Stage Amid Huge Unexploded Weapons Risk, Warns Demining Expert,” April 30, 2024a; Jason Burke, “Clearing Gaza of Almost 40m Tonnes of War Rubble Will Take Years, Says UN,” *The Guardian*, July 15, 2024b.

²¹⁴ Andrew G. Clemmensen, “Explosive Remnants: Gaza’s Literal Ticking Bomb,” Washington Institute, August 12, 2024.

²¹⁵ Will Worley, “Unexploded Ordnance: The Growing Gaza Challenge That’s Not Going Away,” *The New Humanitarian*, June 10, 2024.

²¹⁶ Shelly Culbertson, Olga Oliker, Ben Baruch, and Ilana Blum, *Rethinking Coordination of Services to Refugees in Urban Areas: Managing the Crisis in Jordan and Lebanon*, RAND Corporation, RR-1485-DOS, 2016.


Therefore, we propose an approach to reconstruction of housing and communities called *incremental urbanism*.²¹⁷ Planning and developing this combination of restoration of housing and building of camps now should use thoughtful placement of different housing options, services, utilities, and community facilities to set urban patterns and corridors that will form the foundation for well-designed permanent neighborhoods in the future.

In this strategy, camps for IDPs and temporary support facilities are blended into existing partially damaged neighborhoods and located along main corridors and streets that existed before the war, both in urban and peripheral areas. If well-designed block patterns are set in the camps, as these evolve into urban environments, rational planning can enable these new places to meet community needs, creating a safe and stable waystation for eventual return home. At 25 miles long and four or five miles wide, Gaza's potential for "sprawl" is limited, but the rush to provide temporary accommodations and services makes the potential for poorly managed growth or "urban form" high. The goal is to structure communities within walking distances around centers of stability—*community hubs* that could be located near prior landmarks and on block grids to ensure continuity between what is urgently needed and what is envisioned in the long run. Community hubs can combine food provision, sanitation access, health care, mental health care, education, local engagement, and administration in central places so that people living in nearby homes and those living in tents or caravans can access essential services.

Figure 4.2 illustrates this concept. The top map shows a partially damaged and destroyed neighborhood in Gaza City, with the buildings outlined in red destroyed, the pink buildings moderately or heavily damaged, and the white buildings undamaged. Immediate steps would be land planning in the neighborhood; getting people back into intact homes (white buildings) and moderately damaged buildings, as appropriate; cordoning off destroyed or heavily damaged buildings (dark pink and red buildings); and identifying common space for tent camps and temporary community facilities (purple places), with active construction sites in yellow. In the short term, common spaces can be used for the community facilities and tent camps while repairs

²¹⁷ urbanNext, "Flexible Urbanisms: Towards Incremental Urbanism," webpage, undated.

FIGURE 4.2
Incremental Urbanism: From Camps to Communities



LEGEND

Building conditions

- Fully functional
- Moderate damage sustained
- Heavy damage sustained
- Demolished

Program

- Temporary
- New construction

Land uses

- Inaccessible – Rubble/Unexploded ordinance
- Planned permanent construction
- Planned temporary construction
- Planned civic hub
- Park / Inner courtyard
- Public passage/square
- Central civic space

Infrastructure

- Water / Sewage lines
- Main energy lines
- Planned main roads
- Planned secondary roads

SOURCES: Google Earth (for aerial image), OpenStreetMap (for street and building geometry), Airbus and United Nations Satellite Centre (for damage assessment). Map and image production by ORG Permanent Modernity.

and construction occur in the surrounding areas. In the medium and long terms, buildings are built, with residents moving out of the tent camps.

The underlying new community for people in transition is a place of privacy, security, and shelter for families. Gender-sensitive hygiene, a place of worship, a place for children to recover through play and school, and basic health care, including mental health services, are available. Here people's needs can be met, aid can be delivered, and the community can gather.

Physical and Social Component 6: Implement a Health Care Reconstruction Plan

A detailed ten-year health reconstruction plan should be developed with local community engagement, including clear delegation of authorities to oversee, manage, and implement the plan. Developing the plan should be a coordinated effort between the PA, nongovernmental organizations, the private health care sector, and multilateral organizations. The UN, the PA, and nonprofits on the ground should provide immediate primary and tertiary care for the population within the boundaries and management oversight established in the master plan. Coordinating with Israeli IDF and civilian officials will be necessary to facilitate implementation and in the short run to ensure delivery of needed construction supplies, medicines, and equipment.

Where possible and consistent with the new plan and people's needs, existing health facilities (including clinics, hospitals, and labs) could be repaired or rebuilt while construction of new facilities begins. Priority should be given to maternal childcare services. Because health facilities have special construction needs and take time to build and open, this will take years to complete.

As soon as possible, the health care network in Gaza should be reintegrated with the network in the West Bank. The health workforce, an interconnected primary care network, and ancillary medical services (such as clinical laboratories) must also be rebuilt. Long-term workforce needs should be assessed, and programs should be established to train and educate needed health providers. Establishing telemedicine capability could facilitate providing care.

In health, the long-term goal should be to establish a fully functioning, self-sustaining health and health care system that serves the community's physical and mental health needs. But rebuilding Gaza's health care system and upgrading access to acceptable regional standards similar to those in the West Bank will be an immense and expensive challenge. The Arab Hospitals Group, which manages hospitals in the West Bank and Gaza, estimated that its costs are approximately \$250,000 per fully equipped bed to build a hospital in the West Bank and Gaza, with variations for hospital type.²¹⁸

The UN estimated damage to the health sector at \$553 million. This estimate was done before the fighting at Al Shifa hospital. This estimate should be viewed as low: Replacing Al Shifa alone will likely cost over \$200 million; increasing the number of beds per capita to the level of Israel, using the Arab Hospitals Group's estimate of \$250,000 per bed, would drive the total needed to well over \$1 billion.

Hospital reconstruction is only one of the hurdles to reestablishing a functioning health care system. Physical and mental health facilities are core components of the incremental urbanism communities described above. The health system would be designed on a classical hub-and-spoke concept with a clinic near the community center, transit corridors, and primary care and public facilities on the spokes to serve areas at a distance from the community center. The corridor should also connect the clinical facility in each community to the tertiary care hospital being rebuilt in the urban core.

Physical and Social Component 7: Establish Community Mental Health Services

In one way or another, almost the entire population of Gaza has been traumatized by the war. Family members have died or been injured, the vast majority has been displaced and moved multiple times, 19,000 children have been orphaned, and many face pervasive hunger. Given the huge numbers and the total disruption of the health care system, one-on-one clinical approaches to the psychosocial needs of the population will not work,

²¹⁸ Arab Hospitals Group, correspondence with author, April 28, 2024.

which calls for a community approach. Community approaches to collective trauma after war have been used in other countries (including Vietnam, Kosovo, Ukraine, and elsewhere), and their efficacy has been established.²¹⁹

Establishing a safe and secure environment that enables both adults and children to feel safe is the first step in addressing mental health trauma. Community-based mental health programs could then be launched. Although it is important to address the needs of the entire population, two groups have been highlighted as deserving special attention: mental health workers and children. Mental health workers have experienced the same trauma as the general population in Gaza. If their needs are not addressed, they will burn out rapidly and will be unable to provide sustained services to others. Regarding children, a 2022 study found that “the impact of war on children is tremendous and pervasive, with multiple implications, including immediate stress-responses [and] increased risk for specific mental disorders.”²²⁰

To implement a public health community-based mental health program, people without mental health professional experience, such as teachers, could be trained to provide group-level education for people in their community, such as those in camps.

Evidence-based, developmentally appropriate group mental health and psychosocial approaches can also be implemented in school settings. School-based programs should be specialized to specific age groupings—children under 6 years old, those 7–12 years old, and those 13–18 years old. Additional educational support, such as *Ahlan Simsim*—televised early childhood programming by Sesame Workshop for Syrian refugee children—has been found to be helpful to children affected by conflict.

²¹⁹ Victoria K. Ngo, Bahr Weiss, Trung Lam, Thanh Dang, Tam Nguyen, and Mai Hien Nguyen, “The Vietnam Multicomponent Collaborative Care for Depression Program: Development of Depression Care for Low- and Middle-Income Nations,” *Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy*, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2014; Jack Saul, *Collective Trauma, Collective Healing: Promoting Community Resilience in the Aftermath of Disaster*, Routledge, 2022.

²²⁰ David Bürgin, Dimitris Anagnostopoulos, Board and Policy Division of ESCAP, Benedetto Vitiello, Thorsten Sukale, Marc Schmid, and Jörg M. Fegert, “Impact of War and Forced Displacement on Children’s Mental Health—Multilevel, Needs-Oriented, and Trauma-Informed Approaches,” *European Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, Vol. 31, No. 6, June 2022.

Physical and Social Component 8: Rebuild and Reform the Education System

Because half of Gaza's population is children under the age of 18, the education and well-being of children are priorities. Immediate challenges include the complete unavailability of school infrastructure, whether from damage, use as housing, or Israeli military use; a traumatized and displaced teacher workforce and student body; children having missed more than an entire year of school; and physical and mental health problems that are the toll of fighting and hunger.

Recovery of education will be important for enabling the recovery of society in general, creating and maintaining human capital of the current generation, and providing normalcy for children who have been through trauma. Investment in education recovery also affords opportunities to improve the physical and mental health of children and youth, to develop the content of education to support reconciliation, and to provide skills needed for a strong society in the long term and for the immediate recovery. Education in Gaza will need a specially designed approach, as students after the conflict are unlikely to catch up to conventional learning outcomes for their age levels.

For the medium and longer terms, plans should be developed and implemented to rebuild and rehabilitate educational facilities, offer a new curriculum, manage the teacher workforce, and ensure the well-being of students. Gaza should aim for a high-quality education system that meets the needs of its citizens and the labor market.

K-12 school facilities: Although satellite-based damage assessments of physical school infrastructure found that three-quarters need complete reconstruction or major rehabilitation,²²¹ a more complete damage assessment of the usability of remaining school infrastructure is needed, along with a triage plan for repairing school facilities that are usable. A plan should be developed to maximize school facilities, drawing on school buildings that are repairable, new sites for prefabricated school buildings, and implementation of a system of shifts in schools. In addition, plans will be

²²¹ Dawoud Abu Alkas, Nidal Al-Mughrabi, Aidan Lewis, and Saleh Salem, "Gazans Strive to Study as War Shatters Education System," Reuters, May 13, 2024.

needed to move people who are currently living in schools into other suitable accommodation. Schools that will be rebuilt should be designed to meet the specific needs of students in Gaza and in line with modern pedagogical approaches. Educational infrastructure will also need a cost, implementation, and financing plan.

Education governance: Prior to the war, roughly half of Gaza's 610,000 K-12 students (those with refugee status) were educated in UNRWA-managed schools, with similar numbers educated in PA schools, and about 3 percent educated in private schools.²²² In the longer term, Palestinian leadership and donors should reconsider the extent to which it is appropriate for Gaza's students to be divided in this way among school systems, with the UN providing the long-term education that a public school system more typically provides.

Teacher workforce: A professional development and recovery strategy should be designed for the Gazan educational staff and the 23,000-teacher workforce.²²³ The vast majority of Gaza's teachers have been displaced (along with other civilians), and organizing them, meeting their psychosocial needs, and giving them training for education of their students during the recovery will be needed.

Universities: All of Gaza's universities have been completely destroyed. Coordination with the West Bank and countries in the region and globally could provide opportunities for Gaza's university students, either in person or through remote education. These students should also be supported with scholarship opportunities both from the PA and from other countries, as well as with temporary facilities in Gaza.

²²² Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, "Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) Issues a Press Release on the Impact of the Israeli Occupation Aggression on the Right to Education in Palestine During the 07/10/2023–11/11/2023 Period," webpage, November 13, 2023b.

²²³ United Nations Children's Fund and Save the Children International, "Education Under Attack in the Gaza Strip," infographic, January 8, 2024.

Physical and Social Component 9: Transition to Longer-Term Development and Prosperity

The ultimate goal of reconstruction should be stability, prosperity, and greater resilience, with diversified and redundant solutions. Together with the governance strategy presented earlier, such long-planned initiatives as a Gaza–West Bank corridor, an upgraded fishery and logistics port, or an international airport can bring greater prosperity and stability. New resources, such as the Gaza Marine natural gas extraction and power plant conversion, would transform the strip’s growth potential.

Pathway E: International Actors

Achieving a viable Palestinian state and durable peace between it and its neighbors will require support from nations across the globe—diplomatic, financial, security, and technical assistance—as a new Palestinian entity, a second state, builds an economy and the structures necessary to ensure peaceful long-term governance. These achievements will also necessitate that malicious actors that might seek to disrupt the ongoing peace process for their own objectives are discouraged and prevented from doing so.

Table 4.5 summarizes the types of actions that key international actors will need to take in the short, medium, and long term for a Palestinian state to live in peace alongside the State of Israel. This table is not meant to be comprehensive; rather, it is intended to capture the important actions that are requisite for the durability of the peace.

The delineation of tasks in Table 4.5 is framed from the perspective of the major Western powers, with specific tasks assigned to the United States, UK, and EU (combining the tasks of France and Germany). For the other nations or groupings—the Arab states, China, Iran, and Russia—the tasks are framed as the types of actions that should be encouraged or incentivized by the Western powers to enable a durable peace. These include incentivizing an active and constructive role in the peace (Arab states and China) and attenuating the influence of potential spoilers (Iran and Russia).

United States

The United States has played a central role in recent international efforts toward building a durable peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians.²²⁴ This includes co-sponsorship (alongside the Soviet Union) of the 1991 Madrid Conference that set the conditions for the Norwegian-negotiated 1993 Oslo Accords;²²⁵ focused efforts during 1996–1999 to prevent the peace

²²⁴ The following discussion focuses only on the post–Cold War role of the United States.

²²⁵ U.S. Department of State, “The Oslo Accords, 1993,” webpage, undated-c.

TABLE 4.5
**International Actors and the Road Map to a Durable Peace
(actors not in order of importance)**

International Actor	Task	Short Term	Medium Term	Long Term
United States	Action 1: Reposture the U.S. executive branch for a role as process orchestrator rather than sole mediator	X		
	Action 2: Focus U.S. near-term assistance on support for the international security force and Palestinian security forces by contributing senior officers and enablers	X	X	X
	Action 3: Develop a coordinated Presidential-congressional approach for the second state		X	
UK	Action 1: Continue provision of humanitarian assistance to Gaza	X		
	Action 2: Provide training and support to Palestinian and international peacekeeping security forces	X		
	Action 3: Support and contribute senior officers and enablers to a coordinated international effort		X	X
EU	Action 1: Continue to provide humanitarian assistance as a priority mission	X		
	Action 2: Provide policing-centric training and other assistance to Palestinian and international security forces	X		
	Action 3: Provide political and economic support for an international coalition		X	X
	Action 4: Provide financing for reconstruction efforts once a pathway for a two-state solution is determined		X	X

Table 4.5—Continued

International Actor	Task	Short Term	Medium Term	Long Term
Arab states	Action 1: Contribute troops, police, and security personnel to the MSF and civilian experts to assist in governance	X		
	Action 2: Provide financial support for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts		X	
	Action 3: Provide support for revitalization of economic infrastructure and economic opportunities for the second state			X
China	Action 1: Encourage China to play a constructive, significant role in negotiating and supporting the durable peace	X		
	Action 2: Encourage a Chinese role in reconstruction			X
	Action 3: Consider allowing China preferential access to economic infrastructure within Gaza and the West Bank			X
Iran	Action 1: Leverage anti-Iranian rivalries to bolster military collaborations between Saudi Arabia and Israel		X	
	Action 2: Prevent Iranian formal participation in diplomatic discussions surrounding the durable peace and the new Palestinian state		X	X
Russia	Action 1: Ensure that Russia is not provided an opportunity to veto new security arrangements	X		
	Action 2: Get leading Arab countries to understand the implications of Russian meddling for Palestinian progress and Israel–Gulf Cooperation Council relations	X		
	Action 3: Minimize the Russian role in reconstruction			X

process started by the Oslo Accords from failing;²²⁶ the U.S.-hosted summit in 2000 at Camp David that sought to resolve final status negotiations;²²⁷ co-sponsorship of the 2002 establishment of the Quartet—alongside the EU, Russia, and the UN—that promulgated the *Road Map* to peace;²²⁸ a series of brokered Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during 2010–2011 and 2013–2014; and the unsuccessful 2020 *Peace to Prosperity* proposal. The Abraham Accords became possible when the UAE offered normalization in exchange for an Israeli commitment not to annex occupied territories in the West Bank.²²⁹

Despite this central role, the United States is not viewed as an “honest broker” by the parties to peace negotiations.²³⁰ In particular, there is a perception that sustaining its special relationship with Israel is more important to the United States than achieving peace between the Israelis and Palestinians.²³¹ And while some have argued that the United States can be an “effective broker,”²³² others have suggested that decoupling U.S. force and diplomacy—which historically proved critical to other difficult negotiations—has weakened U.S. efforts to successfully negotiate this pernicious conflict.²³³

²²⁶ U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,” webpage, undated-b.

²²⁷ Avi Shlaim, “The United States and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds., *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of World Order*, Palgrave, 2002.

²²⁸ UN, “The Quartet,” webpage, undated.

²²⁹ Peter Baker, Isabel Kershner, David D. Kirkpatrick, and Ronen Bergman, “Israel and United Arab Emirates Strike Major Diplomatic Agreement,” *New York Times*, August 13, 2020, updated September 2, 2020; and Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Dennis Ross, and Adam Boehler, “How Peace and Prosperity in the Middle East Can Still Be Reached,” *Time*, October 15, 2023.

²³⁰ Aaron David Miller, “America Needs to End Its Obsession with Trying to Fix Everything in Gaza,” *The Guardian*, July 29, 2014.

²³¹ Khaled Elgindy, *How the Peace Process Killed the Two-State Solution*, Brookings Institution, April 12, 2018.

²³² Miller, 2014.

²³³ Shlomo Ben-Ami, “The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Conundrum,” *Currents: Briefs on Contemporary Israel*, Y&S Nazarian Center for Israeli Studies, No. 1, Fall 2019.

The American people have remained, despite the political uncertainty and violence during 2023–2024 and in preceding years, largely supportive of the peace process.²³⁴ Although this may suggest that American politicians would be consistently on firm ground in forcefully supporting the peace process, national-level policymaking is often at odds with this support, which some have attributed to the potency of the “Israel lobby.”²³⁵

Despite the popular support for the peace process, there has been a notable shift within America’s political elite on end goals for the conflict, most notably the requisite bipartisan consensus in which a two-state formula is a necessary (if not sufficient) policy goal for the broader regional architecture. Within the Democratic party, the two-state solution remains a broadly supported outcome; however, within the Republican party, there has been a notable shift away from the two-state paradigm without a suggestion of what may replace it.²³⁶

There are three broad actions that the United States can take to enable the emergence of the second state and promote the durability of the peace.

Action 1: Reposture the U.S. executive branch for a role as process orchestrator rather than sole mediator. The United States should redefine its role from mediator to the orchestrator of the process, using its own allies and networks—along with its access to leaders in Jerusalem and Ramallah—to help deliver the necessary incentives and pressures to the myriad actors in

²³⁴ Jeffrey M. Jones, “Americans’ Views of Both Israel, Palestinian Authority Down,” Gallup, March 4, 2024.

²³⁵ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “Is It Love or the Lobby? Explaining America’s Special Relationship with Israel,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2009. For a contending view, see Robert C. Lieberman, “The ‘Israel Lobby’ and American Politics,” *Perspective on Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2009.

²³⁶ Alex Traiman, “‘Future of Judea & Samaria’: Former US Envoy Unveils Sovereignty Plan,” Jewish News Syndicate, February 29, 2024.

Using moderated focus groups, in 2021 RAND researchers explored Israeli and Palestinian attitudes toward a range of possible alternative ways of dealing with the situation, including one-state, confederation, two-state, or status quo arrangements. The researchers found that no alternative had stronger support than two states, although no alternative commanded majority support in either Israel or Palestinian territories (Daniel Egel, C. Ross Anthony, Shira Efron, Rita T. Karam, Mary E. Vaiana, and Charles P. Ries, *Alternatives in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, RAND Corporation, RR-A725-1, 2021).

the system. Such orchestration should apply to both the transitional authority and subsequent political entities.

To achieve this, the administration should once again appoint and empower a Presidential envoy whose responsibility would be to facilitate coordination among U.S. allies and partners in support of a durable peace. A core responsibility of this envoy would be to coordinate across the U.S. executive branch to ensure that the mediators receive the needed diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military support to achieve their mandate.

Action 2: Focus U.S. near-term assistance on support for the international security force and Palestinian security forces by contributing senior officers and enablers. The United States should focus its foreign assistance on security rather than rebuilding. Congressional vetting requirements in the West Bank and Gaza make the United States unreliable and unsuitable as a leading donor in reconstruction, and attempts to funnel congressional funds to UN agencies for reconstruction could lead to U.S. bilateral vetting procedures being a condition of acceptance.

Instead, the United States should see itself as the main contributor to the training and equipping of security forces responsible for the durable peace. Senior officers should be seconded to the MSF and enablers assigned. Contributions should include continued support to existing Palestinian security forces but also to the international security force responsible for overseeing the internal security of Gaza. This support would need dedicated funding through the same funding streams that have funded Israeli-PASF security cooperation in the past (International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement), which are not subject to the same restraints as Economic Support Funds, or by according the envoy “notwithstanding authority” to direct funding as needed, despite other provisions of law.

Action 3: Develop a coordinated Presidential-congressional approach for the second state. A coordinated U.S. approach involving both the President and the U.S. Congress would be critical to ensuring that U.S. financial and security support for a durable peace is long term and hence credible. While the President can and should negotiate on behalf of the United States, only the U.S. Congress can authorize the programming and appropriate the funds that will be needed to support the reconstruction, development, and security operations essential to the viability of the durable peace. Coordination has proven vital to the sustained efficacy of the USSC for Israel and the

PA,²³⁷ sustained financial support to Israel,²³⁸ and such multiyear support programs as the Middle East Partnership for Peace Act.²³⁹

Since President Ronald Reagan legalized meetings with PLO officials, Congress has sought to restrict the freedom of any U.S. President to deal with this conflict. Starting with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, whose authority was never agreed to by President Reagan,²⁴⁰ Congress has passed a handful of stand-alone laws, along with the annual State and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, that limited what an administration can and cannot do. Beyond direct bilateral assistance through the Economic Support Fund, Congress limited PLO representation in the United States via the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act, cut off funding to UNRWA in the recent supplemental appropriations, and conditioned the entire U.S. dues to the UN on preventing the recognition of a Palestinian state.²⁴¹

Policy efforts by the U.S. executive branch must take into account this active congressional role in U.S. efforts toward the conflict. Ensuring that these policies are either aligned with congressional incentives or sufficiently

²³⁷ U.S. Senate, letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, June 17, 2022.

²³⁸ Jeremy M. Sharp, *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel*, Congressional Research Service, RL33222, updated February 18, 2022.

²³⁹ United States Agency for International Development, “Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA),” webpage, undated.

²⁴⁰ See President Reagan’s signing statement (Ronald Reagan, “Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989,” White House, December 22, 1987):

Section 1003 of the Act prohibits the establishment anywhere within the jurisdiction of the United States of an office “to further the interests of” the Palestine Liberation Organization. The effect of this provision is to prohibit diplomatic contact with the PLO. I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO. However, the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if any, the United States will maintain is encompassed by the President’s authority under the Constitution, including the express grant of authority in Article II, Section 3, to receive ambassadors. I am signing the Act, therefore, only because I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO, as a consequence of which no actual constitutional conflict is created by this provision.

²⁴¹ Public Law 101-246, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991; Section 414, Membership of the Palestine Liberation Organization in United Nations Agencies, February 16, 1990.

coordinated with U.S. congressional leadership will be critical to their credibility.

United Kingdom

Achieving a two-state solution is the UK's long-term policy objective and has largely driven the government's diplomatic efforts since the beginning of the war. The stance adopted by the UK and the response that followed are reflected in its vision for the day after in Gaza, a five-point plan that calls for release of all hostages, formation of a new Palestinian government backed by an international support package, removing Hamas from control of Gaza, removing Hamas's capacity to launch attacks against Israel, and a political process that will lead to a two-state solution.²⁴²

Although the UK has reiterated its desire to recognize a Palestinian state as part of a second-state solution,²⁴³ the government has tried to thread a careful balance between the two sides since the onset of war. This balancing included what might be perceived as clear support for the Israeli position, refusing to back calls for an immediate ceasefire and supporting "specific pauses" in fighting instead;²⁴⁴ abstaining from both October and December 2023 UN General Assembly votes for an immediate ceasefire, as well as abstaining from the May 2024 vote on Palestine's full UN membership; deploying additional military assets to the eastern Mediterranean to support

²⁴² UK Parliament Debates, "Volume 746: Israel and Gaza," debated on February 27, 2024a. Following the October 7 attack, then-Prime Minister Conservative Rishi Sunak described the UK's response as consisting of three elements: preventing further escalation and threats against Israel, increasing humanitarian aid for the Palestinians, and working diplomatically to support stability and a two-state solution.

²⁴³ Kiran Stacey, "How Keir Starmer Averted Gaza Ceasefire Vote Crisis," *The Guardian*, February 21, 2024.

²⁴⁴ Joshua Nevett, "Rishi Sunak Backs Calls for Humanitarian Pauses in Israel-Hamas War," BBC, October 25, 2023.

Israel;²⁴⁵ and refusing to suspend arms exports to Israel.²⁴⁶ However, alongside these measures, the UK has implemented economic sanctions against Israeli settlers,²⁴⁷ publicly opposed the full-scale offensive against Rafah,²⁴⁸ and—via former officials who may or may not represent the government—voiced concerns that Israel may have breached international law.²⁴⁹

This commitment to “a recognised Palestinian state alongside a safe and secure Israel” was reiterated by Prime Minister Keir Starmer in the weeks before the one-year anniversary of the beginning of the violence.²⁵⁰ However, the UK’s diminished role in the region will likely limit its ability to push its vision for the day after: The country is less involved in the region than it was in the past and does not have enough influence to lead the peace process.²⁵¹

Action 1: Continue provision of humanitarian assistance to Gaza. The UK’s most tangible role in the conflict so far has been focused on humanitarian support, including support for the (ultimately unsuccessful) construction of a pier off the Gaza coast for delivering assistance,²⁵² the air-

²⁴⁵ Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Defence, Grant Shapps, and Rishi Sunak, “Prime Minister Deploys UK Military to Eastern Mediterranean to Support Israel,” press release, October 13, 2023.

²⁴⁶ Patrick Wintour, “UK Has Issued 108 Arms Export Licenses to Israel Since 7 October,” *The Guardian*, June 11, 2024b.

²⁴⁷ Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “UK Sanctions Extremist Settlers in the West Bank,” press release, February 12, 2024a.

²⁴⁸ Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Communiqué (Capri, 19 April 2024)—Situation in the Middle East,” April 19, 2024b.

²⁴⁹ Esther Webber and Sam Blewett, “The Real PM? David Cameron Is Shifting Britain’s Stance on Israel,” *Politico*, April 17, 2024.

²⁵⁰ Will Durrant, “Starmer Calls for Israel and Hezbollah to ‘Pull Back from the Brink,’” *The Independent*, September 24, 2024.

²⁵¹ Olivia O’Sullivan, “To Engage in the Middle East Peace Process, UK Needs Dedicated Diplomatic Leadership,” Chatham House, November 8, 2023.

²⁵² Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “UK Aid En Route to Temporary Pier Off Gaza,” press release, May 15, 2024c.

dropping of assistance via a collaboration with the Jordanians,²⁵³ and direct financial and other support for UN humanitarian assistance flowing into Gaza. In addition, the UK has maintained a long-term presence in Gaza in the form of a projects office, providing it with useful on-the-ground experience in the Strip. This leaves the UK well-positioned to take a leadership role in facilitating humanitarian assistance into Gaza, thus complementing its U.S. ally, which is limited in its ability to deliver such assistance.

Action 2: Provide training and support to Palestinian and international peacekeeping security forces. The UK is well-postured to provide training and other support to both Palestinian and other peacekeeping forces operating under an international mandate. This support will build on the UK's ongoing security sector reform efforts in the West Bank, which have been led by the Ministry of Defence's Ramallah-based British Support Team.²⁵⁴

Action 3: Support and contribute senior officers and enablers to a coordinated international effort. The UK should provide diplomatic, financial, and technical support to the international security forces responsible for Gaza. This support would be in line with the previous UK government's advocacy of an international contact group. However, while the UK argued that such a group should be a joint Western-Arab endeavor that will coordinate wartime diplomacy, as well as the reconstruction and stabilization of Gaza,²⁵⁵ British leaders indicated that it would be better if Arab states performed the role of on-the ground support.²⁵⁶ Then-Foreign Secretary

²⁵³ UK Ministry of Defence, "UK Forces Airdrop 100 Tonnes of Aid for Gaza Civilians," press release, May 9, 2024; UK House of Commons Library, "UK Aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip: FAQs," webpage, April 29, 2024.

²⁵⁴ "UK Team Helping Palestinian Authority Prepare for Gaza Takeover: Defense Secretary," *Arab News*, December 7, 2023.

²⁵⁵ David Lammy, "Labour Will Oppose Expulsions of Palestinians and Bar Violent Settlers from UK," *The Guardian*, December 9, 2023.

²⁵⁶ UK Parliament Debates, "Volume 749: UK Armed Forces in Middle East," debated on April 29, 2024b.

David Cameron argued, “British boots on the ground, I think, is a risk that we should not take.”²⁵⁷

European Union

The EU remains committed to a two-state solution, and it promulgated a “10-point roadmap” in early 2024 to offer a revised approach to reflect the degraded security environment.²⁵⁸ The approach envisions a two-state solution and full normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world through a Preparatory Peace Conference. The conference would design an initial framework in consultation with the conflict parties, who would eventually negotiate the final text themselves. In parallel to the conference, the EU proposes that international actors should deal with the humanitarian crisis, ensure the release of Israeli hostages, prevent regional escalation, strengthen the legitimacy of the PA, and support the reconstruction of Gaza. This road map reaffirmed earlier commitments to build a fully sovereign Palestinian state and work with regional partners toward a peace conference that will implement the two-state solution;²⁵⁹ however, EU leaders were explicit that the European Council could not be expected to find a solution immediately.

While committed to supporting a peace conference, the EU currently lacks sufficient influence in the region to realize its vision. Although it did play a critical role in the 2003 Roadmap to Peace,²⁶⁰ it has proven ineffective in dealing with other crises in the region—including the conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Yemen and on the Iranian nuclear issue. Its regional influence is further weakened by what are perceived as “double standards” in its approach to the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine: Although the EU coun-

²⁵⁷ Esteban Duarte, “UK Won’t Send Military Forces to Deliver Gaza Aid, Will Rely on Contractors: Cameron,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2024.

²⁵⁸ Maria Psara and Jorge Liboreiro, “Revealed: Josep Borrell’s 10-Point Peace Roadmap for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Euronews*, January 19, 2024.

²⁵⁹ Josep Borrell, “What the EU Stands for on Gaza and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” European Union External Action, November 15, 2023b.

²⁶⁰ European Council on Foreign Relations, *Mapping European Leverage in the MENA Region*, December 2019.

tries generally rallied behind Ukraine and strongly criticize Russia's actions, they are seen by some as not applying the same level of criticism to Israel.²⁶¹ EU leaders have warned that the bloc is facing increasing animosity in the Muslim world and beyond as a result.

The EU's ability to drive a political process is further undermined by divisions among its member states. Highlighting the rift, Spain, Ireland, and Slovenia have recognized Palestinian statehood, while the Czech Republic and Hungary voted against the UN resolution backing Palestine's full membership.²⁶² These internal divisions are further demonstrated by the widely diverging positions taken by EU and European Commission leadership. While President of the European Parliament Josef Borrell emphasized the need to defend the rights of both Palestinians and Israelis,²⁶³ European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen is more supportive of Israel—and projected an Israeli flag on the facade of the commission's headquarters, which had only been done once before, for Ukraine. One EU commissioner

²⁶¹ In March 2024, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres urged the EU to stick to the principles of international humanitarian law without double standards, saying, "we must stick to principles in Ukraine as in Gaza" (Lorne Cook, "UN Chief Urges the EU to Avoid 'Double Standards' over Gaza and Ukraine," Associated Press, March 21, 2024).

²⁶² Member states of the EU can be divided roughly into three camps: (1) unconditional support for Israel (including Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary), (2) willing to publicly criticize Israeli action (including Belgium, Ireland, and Spain), and (3) less vocal and maintaining a neutral position (including Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Slovakia). These divisions are partially illustrated by members' votes, including on a UN vote on cease-fire resolutions on October 27, 2023. In this vote calling for a truce, eight member states were in favor, 15 abstained, and four were against. However, in the December 12, 2023, vote on a resolution calling for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire and the unconditional release of hostages, the states appeared less divided, with 17 voting in favor, eight abstaining, and two opposing the resolution. The same differences were highlighted by reactions to the International Criminal Court arrest warrant for Benjamin Netanyahu, with some states welcoming the decision and others criticizing it (Nathalie Weatherald and Ben Munster, "European Leader Divided on ICC Arrest Warrant Bid for Netanyahu," *Politico*, May 20, 2024). The most critical stance toward the request was adopted by countries such as Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, while countries including Belgium, Ireland, and Spain supported the International Criminal Court's independence (Weatherald and Munster, 2024).

²⁶³ Josep Borrell, "In the Eye of the Hurricane," European Union External Action, November 14, 2023a.

unilaterally announced, without consultations with colleagues, a freezing of all EU development assistance to the Palestinians.²⁶⁴

Action 1: Continue to provide humanitarian assistance as a priority mission. European nations should remain a critical source of near-term funding for humanitarian assistance requirements in both Gaza and the West Bank. This focus would reflect a continuation of ongoing support from EU member states that—despite divisions within the EU—have provided robust funding since October 7 focused on food, health, water, sanitation and hygiene, and shelter.²⁶⁵

Action 2: Provide policing-centric training and other assistance to Palestinian and international security forces. The EU and its member states should continue to provide technical and other assistance to civilian security forces, including both border and internal police forces.²⁶⁶ This assistance may need to expand to include embedded advisors within the international security force.

Action 3: Provide political and economic support for an international coalition. Political, technical, and economic support from the EU would be critical to the viability of the international coalition and the second state. This is in line with public statements from EU leadership, who have emphasized the importance of an international-led coalition to stabilize Gaza.²⁶⁷ However, the EU is unlikely to be willing to authorize a collective military mission by its member states because of internal divisions within the EU;²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ Lisa O’Carroll, “EU Appears to Backpedal on Freezing of Palestinian Aid Payments,” *The Guardian*, October 9, 2023.

²⁶⁵ European Council, “EU Humanitarian Support for Palestinians,” webpage, last updated December 10, 2024.

²⁶⁶ The EU runs two civilian missions in the Palestinian territories—the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point and the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories—although the Rafah mission has been limited to advisors based in Jericho since Hamas took over in 2007. Both missions were recently extended until June 30, 2025.

²⁶⁷ Josep Borrell, “Starting to Work for the ‘Day After,’” European Union External Action, November 29, 2023c.

²⁶⁸ The EU currently has only five land military missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy, all of which focus on supporting and training local militaries (European Union External Action, “Missions and Operations,” webpage, January 23, 2023).

such missions can only be established by a unanimous agreement, and it is likely that Austria, the Czech Republic, or Hungary would oppose deployment of military forces in Gaza.

Action 4: Provide financing for reconstruction efforts once a pathway for a two-state solution is determined. EU financial support should pivot to reconstruction and economic stabilization—in line with the approach detailed in the economic pathway (Section C)—as soon as feasible. This is likely to require, as a prerequisite, a sustainable ceasefire and a path toward a two-state solution backed by the international community with strong involvement of the United States and the Arab states.

Arab States

The success of the durable peace is likely to depend as much on the Arab states, and in particular the Arab Gulf states, as it does on major Western powers. Arguably no other nations have more at stake in a durable peace between Israelis and Palestinians than Egypt and Jordan.²⁶⁹ Finding a durable peace will be essential for Egypt if it hopes to sustain its own peace agreement with Israel,²⁷⁰ and the stakes are equally high in Jordan, where Israeli operations have exacerbated grievances with the regime and enflamed the Jordanian population.²⁷¹ Crucially, the success of any such durable peace is likely to depend in significant part on the support of the Arab Gulf states, who will need to play a key leadership role in both the transition and the final agreement on the pathway to a durable peace.

²⁶⁹ Both Jordan and Egypt already feel the immediate spillover effects of the conflict at their own borders, where refugee flows, smuggling, and militant threats represent a constant source of tension and instability (Samia Nakhoul and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Jordan Foils Arms Plot as Kingdom Caught in Iran-Israel Shadow War,” Reuters, May 15, 2024; Nadeen Ebrahim and Sarah El Sirgany, “Egypt on Edge as Israel’s War Presses More Than a Million Palestinians Up Against Its Border,” CNN, February 16, 2024).

²⁷⁰ Ebrahim and El Sirgany, 2024.

²⁷¹ A majority of Jordanians are of Palestinian descent, leading to protests calling for the Hashemite kingdom to sever ties with Israel (Aaron Magid, “Jordan Was Already Walking a Tightrope. Then the Gaza War Happened,” Atlantic Council, April 3, 2024).

Saudi Arabia is the most important of the Arab states for the success of the durable peace, but it is also strongly motivated to play a major role in doing so. Such a role would cement its influence and symbolic position as the leader of the Muslim world. Saudi efforts to balance internal reforms, change perceptions of it around the globe, and transition its economy away from oil all depend, in part, on making peace with Israel.²⁷² The Kingdom may be disinclined to commit ground forces, but it has already indicated its willingness to provide financing if a credible peace process is established and to provide vital support to international security forces, including maritime security operations, intelligence-sharing, and compensation for troop-contributing countries.

The UAE is likely to join Saudi Arabia in supporting a durable peace, as it would be well-aligned with the UAE's public commitment to long-term regional stability and conflict de-escalation.²⁷³ Bahrain and Kuwait are likely to follow the Saudi example as well, though perhaps to a lesser extent; Qatar and Oman could provide a crucial back-channel for negotiation and sustainment of the peace by facilitating lines of communication to de-escalate tensions and coordinate when necessary.

Action 1: Contribute troops, police, and security personnel to the MSF and civilian experts to assist in governance. The MSF will need to be U.S.-led, but, to be successful, the preponderance of troops doing the initial policing mission on the streets of Gaza's cities should be from Arab countries, with the United States and Western countries providing such enablers as intelligence and logistics. The Arab Gulf states will need to assume important diplomatic, financial, and security roles for the MSF. Egypt and Jordan have highly capable armed forces and border security capabilities that make them well positioned to contribute to border security opera-

²⁷² And until October 7, all indications suggested that such a deal could be soon realized. Although the war in Gaza has put such efforts on pause, reports suggest that both Israel and Saudi Arabia remain interested in such a deal, but for Saudi Arabia it will first depend on resolving the conflict in Gaza and ensuring that Palestinian statehood is a part of any future final status agreements (Jennifer Gnana, "Saudi-Israel Normalization 'Off Table' Until Palestinian Statehood, FM Says," *Al-Monitor*, October 31, 2024).

²⁷³ Marwan Muasher, Amr Hamzawy, Rain Ji, Mohanad Hage Ali, Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, and Yasmine Farouk, "Governing Gaza After the War: The Regional Perspectives," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 16, 2024.

tions; therefore, they should take a leadership role—under international authority—to secure the lawful movement of people and goods and disrupt smuggling and illicit transit between Egypt and Gaza and between Jordan and the West Bank.

Action 2: Provide financial support for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts. Robust financial support from the Arab states is a necessity for the viability of the second state, although these states have publicly stated that they will not be willing to provide any financial support without a formal peace process. Once such a peace process is established, this financing should be put under the stewardship of an international contact group to ensure that it is efficient and is not coopted by political forces or legacy UN agencies.

Action 3: Provide support for revitalization of economic infrastructure and economic opportunities for the second state. Alongside direct financial support, the Arab states must be prepared to provide preferential access for the new second state to their economies. This should include collaborative financing, bilateral and perhaps multilateral trade, and opportunities for Palestinians to work abroad in both low- and high-skilled occupations.

China

China—which has economic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean but only modest security and political interests²⁷⁴—has joined others in calling for a ceasefire, humanitarian aid, and a two-state solution. And although it has little experience with leading this kind of diplomacy, China has actively sought to encourage Hamas and Fatah to broker peace.²⁷⁵

China’s geopolitical interests in a durable peace are twofold. The first is that by playing a lead role as a peacemaker, China can simultaneously cement its reputation as a great power while attenuating Western influence

²⁷⁴ James McBride, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 2, 2023.

²⁷⁵ Zhao Ziwen, “China to Host New Round of Hamas-Fatah Talks but Its Influence ‘May Be Limited,’” *South China Morning Post*, July 17, 2024.

in the Middle East.²⁷⁶ Beijing may see an opportunity to display its skill and influence in a high-profile role of a kind traditionally led by Western great powers and the EU. Although China has limited experience in this form of peace-brokering, the potential for China as generous benefactor may give it some influence over the parties.²⁷⁷

The second is that China is increasing its geoeconomic footprint in the Mediterranean, and a peaceful region is likely to support these efforts. Chinese firms have invested in ports in Egypt, Spain, Morocco, Israel, Bulgaria, and Turkey;²⁷⁸ and Ankara seeks to join the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization.²⁷⁹ Moreover, long-term access to a Gaza port could provide a low-cost option for distribution or manufacturing close to China's rich European markets.

China may well be willing and able to play a constructive role in supporting a durable peace, as its interests are much different from those of Russia. It will take deft diplomacy to get and keep China on-side in this effort. With this goal, the following approaches are recommended.

Action 1: Encourage China to play a constructive, significant role in negotiating and supporting the durable peace. The United States and the West should encourage China to take an active role in any peacekeeping negotiations under two conditions: (1) China should participate independent of Russia, and (2) China should commit to block any weapons or technology shipments that spoilers might use to disrupt the peace effort. Under these conditions, China should be given a significant role in any new international contact group. China's participation may offer the ancillary benefit of abating some of the strains in its relations with the West.

²⁷⁶ Ahmed Aboudouh, "China Is Fixed on Discrediting the US on Gaza War. But This Policy Lacks Credibility and Will Likely Fail," Atlantic Council, December 14, 2023.

²⁷⁷ Anushka Saxenz, "75 Years of China-Russia Relations: Indeed a 'No Limits' Partnership," Institute for Security & Development Policy, May 27, 2024.

²⁷⁸ Ouail Oulmakki, Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Andrey Hernandez Meza, and Jérôme Verny, "The Implications of Chinese Investments on Mediterranean Trade and Maritime Hubs," *Journal of Shipping and Trade*, Vol. 8, No. 28, November 13, 2023.

²⁷⁹ Selcan Hacaoglu and First Kozok, "NATO Ally Turkey Seeks Membership in China-Led SCO, Erdogan Says," Bloomberg, July 5, 2024.

Action 2: Encourage a Chinese role in reconstruction. A willingness to finance reconstruction efforts could bring China an otherwise unobtainable role in a major international peacemaking endeavor. This could reduce the burden on Western and Arab donors. Prior to pledging an amount for reconstruction, Beijing may try to gauge the price of admission. A careful negotiation may be required to develop arrangements that are productive and reduce risks of misunderstandings.

Action 3: Consider allowing China preferential access to economic infrastructure within Gaza and the West Bank. China would seek to secure port and airport privileges in Gaza as part of the payback for its contribution to reconstruction. In weighing any such request, the United States and the West will want to be sure that the proposed Chinese role does not compromise Israeli security, prospects for Gaza reconstruction, or the sovereignty of a new Palestinian entity.

Iran

Iran will remain a potential spoiler in Israeli-Palestinian dynamics, for reasons both ideological and practical. The Islamic Republic remains deeply antisemitic and opposed to Israel's existence. Iran has also cultivated an "axis of resistance," a loose coalition of the former Assad regime and regional proxy groups centered around opposition to the United States and Israel. The axis of resistance's shared vision would be undermined by a durable peace in Gaza. Israel and Iran have fought a "shadow war" for decades, characterized by mutual attacks, airstrikes, cyber operations, assassinations, sabotage, and drone strikes.²⁸⁰ Iran continues to fund and back proxies, including training and material support for Hamas, Iranian-backed groups attacking U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria, the Syrian government, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and Yemen's Houthis.

Although careful not to take direct responsibility for the October 7 attacks, Iran praised the attack, congratulated the fighters, and pledged sup-

²⁸⁰ C. Vinograd, "The Shadow War Between Iran and Israel: A Timeline," *New York Times*, April 18, 2024.

port to Hamas.²⁸¹ But the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a higher priority for the Iranian government than it is a national cause for the Iranian people.²⁸² Tehran Stadium spectators booed a soccer team carrying Palestinian flags, prominent Iranian academics argue that Iran should prioritize its own needs over Palestine's, and the slogan "No to Lebanon, no to Palestine, my life only for Iran"—which had emerged during the 2009 Green Movement—is being occasionally chanted again to express frustration.²⁸³

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides Iran an opportunity to undermine Israeli security and enhance regional influence while avoiding direct confrontation that could escalate into a multi-front regional war.²⁸⁴ Iran will continue to provide financial, material, and technological support to its regional proxies, which it leverages to keep Israel engaged on multiple fronts and sustain a state of insecurity for Israel.²⁸⁵ The conflict may also provide Iran a mechanism to disrupt the normalization of relations through the Abraham Accords between Israel and other Middle Eastern countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Such disruption has been a clear aim of Iran, which fears that the Abraham Accords might further isolate Iran.²⁸⁶

Iranian goals in the conflict will create challenges for the West and Arab countries but also opportunities. The shared threat from Iran may foster collaboration among the nations that will be critical to the viability of a durable peace. The following approaches can be employed to take best advantage of this situation.

²⁸¹ Sina Toossi, "How Iran Really Sees the Israel-Hamas War," *Foreign Policy*, November 2, 2023.

²⁸² Ali Afshari, "Why Are So Many Iranians Seemingly Indifferent to the War in Gaza?" Stimson Center, May 13, 2024; Ali M. Ansari, "The Shallow Roots of Iran's War with Israel," *Foreign Affairs*, May 29, 2024.

²⁸³ Afshari, 2024.

²⁸⁴ Shahir Shahidsaless, "Decoding Iran's Position on the Gaza War," Stimson Center, October 27, 2023.

²⁸⁵ S. J. Frantzman, "Iran's Multi-Front War on Israel Has Diminishing Returns—Analysis," *Jerusalem Post*, 2024; A. Martinez and G. Myre, "Israel Is Engaged in Conflicts on 3 Separate Fronts: Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran," NPR, 2024.

²⁸⁶ Toossi, 2023.

Action 1: Leverage anti-Iranian rivalries to bolster military collaborations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Rivalry with Iran has been one of the core drivers of improved relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia—two countries that otherwise dramatically differ on makeup, values, and policy approaches. It is not in the U.S. interest to exacerbate these rivalries, but shared animosity to Iran does provide an avenue to building better relations between Israel and a critical Arab state and could stymie Iranian influence across the region. This can include collaborative measures to disrupt Iran’s military and technical support to its proxy groups, including targeting networks and resources; improved intelligence cooperation; and the use of diplomacy to improve prospects for unresolved Middle East conflicts.

Action 2: Prevent Iranian formal participation in diplomatic discussions surrounding the durable peace and the new Palestinian state. It is difficult to imagine that Iran will seek to be a contributor in good faith to diplomatic negotiations or a durable peace. Iran is more likely to maintain support to Hamas, exacerbate Palestinian factionalization, and undermine any political entity that would govern Palestinians, all of which better serve its national political interest.²⁸⁷ Although negotiators do not need to explicitly prohibit Iranian participation in any negotiations, Tehran’s participation should be contingent on it publicly accepting both the two-state solution and Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state alongside a Palestinian state.

Russia

Moscow backed Hamas following the October 7 attacks,²⁸⁸ even though this involved reversing more than 30 years of improving Russian-Israeli diplomatic relations following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. Early in his presidency, Vladimir Putin was seen as pro-Israel. In 2014, Israel was neutral on Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made frequent visits to Moscow, and Russia recognized West Jerusalem as

²⁸⁷ Danielle Pletka, “What Is Iran’s Role in the Hamas Attack on Israel?” *Foreign Policy*, 2023; M. Levitt and L. von Thaden, “Guns, Drugs, and Smugglers: A Recent Heightened Challenge at Israel’s Borders with Jordan and Egypt,” Washington Institute, July 2023.

²⁸⁸ Steven Lee Myers and Sheera Frenkel, “In a Worldwide War of Words, Russia, China and Iran Back Hamas,” *New York Times*, November 3, 2023.

Israel's capital. In March 2022, Israel declined to co-sponsor a UN Security Council resolution condemning Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Russia's interests in a durable peace are colored by three phenomena. The first is Russia's desire for opportunities to embarrass the United States. This is demonstrated by Russia's blaming of the United States for blocking a UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire.²⁸⁹ The second is Russia's inconsistency in supporting peacekeeping efforts. Moscow stood aside during the Bosnia-Croatia-Serbia Peace Agreement despite Russia's role in the conflict and has not played a constructive role in Syria despite promises to the contrary. The third is Russia's security interest in the Eastern Mediterranean, which Putin has described as a "strategically important" region.²⁹⁰ Russia's strategic position in the Middle East depends on maintaining good ties with the Arab world. Russia has simultaneously bolstered ties with Hamas, Hezbollah, and others in the Iran-backed "axis of resistance."²⁹¹

Based on its past performance, its interests, and its actions thus far, Russia is best characterized as a *spoiler*—not a contributor—to a durable peace between Israel and Palestinians. The Kremlin might view Russia as stronger now and might insist on having more heft in peacemaking, equal to the influence of other great powers. Yet, even if it were to have such heft, Moscow would be unlikely to play a positive role. To the contrary, it would likely denigrate and undermine U.S. and other Western efforts, especially if they are perceived as reducing Russia's sway in the region or increasing the West's.

To limit and contain the opportunities for Russian disruptions, the following approaches are recommended.

Action 1: Ensure that Russia is not provided an opportunity to veto new security arrangements. Security interests in the region lie at the core of Russia's interests. Moscow will oppose any new Western military pres-

²⁸⁹ Hugh Cameron, "Russia Blames US for 'Suffering of Millions' Following UN Cease-fire Veto," *Newsweek*, November 21, 2024.

²⁹⁰ Lazar Berman, "Russia Says Navy to Stay in Mediterranean, but Poses No Threat," *Times of Israel*, June 6, 2013.

²⁹¹ Hamidreza Azizi and Hanna Notte, "Russia's Dangerous New Friends: How Moscow Is Partnering with the Axis of Resistance," *Foreign Affairs*, February 14, 2024.

ence, such as to bolster security for Gaza or a new Palestinian entity. But the Kremlin would especially object to any initiatives that would impose new constraints on Russia's military role in Egypt, Syria, or elsewhere in the region, particularly its naval facility at Tartus. Moscow could exercise its veto power in the UN Security Council to derail peace arrangements not to its liking, so peace arrangements should not be brought to it for consideration.²⁹²

Action 2: Get leading Arab countries to understand the implications of Russian meddling for Palestinian progress and Israel–Gulf Cooperation Council relations. The United States and the West should make a strong case to Arab partners that Russia is a rogue and that its role in an international contact group overseeing peacemaking should be minimized. Although the United States and Russia both favor the creation of a Palestinian state, Moscow is likely to play a disruptive role in any attempt to create one and would aim to limit U.S. and Western influence.²⁹³

Action 3: Minimize the Russian role in reconstruction. As in Bosnia, Syria, and previously the West Bank and Gaza,²⁹⁴ Russia is unlikely to make major contributions to reconstruction. The United States and the West should use this reluctance as a reason for minimizing Russia's role in the international contact group. However, excluding Russia entirely from this process could be problematic, as this exclusion could elevate disruptive Russian behavior, such as propaganda alleging that Western aid is a cloak for keeping Gaza or a new Palestinian entity weak or dependent.

²⁹² Dayton et al., 2024.

²⁹³ Raphael S. Cohen, "Netanyahu May Be Standing in the Way of a Two-State Solution. But He's Far from Alone," *RAND Blog*, January 22, 2024.

²⁹⁴ In Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s, and in Syria more recently, Moscow provided little aid (Azizi and Notte, 2024). Russia did not participate in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–led coordination platform for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the 2008–2009 Gaza conflict, Russia sent only 60 tons of humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, 15 times less than the United States supplied. Although Putin boasts that Russia played a "decisive" military role in stabilizing Syria, it has given little aid to help with reconstruction ("Putin Hosts Assad, Expected to Focus on Rebuilding Syria," Associated Press, March 15, 2023). At present, Moscow seeks to destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina for its westward turn (Emir Hadzikadunic, "Dayton Peace (Dis)Agreement, 25 Years On," *Al Jazeera*, December 14, 2020).

Conclusions

A pathway to a durable peace between Israelis and Palestinians is possible, but it will be challenging to navigate. The underlying conflict has lasted for more than 75 years. Many approaches to reaching lasting peace accords and to fostering cooperation in the interests of prosperity have been tried without success. Memories of acts of terrorism and intimidation, of lives lost, and of negotiating disappointments are many and are vivid. The structural impediments to peace outlined at the outset of this report—the scarcity of influential leaders on both sides committed to peace, the incompatible territorial claims of both sides, and the internationalization of the conflict—cast long shadows over efforts to find a way to a durable peace. Historical precedents for success, given these characteristics, are few.

Yet, the ferocity and brutality of the attacks on defenseless Israeli civilians on October 7, and the heavy casualties among Gazans and near-total destruction of Gazan infrastructure that have occurred in the months-long effort to find and eliminate Hamas as a nihilistic force against peace, could unlock opportunities to build a more secure and better future. And given the international and regional context, another failure to resolve this conflict would be devastating, leading to the revitalization of Hamas and similar groups in the future, and would accord a strategic victory to Iran and its proxies.

The Prerequisites

This report is about how to build a durable peace, conceptually as well as practically. Our focus is on the prerequisites—the prospect of better lives in

the future for Palestinians and Israelis—and the modalities—what will be needed to get there.

It will be hard to move from war to the pathway to a durable peace without credible *leadership* voices on all sides advocating for peace. This requires a willingness to speak of the envisaged better future, rather than of retaliation and revenge, and for international friends of Israel and the Palestinians to incentivize and praise such leadership.

The second prerequisite is to *restore security* to Gaza in particular, but also to the West Bank. There can be no rebuilding of infrastructure, the economy, or people's confidence without it. In the aftermath of intense conflict, a new security paradigm is needed; without such a paradigm, in the lawlessness and destruction, Hamas or a Hamas-like radical force will reemerge. Experience has shown many times that effective security and policing require the support and respect of the community and clear international legal authority. Israelis cannot on their own govern Gaza and provide such security, especially not the IDF. The authors of this report advocate that a multinational security force (MSF) should be established from scratch with significant participation by the United States, Israel's Arab neighbors, Europeans, and other leading powers willing to commit to help build that pathway to a durable peace. The MSF, with support from international partners and mentors with real-life experience, would also support vital deradicalization efforts. To attract international forces and to win cooperation and support of Gazans, such a force must be clearly transitional to a sovereign, secure future.

Thus, the third prerequisite to a durable peace is a certain horizon for a *new Palestinian governance construct*, one that is responsible, respected, effective, and committed to peace. Such a basis for long-term governance and sovereignty cannot be built overnight, but securing commitments and instilling confidence that it can be achieved is critical to the pathway for durable peace. It must also bring together Palestinians in the West Bank as part of the new envisaged entity, providing scale and credibility to the sovereign Palestinian future horizon that is essential to unlocking such a pathway.

Finally, peace is not sustainable without *economic and infrastructure revival and the rebuilding of social structures and services*, including housing, viable physical and mental health services, education systems, and civil

society institutions. Support for nonviolence and commitment to a peaceful future critically depend on improving economic and social conditions and kindling public confidence that improvement can be sustained and enhanced in the future. A better tomorrow must start now.

Insights from Other Conflicts

In Chapter 3, we examined a variety of other post–World War II examples of difficult inter-ethnic and inter-sectarian conflicts. Some resulted in durable peace arrangements (e.g., Egypt-Israel, the Balkans, Northern Ireland, East Timor); others (e.g., Nagorno-Karabakh) attained peace by the imposition of peace by a victorious side; and still others (e.g., Kashmir) are yet unresolved, resulting in periodic outbreaks of violence and terror with concomitant security and economic opportunity costs.

Other cases may also be relevant. There is the very real risk of unintended consequences of conflict initiation. For example, Israel's intervention in Lebanon in 1982 was aimed at ending the terrorist threat from PLO camps. The threat was resolved in part through the expulsion of the PLO leadership to Tunis, but the unintended consequence of the large, lengthy Israeli intervention was the creation of the far-worse threat of Hezbollah, now a full-fledged Iranian proxy threatening Israel's north. The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 based on a concern over the (erroneous) threat of weapons of mass destruction and to depose Saddam Hussein's regime, which threatened regional stability. Famously, the results were unsatisfactory: an occupation very costly in lives and resources and the creation of terrorist groups associated with Iran. The Iraq conflict was only stabilized by an integrated strategy of "clear, hold, and build," instituted with the Surge.¹ Yet, when withdrawing from Iraq in 2011, the United States failed to anticipate the political impact of the departure, which led to the exercise of Shia

¹ David Petraeus, Meghan O'Sullivan, and Richard Fontaine, "Israel's War of Regime Change Is Repeating America's Mistakes: But Israel Can Still Learn from America's Successes," *Foreign Affairs*, June 17, 2024.

government power on the Sunni communities and reignited Sunni terrorism in the form of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).²

Each of the cases examined in Chapter 3 has its own particularities. But, in our analysis, the successes shared two important characteristics: (1) the importance of leadership and (2) the importance of international engagement and, as needed, international pressure in finding and supporting peace efforts. Lebanon is relevant in illuminating the very real risks of failure and unintended consequences. Iraq shows the importance of planning for and having a political strategy for the day after.

The Pathways

In Chapter 4, we examined what will be required to begin and to persevere on the pathway to a durable peace. The starting point must be the elimination, or near elimination, of Hamas as a governing entity and a security threat, consistent with the IDF's intention. Hamas's basic rationale and ideology are antithetical to the establishment of a durable peace between Israelis and Palestinians. But sidelining Hamas is only a starting point, and, if complementary and reinforcing strategies are not put in place from the outset, the opportunity for a lasting peace will be lost. These pathways comprise security, governance, economic, and social services initiatives supported by the international community.

Security

The tragic memory of October 7 and the destruction of war that has followed, the vexed history of terrorism and violence between Palestinians and Israelis, and the lessons of other conflicts in other places reinforce the principle that security must come first. Even now, while the IDF is conducting combat operations in Gaza, the building blocks for effective security in Gaza must be put in place through assembly of a force that can take responsibil-

² Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Charles P. Ries, Larry Hanauer, Ben Connable, Terrence K. Kelly, Michael J. McNerney, Stephanie Young, Jason Campbell, and K. Scott McMahon, *Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: The Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq*, RAND Corporation, RR-232-USFI, 2013.

ity for public safety and order in Gaza border security and the protection of urgent humanitarian relief and recovery operations. The PASF, which was established subsequent to the Oslo Accords and is currently operating in the West Bank, is not in a position to take on this mission, at least initially.

To ensure effectiveness in this critical function, we recommend that a special multinational coalition authority be assembled under the authority of an international high representative, as has been proposed in *Plan for Postwar Gaza*.³ An MSF in Gaza and an expanded security capacity-building effort in the West Bank would be composed of forces, enablers, trainers, and advisors contributed by Western and regional countries with a strong interest in laying the groundwork for peace between Israel and Palestine. The United States will need to play a key role in organizing these forces, including through leadership roles and by contributing key enablers and specialized capabilities. Under the responsibility and supervision of the MSF and MATG, new and/or retrained and vetted PASF forces could serve, and over time they could take on growing responsibilities. International partners would support the development of intelligence functions and civil justice.

In Gaza, and also in the West Bank, Israeli and Palestinian authorities must take key steps to demonstrate a clean break with destructive security practices of the past and to begin the process of reconciliation and deradicalization. Palestinian entities, including the PA, must end the practice of offering “martyr’s payments” to the families of those who are convicted (or lose their lives) in terrorist attacks, and Israeli authorities must end the practice of collective punishment (destroying the homes and other property of those related to individuals convicted of such offenses).

Governance

The goal of governance initiatives is to build a Palestinian governing body that enjoys broad legitimacy, is fiscally responsible, and is committed to living in peace and security alongside Israel. Palestinians will ultimately determine *how* they are governed by drafting and ratifying a constitution,

³ Dayton et al., 2024.

but an effective governance pathway has short-, medium-, and long-term components.

In the short term, and under the authority of the multinational coalition authority described above, there will be a need to establish both local-level governing structures and a technocratic governing body to liaise with the international community, the Israelis, and humanitarian assistance groups. The local structures can ensure that Palestinians have input and agency in how their communities are reconstructed and revived. The governing body will be critical to the many immediate recovery and relief tasks while laying the foundation for a more legitimate, responsible, and accountable leadership in the future.

Over the medium term, with the support of the international community, Palestinians can take the next step in governance by convening a national reconciliation process to rebuild linkages and common interest between Gaza and the West Bank, which will be foundational to fulfilling the promise of a creating a viable “second state.” Reconciliation builds on and reinforces education programs, reintegration and deradicalization efforts, and anti-corruption programs, all fundamentally aimed at rebuilding trust—between Palestinians and between Palestinians and Israelis—and confidence in the future.

The next step will be to convene an interim constitution to lay the legal framework for self-governance and sovereignty. Although previous efforts at Palestinian state-building have been less than successful, historical evidence suggests that such an approach can be beneficial. Interim constitutions have been used in nine post-conflict contexts and have been found to “allow for greater constitutional legitimacy, sophistication, flexibility, and effective peace making.”⁴

A next step in the governance process would be to convene free and fair elections in Gaza and the West Bank to allow voters to choose among candidates committed to democracy and durable peace with Israel (militant group leaders and members would be ineligible to run or vote). Such a step is obviously not without risk. If rushed, elections could serve to reinforce existing cleavages and reproduce pre-conflict power structures, reinstalling

⁴ Goss, 2015. Those countries with interim constitutions are Poland, Hungary, Albania, South Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Sudan, Thailand, and Nepal.

old leaders. If viewed as broadly illegitimate, elections risk undermining the entire transition process and the eventual transfer of power from the multinational coalition authority and the technocratic government. Although electoral design choices and international monitoring can help mitigate these risks,⁵ they can never be fully eliminated. But forestalling these elections indefinitely may pose an even greater risk to peace and stability.

A last step in the governance pathway, the culmination of the new start for Palestine, Israel, and the region, is to negotiate a final status agreement with Israel. This cannot be rushed, but it also must not be endlessly postponed. In practice, many of the key dimensions of these talks will likely be explicitly negotiated or implicitly decided well in advance, although territorial boundaries will be central, as they have been in earlier iterations.

But crucial to these talks will be the role and legitimacy of the new Palestinian leadership. Having been popularly elected, new leaders will serve as the formal representatives of the Palestinian people, enjoying legitimacy from Gaza to the West Bank, and will be internationally recognized as having the authority to negotiate for Palestine's future. Such conditions are necessary to ensuring a credible commitment to peace. And with the strong support and engagement of the international community—as in other thorny settlements elsewhere, such as Northern Ireland and the Balkans—success is feasible.

Economics

Establishing security and building effective systems of governance, important as they are, are insufficient to ensure a durable framework for peace. The people of Gaza, and indeed all Palestinians, will need to see the prospect of better, more prosperous days ahead, through the creation of a growing economy and the restoration of social services (discussed in the next section). Yet, the Palestinian economy has been stagnant for more than a decade, mirroring the loss of hope for the peace process during the period. As cited in Chapter 4, average annual per capita GDP growth was negative (−0.6 percent) between 2013 and 2022. A series of short-, medium-, and longer-term reforms and initiatives, in the context of extended peace and

⁵ Reilly, 2016.

security and with the strong support of neighbors and the international community, can make a dramatic difference and buttress support for a durable peace.

Important short-term measures include a well-resourced plan to restore power, water, roads, and communications in Gaza, which will provide immediate relief and lay the groundwork for more-sustained economic activity. Similarly, Gaza's financial system must be restored: Banks need recapitalization loans and support, which will be fundamental to processing government transfers and supporting small and medium enterprise. The reopening of a commercial trade corridor between the West Bank and Gaza can help stimulate profitable economic transactions and underpin the political reconciliation so important to governance structures just discussed.

Among medium-term economic priorities are creating regional opportunities (in Israel initially) for Palestinian workers, whose earnings can help revive the economy back home; reestablishing international banking linkages to the Palestinian economy; and finding ways to de-shekelize the Palestinian economy, perhaps through a Palestinian currency linked to the euro, which would allow Palestinian monetary and credit policy to be designed in accordance with Palestinian economic requirements. Work also should be undertaken, in cooperation with international partners, to establish mechanisms to compensate Israeli settlers who would be asked to resettle in Israel, which would also benefit the now-struggling Israeli economy. Public housing and private mortgage facilities would help address the acute housing crisis in the aftermath of the war. Negotiations can get underway for the development and commercialization of the Gaza Marine gas field, which will help place the interim technocratic Palestinian government on a stronger financial footing.

Important longer-term economic measures to support a durable peace include the negotiation of free trade and economic agreements, the building of a Palestinian port and airport, and the completion of the envisaged direct land link (perhaps by rail) between Gaza and the West Bank.

Social Services

Gaza's social and physical infrastructure, including housing, power, water, health, and education, will need both urgent and long-term attention to support a durable peace. Life in Gaza today is difficult. An estimated 90 percent of the population has been displaced during the war, many repeatedly. Therefore, the first priority with a ceasefire is to find safe, secure locations for temporary communities to house IDPs and to provide safe, secure, and dispersed locations to provide food, water, power, and sanitation.

Even in temporary communities, however, the concepts of incremental urbanism can be applied, envisaging how these locations can develop into more-permanent communities and can prevent the transition to permanent, and unhealthy, insecure refugee camps that the international community has seen after previous conflicts (and elsewhere in the world).

Local participation in planning and implementation is critical to developing sound plans and programs to support reconstruction of Gaza's physical and social infrastructure. Special attention needs to be paid to mental health professionals and programs, in part to ensure that the traumas experienced by Gaza's youth do not result in a generation permanently scarred and radicalized by the experience. Temporary facilities will be needed. Development of interim and longer-term plans to restart education in Gaza will be necessary, drawing on neighboring countries' curriculum materials that do not include radicalized content.

Mobilizing International Supporters and Containing Spoilers

Laying the groundwork for a durable peace between Israelis and Palestinians will require both sides to exert leadership and take difficult steps forward. It will also require sustained and effective support from major Western nations, including the United States, the nations of the EU, and the UK; support from the neighboring Arab countries, including, in particular, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE; the constructive participation of China; and steps to contain or stop potential spoiler efforts from Iran and Russia.

The United States should aim to be a process orchestrator rather than the sole mediator for the conflict in order to instrumentalize a broader swath of

international partners. It should focus its near-term support on the international and Palestinian security forces to ensure their resourcing and effectiveness. This will likely require the involvement of U.S. forces in enabling roles on the ground.

The UK should continue to play a major role in organizing and funding urgent humanitarian assistance to Gaza while contributing on the security side. The EU's efforts to support large-scale humanitarian assistance are vital, as is providing training for Palestinian police cadres and financing for longer-term reconstruction once a pathway for Palestinian governance and statehood is agreed.

Arab states should take a lead in contributing to the envisaged multinational security force, provide financing for humanitarian support, and provide economic opportunities for the second state (and Israel as well) over the medium term.

China should be encouraged to play a constructive, significant role in the recovery, reconstruction, and support for a durable peace. The United States and other members of a future international contact group should offer membership to China if it is prepared to be a partner, and they should be willing to accord China access to economic infrastructure within Gaza and the West Bank.

Finally, Western nations and Arab partners should cooperate steadfastly in preventing Iran and Russia from spoiling the pathway to a durable peace, either through material and financial support for rejectionist groups or by meddling in Palestinian and Israeli politics.

Key Short-Term Measures

Even as hostilities against Hamas militants in Gaza continue, there is an urgent need for the international community, Israel, and Palestinians to begin work now to plan and to carry out a comprehensive program to leverage this horrific war and destruction into a better future for the region. That must begin with encouraging and incentivizing a new vision of leadership that it will require.

Leadership: As has been stressed in this report, a pathway to a durable peace depends on the emergence of leaders committed to take it. Israel's and Palestine's partners and friends need to find new and effective ways to encourage and support leaders willing to stand up for the vision of a durable peace and embrace the compromises needed to achieve it. The United States and the international community cannot (and should not) impose leaders for Palestinian or Israeli governance. But the international community can play an important role by crystallizing the need for visionary leadership on both sides and making clear that such leadership would be recognized, supported, and sustained.

Planning: Creating a robust multinational coalition to support deployment of an interim security force in Gaza should begin without delay. The United States should take the lead in creating an international contact group to assume all political and legal responsibility. This group should be notified to the UN Security Council, but this should not be a UN mission: The UN's long and vexed history of involvement in the conflict makes a clean start essential.

The contact group can appoint leads for security force planning and decisionmaking, oversight of the reconstruction tasks, accountability (eventual indictments for war crimes for the brutal events of October 7), and other functions.

Pre-positioning: The timing and duration of any ceasefires and the nature of the transition to a stable postwar are as yet uncertain. However, major international partners should start now to assemble and pre-position critical commodities to ensure an immediate and effective response to the opportunity offered by an end, even if temporary, to active hostilities.

Abbreviations

DDR	demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration (Marshall Plan)
EU	European Union
G7	Group of Seven (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with the European Union as a non-enumerated member)
GDP	gross domestic product
GRM	Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (2014)
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
IDP	internally displaced person
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MATG	Multinational Advisory and Training Group
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MSF	multinational security force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PA	Palestinian Authority
PASF	Palestinian Authority Security Forces
PCPSR	Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	UN Trade and Development
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
USSC	U.S. Security Coordinator

Bibliography

Abdel-Baqui, Omar, and Fatima AbdulKarim, "Many Palestinians Pin Postwar Hopes on Leader Jailed by Israel for Two Decades," *Wall Street Journal*, July 6, 2024.

Aboudouh, Ahmed, "China Is Fixed on Discrediting the US on Gaza War. But This Policy Lacks Credibility and Will Likely Fail," Atlantic Council, December 14, 2023.

Abusada, Mkhaimar, Zaha Hassan, Sanaa Alsarghali, Nathan J. Brown, Imad Alsoos, Vladimir Pran, and Nur Arafeh, *Governing Gaza After the War: Palestinian Debates*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 9, 2024.

Addison, Tony, Alemayehu Geda, Philippe Le Billon, and S. Mansoob Murshed, "Reconstructing and Reforming the Financial System in Conflict and 'Post-Conflict' Economies," *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2005.

Addison, Tony, Philippe Le Billon, and S. Mansoob Murshed, "Finance in Conflict and Reconstruction," *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 13, No. 7, October 2001.

"After Israeli Raids, Palestinian Police Struggle to Reassert Control in Terror Hotbed," *Times of Israel*, August 18, 2023.

Afshari, Ali, "Why Are So Many Iranians Seemingly Indifferent to the War in Gaza?" Stimson Center, May 13, 2024.

Agence France-Presse, "Israel No Longer 'Partner' for Peace, Palestinians' Abbas Tells UN," *France 24*, September 23, 2022.

Agencies and Times of Israel Staff, "2023 'Most Violent' Year for West Bank Settler Attacks, Watchdog Says," *Times of Israel*, January 1, 2024.

Agrawal, Ravi, "Salam Fayyad on the 'Day After' in Gaza," *Foreign Policy*, August 27, 2024.

Agreement Between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan Regarding the Establishment of a Ceasefire Line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (Karachi Agreement), July 27, 1949. As of December 14, 2024: <https://peacemaker.un.org/en/node/9225>

Ahmed, Bulbul, "India and Pakistan Fought 3 Wars over Kashmir—Here's Why International Law Falls Short to Solve This Territorial Dispute," *The Conversation*, August 24, 2021.

Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq, "Israel's War for Gaza's Gas," *Le Monde diplomatique*, November 28, 2012.

Alkas, Dawoud Abu, Nidal Al-Mughrabi, Aidan Lewis, and Saleh Salem, "Gazans Strive to Study as War Shatters Education System," Reuters, May 13, 2024.

Alkhatib, Ahmed Fouab, "Gaza's Suffering Is Unprecedented," *The Atlantic*, September 23, 2024.

al-Marashi, Ibrahim, "What the World Can Learn from the History of Hamas," *Time*, October 17, 2023.

Al-Zagha, Adel, "A Monetary Alternative for the Palestinian Economy: A Palestinian Currency," Middle East Forum, March 1996.

Anera, "Adequate Housing Is Under Attack in Gaza," April 18, 2024.

Ansari, Ali M., "The Shallow Roots of Iran's War with Israel," *Foreign Affairs*, May 29, 2024.

Anthony, C. Ross, Daniel Egel, Charles P. Ries, Craig A. Bond, Andrew Liepman, Jeffrey Martini, Steven Simon, Shira Efron, Bradley D. Stein, Lynsay Ayer, and Mary E. Vaiana, *The Costs of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, RAND Corporation, RR-740-1-DCR, 2015. As of November 19, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR740-1.html

Applied Research Institute—Jerusalem, *Assessing the Impacts of Israeli Movement Restrictions on the Mobility of People and Goods in the West Bank*, 2019.

Applied Research Institute—Jerusalem, "The Instigation of Apartheid Roads Era: Israel Blocks Palestinian Movement Inside West Bank Governorates," October 17, 2023.

Arieli, Shaul, "West Bank Settlements," webpage, Israel Policy Forum, undated. As of November 8, 2024: <https://israelpolicyforum.org/west-bank-settlements-explained/>

Arnold, Matthew B., "Challenges Too Strong for the Nascent State of Timor-Leste: Petitioners and Mutineers," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 49, No. 3, 2009.

Arnon, Arie, "Israeli Policy Towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Economic Dimension, 1967–2007," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 4, 2007.

Arnon, A., and A. Spivak, "Sovereignty and Economic Development: The Case of Israel and Palestine," *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 111, No. 472, June 2001.

Arnon, Arie, Israel Luski, Avia Spivak, and Jimmy Weinblatt, *The Palestinian Economy: Between Imposed Integration and Voluntary Separation*, Social, Economic and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia (Book 60), Brill Academic Publishers, 1997.

"As Kashmir's Hindus Face Targeted Killings, Hundreds Flee Valley," *Al Jazeera*, June 2, 2022.

- Asseburg, Muriel, "Shaping the Future of Gaza: How Europe Could Contribute to Sustainable Stabilisation," SWP Comment, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), No. 4, February 2024.
- Associated Press, "Casualties of Mideast Wars," *Los Angeles Times*, March 8, 1991.
- Austin, Sarah, and Jonathan Evans, "Israelis Have Grown More Skeptical of a Two-State Solution," Pew Research Center, September 26, 2023.
- Azizi, Hamidreza, and Hanna Notte, "Russia's Dangerous New Friends: How Moscow Is Partnering with the Axis of Resistance," *Foreign Affairs*, February 14, 2024.
- Bahar, Dany, and Natan Sachs, "How Much Does BDS Threaten Israel's Economy?" Brookings Institution, January 26, 2018.
- Baker, Peter, Isabel Kershner, David D. Kirkpatrick, and Ronen Bergman, "Israel and United Arab Emirates Strike Major Diplomatic Agreement," *New York Times*, August 13, 2020, updated September 2, 2020.
- Barakat, Shereif, "Israel Joins Egypt and Palestine in Rare Partnership to Develop Gaza Gas Field," *Egyptian Streets*, June 19, 2023.
- Barakat, Sultan, and Firas Masri, *Still in Ruins: Reviving the Stalled Reconstruction of Gaza*, Brookings Doha Center, August 2017.
- Barron, Robert, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, and Michael Yaffe, "Middle East Peace: What Can We Learn from Camp David 40 Years Later?" United States Institute of Peace, March 25, 2019.
- Barron, Robert, Mona Yacoubian, and Hesham Youssef, "Could the Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Deal Be a Game-Changer?" United States Institute of Peace, October 13, 2022.
- Ben-Ami, Shlomo, "The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Conundrum," *Currents: Briefs on Contemporary Israel*, Y&S Nazarian Center for Israeli Studies, No. 1, Fall 2019.
- Benzing, Markus, "Midwifing a New State: The United Nations in East Timor," *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Vol. 9, Vol. 1, 2005.
- Berger, Miriam, "What to Know About Palestinian Security Forces and Their Role in West Bank," *Washington Post*, July 11, 2023.
- Berman, Lazar, "Russia Says Navy to Stay in Mediterranean, but Poses No Threat," *Times of Israel*, June 6, 2013.
- Berman, Lazar, "Exiled Palestinian Official: Arab States Will Support an Independent Leader in Gaza," *Times of Israel*, February 14, 2024.

Bhavnani, Ravi, Dan Miodownik, and Hyun Jin Choi, "Violence and Control in Civil Conflict: Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 1, October 2011.

Bieber, Florian, "Bosnia-Herzegovina Since 1991," in Sabrina P. Ramet and Christine M. Hassenstab, eds., *Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989*, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

Bishku, Michael B., "Recognize Kosovo? A Middle East Dilemma?" Middle East Forum, 2024.

Blum, H. Steven, "America's Military Commitment in the Sinai Is Important to Regional Stability," *Military Times*, March 16, 2020.

Borrell, Josep, "In the Eye of the Hurricane," European Union External Action, November 14, 2023a.

Borrell, Josep, "What the EU Stands for on Gaza and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," European Union External Action, November 15, 2023b.

Borrell, Josep, "Starting to Work for the 'Day After,'" European Union External Action, November 29, 2023c.

"Bosnia War Dead Figure Announced," BBC News, June 21, 2007.

Boucek, Christopher, "The Saudi Process of Repatriating and Reintegrating Guantanamo Returnees," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 1, No. 1, December 2007.

Brady, Cynthia, and David G. Timberman, *The Crisis in Timor-Leste: Causes, Consequences and Options for Conflict Management and Mitigation*, United States Agency for International Development, November 2006.

Brennan, Richard R., Jr., Charles P. Ries, Larry Hanauer, Ben Connable, Terrence K. Kelly, Michael J. McNerney, Stephanie Young, Jason Campbell, and K. Scott McMahon, *Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: The Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq*, RAND Corporation, RR-232-USFI, 2013. As of December 14, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR232.html

Brown, Nathan J., *The Palestinian Reform Agenda*, United States Institute of Peace, December 1, 2002.

Brown, Nathan J., *The Third Draft Constitution for a Palestinian State: Translation and Commentary*, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, October 2003.

Brown, Nathan J., and Sanaa Alsarghali, "Why an Interim Constitution Could Help Palestine: The Domestic and International Payoffs," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 8, 2024.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1983.

- Bürgin, David, Dimitris Anagnostopoulos, Board and Policy Division of ESCAP, Benedetto Vitiello, Thorsten Sukale, Marc Schmid, and Jörg M. Fegert, "Impact of War and Forced Displacement on Children's Mental Health—Multilevel, Needs-Oriented, and Trauma-Informed Approaches," *European Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*, Vol. 31, No. 6, June 2022.
- Burke, Jason, " Hamas Regroups in Northern Gaza to Prepare New Offensive," *The Guardian*, January 30, 2024a.
- Burke, Jason, "Clearing Gaza of Almost 40m Tonnes of War Rubble Will Take Years, Says UN," *The Guardian*, July 15, 2024b.
- Byman, Daniel, "Can the Palestinian Authority Govern Gaza? How to Revitalize the PA for Postwar Rule," *Foreign Affairs*, January 4, 2024a.
- Byman, Daniel, "Can Anyone Govern Gaza? The Perilous Path to the Day After," *Foreign Affairs*, July 30, 2024b.
- CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet), "Malcolm Sutton: An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland," webpage, undated. As of March 5, 2024: <https://web.archive.org/web/20170701045148/http://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status.html>
- Calic, Marie-Janine, *A History of Yugoslavia*, Purdue University Press, 2019.
- Cameron, Hugh, "Russia Blames US for 'Suffering of Millions' Following UN Ceasefire Veto," *Newsweek*, November 21, 2024.
- Carapic, Jovana, and Oliver Jutersonke, *Understanding the Tipping Point of Urban Conflict: The Case of Dili, Timor-Leste*, Urban Tipping Point, May 2012.
- Carboni, Andrew, "Non-Party Ministers and Technocrats in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia," *Journal of North African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2022.
- Carter, Jimmy, "Support the Palestinian Unity Government," *Washington Post*, May 3, 2011.
- Casey, Nicholas, and Joshua Mitnick, "Israel Revives Demolitions of Palestinian Homes," *Wall Street Journal*, November 19, 2014.
- Centeno, Miguel Angel, "The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy," *Theory and Society*, Vol. 22, June 1993.
- Center for Preventive Action, "Conflict Between India and Pakistan," Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, updated April 9, 2024. As of December 14, 2024: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan>
- Central Office for Recovery, Reconstruction and Resiliency and Governor of Puerto Rico, *Transformation and Innovation in the Wake of Devastation: An Economic and Disaster Recovery Plan for Puerto Rico*, August 2018.

Chkhikvadze, Ani, "Armenians Wonder Who to Trust After Lost Wars," *Foreign Policy*, March 16, 2024.

Clarke, Colin P., "The Counterinsurgency Trap in Gaza: Why Israel Cannot 'Clear, Hold, and Build' Its Way to Victory," *Foreign Affairs*, February 5, 2024.

Clary, Christopher, *The 2021 India-Pakistan Ceasefire: Origins, Prospects, and Lessons Learned*, United States Institute of Peace, 2024.

Clemmensen, Andrew G., "Explosive Remnants: Gaza's Literal Ticking Bomb," Washington Institute, August 12, 2024.

Clinton, William J., "Blocking Property of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Montenegro, and Prohibiting New Investment in the Republic of Serbia in Response to the Situation in Kosovo," Executive Order 13088, June 9, 1998.

Clogg, Rachel, and Michelle Parlevliet, "Reconciliation Is Not Only Possible but Needed in All Stages of Conflict," *Conciliation Resources*, June 2021.

Coakley, John, "Ethnic Conflict and Its Resolution: The Northern Ireland Model," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2003.

Cobham, David, "Alternative Currency Arrangements for Palestine," University of St. Andrews, revised December 2003.

Cohen, Raphael S., "Netanyahu May Be Standing in the Way of a Two-State Solution. But He's Far from Alone," *RAND Blog*, January 22, 2024. As of December 14, 2024:

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/01/netanyahu-may-be-standing-in-the-way-of-a-two-state-solution.html>

Collins, James F., "Nagorny Karabakh: Halting a Slide to Conflict," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 28, 2011.

Commission on Human Rights, "Forty-Ninth Session, Agenda Item 27, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia," February 10, 1993.

Cook, Lorne, "UN Chief Urges the EU to Avoid 'Double Standards' over Gaza and Ukraine," Associated Press, March 21, 2024.

Coulibaly, Karen, *West Bank and Gaza: Selected Issues*, International Monetary Fund, September 16, 2022.

Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, *Situation in East Timor: Hearing Before the Political Affairs Committee*, Doc. 8534, September 20, 1999. As of December 14, 2024:

<https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/council-europe-parliamentary-assembly-situation-east-timor-report>

Counter Terrorism Guide, “Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB),” webpage, September 2022. As of December 14, 2024: https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/aamb_fto.html

Cronin, Audrey Kurth, “How Hamas Ends: A Strategy for Letting the Group Defeat Itself,” *Foreign Affairs*, June 3, 2024.

Culbertson, Shelly, John Bordeaux, Italo A. Gutierrez, Andrew Lauand, Kristin J. Leuschner, Blas Nuñez-Neto, and Lisa Saum-Manning, *Building Back Locally: Supporting Puerto Rico’s Municipalities in Post-Hurricane Reconstruction*, Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center operated by the RAND Corporation, RR-3041-DHS, 2020. As of December 14, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3041.html

Culbertson, Shelly, Olga Oliker, Ben Baruch, and Ilana Blum, *Rethinking Coordination of Services to Refugees in Urban Areas: Managing the Crisis in Jordan and Lebanon*, RAND Corporation, RR-1485-DOS, 2016. As of December 14, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1485.html

Cutler, Robert M., “The Minsk Group Is Meaningless,” *Foreign Policy*, July 23, 2021.

Daalder, Ivo H., “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,” Brookings Institution, December 1, 1998.

Dabed, Emilio, “A Constitution for a Nonstate: The False Hopes of Palestinian Constitutionalism, 1988–2007,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 2, Winter 2014.

Dahman, Ibrahim, Tim Lister, and Eugenia Yosef, “Almost Entire Population in Gaza Now Displaced Amid Fresh Israeli Offensive,” CNN, July 6, 2024.

Dajani, Omar M., and Limor Yehuda, “A Two State Solution That Can Work: The Case for an Israeli-Palestinian Confederation,” *Foreign Affairs*, September 19, 2024.

Davidson, Helen, “US Knew Indonesia Intended to Stop East Timorese Independence ‘Through Terror and Violence,’” *The Guardian*, August 28, 2019.

Dayton, Keith, James F. Jeffrey, Eran Lerman, Robert Silverman, and Thomas S. Warrick, *Plan for Postwar Gaza*, Wilson Center, 2024.

Debusmann, Jr., Bernd, “What Is World Central Kitchen—the Non-Profit Group Struck in Gaza?” BBC News, April 2, 2024.

Dessus, Sebastien, *A Palestinian Growth History, 1968–2000*, World Bank, 2003.

Dobbins, James, Jason H. Campbell, Laurel E. Miller, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman, *DDR in Afghanistan: Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating Afghan Combatants in Accordance with a Peace Agreement*, RAND Corporation, PE-343-A, February 2020. As of October 23, 2024: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE343.html>

Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Andrew Radin, F. Stephen Larrabee, Nora Bensahel, Brooke Stearns Lawson, and Benjamin W. Goldsmith, *Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo*, RAND Corporation, MG-722-RC, 2008. As of October 26, 2024: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG722.html>

Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga R. Timilsina, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, RAND Corporation, MG-304-RC, 2005. As of November 20, 2024: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG304.html>

Dobbins, James, Laurel E. Miller, Stephanie Pezard, Christopher S. Chivvis, Julie E. Taylor, Keith Crane, Calin Trenkov-Wermuth, and Tewodaj Mengistu, *Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building*, RAND Corporation, RR-167-CC, 2013. As of October 26, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR167.html

Dobbins, James, Michele A. Poole, Austin Long, and Benjamin Runkle, *After the War: Nation-Building from FDR to George W. Bush*, RAND Corporation, MG-716-CC, 2008. As of October 26, 2024: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG716.html>

Dobbins, James, Stephen Watts, Nathan Chandler, Derek Eaton, and Stephanie Pezard, *Seizing the Golden Hour: Tasks, Organization, and Capabilities Required for the Earliest Phase of Stability Operations*, RAND Corporation, RR-2633-A, 2020. As of October 24, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2633.html

Duarte, Esteban, "UK Won't Send Military Forces to Deliver Gaza Aid, Will Rely on Contractors: Cameron," Bloomberg, May 12, 2024.

Duclos, Nathalie, "The DDR in Kosovo: Collision and Collusion Among International Administrators and Combatants," *Institut des Sciences sociales du Politique*, Vol. 4, No. 1, July 20, 2015.

Durrant, Will, "Starmer Calls for Israel and Hezbollah to 'Pull Back from the Brink,'" *The Independent*, September 24, 2024.

Earnest, James, and Carolyn Dickie, "Post-Conflict Reconstruction—A Case Study in Kosovo," PMI Research and Education Conference, July 18, 2012.

Easterlin, Richard A., *Happiness and Economic Growth: The Evidence*, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 7187, January 2013.

Eastham, Steve, David Cowles, and Richard Johnson, *The Enterprise Funds in Europe and Eurasia: Successes and Lessons Learned*, U.S. Agency for International Development, September 12, 2013.

Ebrahim, Nadeen, "Why Only a Trickle of Aid Is Getting into Gaza," CNN, February 11, 2024.

Ebrahim, Nadeen, and Sarah El Sirgany, "Egypt on Edge as Israel's War Presses More Than a Million Palestinians Up Against Its Border," CNN, February 16, 2024.

Efron, Shira, "The Best Way to Deal with Gaza's Humanitarian Crisis: Israel Should Let the Palestinian Authority Deliver Aid," *Foreign Affairs*, April 15, 2024.

Egel, Daniel, C. Ross Anthony, Shira Efron, Rita T. Karam, Mary E. Vaiana, and Charles P. Ries, *Alternatives in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, RAND Corporation, RR-A725-1, 2021. As of October 23, 2024:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA725-1.html

Egel, Daniel, Trevor Johnston, and Ben Connable, *The Future of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces: Lessons from Historical Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Efforts*, RAND Corporation, RR-A722-1, 2023. As of October 23, 2024:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA722-1.html

Eizenstat, Stuart E., "The Middle East: Camp David to the Abraham Accords and the Gaza War," in Stuart E. Eizenstat, *The Art of Diplomacy: How American Negotiators Reached Historic Agreements That Changed the World*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2024.

Elgindy, Khaled, *How the Peace Process Killed the Two-State Solution*, Brookings Institution, April 12, 2018.

Elgindy, Khaled, "30 Years On, Oslo's Legacy of Failure," Middle East Institute, September 13, 2023.

European Council, "EU Humanitarian Support for Palestinians," webpage, last updated December 10, 2024. As of December 14, 2024:
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-humanitarian-support-to-palestinians/>

European Council on Foreign Relations, *Mapping European Leverage in the MENA Region*, December 2019.

European Union External Action, "Missions and Operations," webpage, January 23, 2023. As of January 8, 2025:
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/missions-and-operations_en

Ezzeddine, Nancy, and Beatrice Noun, *Iraq and Lebanon's Torturous Paths to Reform*, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations, December 2020.

Fabian, Emanuel, "IDF Says Documents Found in Gaza Show Hamas Was Falsifying Prominent Polling Results," *Times of Israel*, August 29, 2024.

Fai, Ghulam Nabi, "Kashmir and the UN Security Council," Anadolu Agency, December 9, 2020.

Farsakh, Leila, "The Question of Palestinian Statehood," *Boston Review*, June 5, 2024.

Fatah-Hamas Reconciliation Agreement, April 23, 2014.

Federman, Josef, "A Deeply Divided Israel Limpes Toward Its 75th Birthday Under Weight of Internal Rift," *Times of Israel*, April 24, 2023.

Feiner, Naomi, "Q&A: Integrating the Haredim Is Critical for Israel's Economy and Society," Russell Berrie Foundation, January 31, 2024.

Ferziger, Jonathan, "Removing West Bank Settlers Would Cost \$10 Billion: Group," Bloomberg, March 18, 2014.

Ford, Jess, and A. H. Huntington, III, *Enterprise Funds' Contributions to Private Sector Development Vary*, U.S. General Accounting Office, September 1999.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, "UK Sanctions Extremist Settlers in the West Bank," press release, February 12, 2024a.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, "G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting Communiqué (Capri, 19 April 2024)—Situation in the Middle East," April 19, 2024b.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, "UK Aid En Route to Temporary Pier Off Gaza," press release, May 15, 2024c.

Frankel, Julia, "Israel's Military Campaign in Gaza Is Among the Most Destructive in History, Experts Say," Associated Press, December 21, 2023.

Frantzman, S. J., "Iran's Multi-Front War on Israel Has Diminishing Returns—Analysis," *Jerusalem Post*, 2024.

French, David, "Israel Is Making the Same Mistake America Made in Iraq," *New York Times*, April 7, 2024.

"Full Text: Netanyahu's 2024 Address to Congress," *Haaretz*, July 25, 2024.

Gamaghelvan, Philip, "Rethinking the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Identity, Politics, Scholarship," *International Negotiation*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2010.

Garber, Larry, "A Palestinian-Led Approach for Gaza's Day After," Middle East Institute, July 23, 2024.

"Gaslighting Gaza: Israel's Deceptive Extraction Approval Prioritizes Economics over Politics," *The Cradle*, August 1, 2023.

“Gaza Death Toll: How Many Palestinians Has Israel’s Campaign Killed?” Reuters, July 26, 2024.

Ghigliazza, Lisa A., “Children, Trauma, and the Troubles: Northern Ireland’s Social Service Response,” *McNair Scholars Research Journal*, Vol. 1, 2008.

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed at Paris, December 14, 1995. As of November 20, 2024: <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/0/126173.pdf>

Gilad, Doron, “*Peace with Spoilers: On the Inclusion of Opposing Groups in the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process*,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2018.

Giorcelli, Michela, “Closing the Productivity Gap with the US: Causes and Consequences of the European Recovery Program,” *Economic History*, 2019.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44, No. 3, May 2007.

Global Witness, “Oil Firms Bankroll Azerbaijan’s Warring Regime with Billions in Fossil Fuel Money,” press release, November 8, 2023.

Gnana, Jennifer, “Saudi-Israel Normalization ‘Off Table’ Until Palestinian Statehood, FM Says,” *Al-Monitor*, October 31, 2024.

Goddard, Stacie E., “Brokering Peace: Networks, Legitimacy, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 3, September 2012.

Goldman, Robert, “Analysis: International Law and the Israeli Government’s Planned Destruction of Palestinian Assailants’ Family Homes,” *PBS News Hour*, February 5, 2023.

Goss, Caitlin, *The Nature of Interim Constitutions: A Comparative Analysis*, Merton College, 2015.

Government of Israel, “Prime Minister’s Office—Tekuma Authority Joint Announcement,” press release, April 17, 2024.

Government of Timor-Leste, “Timor-Leste: History,” webpage, 2024. As of December 14, 2024: <https://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=29&lang=en>

Gradstein, Linda, “Israel Drafts Relocation Plan for Some Settlers,” NPR, December 8, 2005.

Gumrukcu, Tuvan, “Armenia Says It’s Ready for Peace Deal If Azerbaijan Shows Political Will,” Reuters, March 2, 2024.

Habas, Waleed, and Ismat Quzmar, “The Future of Palestinian Employment in the Israeli Labour Market in Light of Political and Economic Realities,” Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), 2022.

Hacaoglu, Selcan, and First Kozok, "NATO Ally Turkey Seeks Membership in China-Led SCO, Erdogan Says," *Bloomberg*, July 5, 2024.

Hadzikadunic, Emir, "Dayton Peace (Dis)Agreement, 25 Years On," *Al Jazeera*, December 14, 2020.

" Hamas Coup in Gaza: Fundamental Shift in Palestinian Politics," *Strategic Comments*, Vol. 13, No. 5, 2007.

Hamed, Osama, *Government Borrowing and Liquidity and the Stability of the Palestinian Banking System*, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), November 2017.

Hammad, Shatha, "A Palestinian Pound? 'Impossible' Without Full Independence, Say Economists," *Middle East Eye*, July 8, 2019.

Harris, Alex, and Sander Eizen, "Tracking the Religious Zionist Party Bloc in the Settlements," *Fikra Forum*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 22, 2022.

Hensel, Paul R., "Charting a Course to Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict, 1816–1992," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1996.

Hirschfeld, Yair, *The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: A Personal Insider's Account*, Springer, 2024.

Hogan, Michael J., *Blueprint for Recovery*, U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany, The Marshall Plan Investment in Peace—50th Anniversary, 1997.

Hosmer, Stephen T., *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, RAND Corporation, MR-1351-AF, January 1, 2001. As of May 13, 2024:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1351.html

Hubbard, Ben, "Crisis Mode: How UNRWA, the United Nations Agency for Palestinian Refugees, Became a Flashpoint in the Gaza War," *New York Times Magazine*, September 15, 2024.

Hudson, John, and Karen DeYoung, "White House Reverses West Bank Policy, Calling Israeli Settlements Illegal," *Washington Post*, February 24, 2024.

Hughes, James, "Russia and the Secession of Kosovo: Power, Norms and the Failure of Multilateralism," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 65, No. 5, June 6, 2013.

Human Rights Watch, "Kashmir: UN Reports Serious Abuses; India, Pakistan Should Accept Findings, Ensure Justice," July 10, 2019. As of December 14, 2024:

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/10/kashmir-un-reports-serious-abuses>

Human Rights Watch, “West Bank: New Entry Rules Further Isolate Palestinians,” webpage, January 23, 2023. As of December 14, 2024: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/23/west-bank-new-entry-rules-further-isolate-palestinians>

Hussain, Aijaz, “The First Election in a Decade Is Planned in Indian-Controlled Kashmir. Here’s What to Know,” AP World News, August 30, 2024.

Indyk, Martin, “The Strange Resurrection of the Two-State Solution: How an Unimaginable War Could Bring About the Only Imaginable Peace,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2024.

Ignatius, David, “In the West Bank, I Saw How Peace Will Require Confrontation with Israel,” *Washington Post*, December 16, 2023.

Ignatius, David, “A Cry for the Refugees of Emptied Nagorno-Karabakh: ‘We Are Nobody,’” *Washington Post*, March 11, 2024.

Ikiz, Serra Utkum, “Gaza Needs 80 Years to Restore All the Fully Destroyed Housing Units, UNDP States,” *Parametric Architecture*, May 9, 2024.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, “Gaza Strip: Acute Food Insecurity Situation for 15 February–15 March 2024 and Projection for 16 March–15 July 2024,” webpage, March 18, 2024. As of November 20, 2024: <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156872/>

International Committee of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law Databases, “Rule 55: Access for Humanitarian Relief to Civilians in Need,” webpage, undated. As of December 4, 2024: <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule55>

International Crisis Group, *Digging out of Deadlock in Nagorno-Karabakh*, December 20, 2019.

International Crisis Group, *Raising the Stakes in Jammu and Kashmir*, Asia Report 310, August 5, 2020.

International Crisis Group, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Deterring Disintegration,” January 27, 2022.

International Crisis Group, *Managing Palestine’s Looming Leadership Transition*, February 1, 2023.

International Crisis Group, “Helping Keep Bosnia and Herzegovina Together,” May 23, 2024.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook*, 2003.

International Labour Organization, “Palestinian Unemployment Rate Set to Soar to 57 Per Cent During First Quarter of 2024,” March 18, 2024.

International Monetary Fund, *West Bank and Gaza: Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*, August 26, 2016.

International Monetary Fund, *West Bank and Gaza: Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee*, April 10, 2017.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Swords of Iron: Hostages and Missing Persons Report,” December 2, 2024. As of December 14, 2024:
<https://www.gov.il/en/pages/hostages-and-missing-persons-report>

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, “Israel’s Demolition of Palestinian Homes: A Fact Sheet,” webpage, April 20, 2021. As of May 29, 2024:
<https://icahd.org/2021/04/20/the-demolition-of-palestinian-homes-by-israel-a-fact-sheet/>

Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, September 28, 1995.

“Israeli Settler Attacks Against Palestinians,” *Al Jazeera*, March 3, 2023.

“Israel’s Prime Target: What Is Palestinian Islamic Jihad?” *Al Jazeera*, May 11, 2023.

Jackson, Brian A., “Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a ‘Long War’: The British Experience in Northern Ireland,” RAND Corporation, RP-1247, 2007. As of November 26, 2024:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1247.html>

Jackson, Henry F., “Egypt and the United States After Sadat: Continuity and Constraints,” *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, Vol. 12, No. 3/4, 1982.

Jeffery, Jack, Tia Goldenberg, and Huizhong Wu, “Rivals Hamas and Fatah Sign a Declaration to Form a Future Government as War Rages in Gaza,” AP World News, July 23, 2024.

Johannsen, Margret, Ziad AbuZayyad, Karima El Ouazghari, Judith Palmer Harik, Anat Kurz, and Jamil Rabah, “The Reconciliation of Hamas and Fatah: Smoothing the Way to the Middle East Conference by Contributing to Peace and Security in the Region,” *Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East, Policy Brief for the Middle East Conference on a WMD/DVS Free Zone*, No. 3, December 2011.

Jones, Jeffrey M., “Americans’ Views of Both Israel, Palestinian Authority Down,” Gallup, March 4, 2024.

Jones, Seth G., Lee H. Hilborne, C. Ross Anthony, Lois M. Davis, Federico Giroi, Cheryl Benard, Rachel M. Swanger, Anita Datar Garten, and Anga R. Timilsina, *Securing Health: Lessons from Nation-Building Missions*, RAND Corporation, MG-321-RC, 2006. As of November 14, 2024:
<https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG321.html>

Jones, Seth G., Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict*, RAND Corporation, MG-374-RC, 2005. As of November 26, 2024:

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG374.html>

“Kais Saïed: ‘Le gouvernement de technocrates est un grand mensonge et une grande manipulation!’” *Espace Manager*, July 29, 2014.

Kanafani, Numan, “The Cost of Living Crisis in the West Bank,” *Middle East Research and Information Project*, Winter 2012.

Karnovitz, Alan, Sonia Moldovan, and R. D. Menelaws, “An Assessment of Alternative Monetary Regimes for a Future Palestinian State: Dollarization Versus a National Currency,” United States Agency for International Development, May 2010.

“Kashmir Profile,” webpage, BBC News, December 19, 2023. As of November 26, 2024:

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11693674>

“Kashmir Remains Disputed, UN Reminds India,” *Dawn*, August 5, 2021.

Kaye, Dalia Dassa, and Sanam Vakil, “Only the Middle East Can Fix the Middle East: The Path to a Post-American Regional Order,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2024.

Kenner, David, “How to Be a Middle East Technocrat,” *Foreign Policy*, June 15, 2020.

Khalidi, Raja, “The Debate About Kerry’s Economic Initiative: Pitfalls, Benefits, and Risks,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3, Spring 2014.

Konečný, Martin, “EU’s Gaza War Response: A Tale of Contradiction and Division,” *Clingendael Spectator*, March 16, 2024.

Konyndyk, Jeremy, and Jesse Marks, *Untangling the Reality of Famine in Gaza*, Refugees International, September 2024.

Koplow, Michael J., “What an Israeli Policy That Took Security Control Seriously Would Look Like,” *Israel Policy Forum*, January 25, 2024.

Koplow, Michael J., and Shira Efron, “Starting from the Ground Up: U.S. Policy Options for Post-Hamas Gaza,” *Israel Policy Forum*, December 2023.

Kosnett, Philip S., “Planning for Postwar Gaza: Lessons from Kosovo,” *Jerusalem Strategic Tribune*, July 2024.

“Kosovo Awaits Recognition, China Deeply Concerned,” *ChinaDaily*, February 2, 2008.

Krivosheev, Kirill, “Landmark Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Treaty Inches Closer,” *Carnegie Politika*, January 23, 2024.

Kronstadt, K. Alan, *Kashmir: Background, Recent Developments, and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service, R45877, 2020.

Ladadweh, Walid, *Public Sector Strikes: Causes and Treatment*, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, September 2023.

Lahlouh, Alaa, *Armed Groups in Northern West Bank: The Beginning of an Armed Intifada or the Seeds of an Internal Palestinian Conflict?* Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, August 2023.

Lammy, David, “Labour Will Oppose Expulsions of Palestinians and Bar Violent Settlers from UK,” *The Guardian*, December 9, 2023.

Landgraf, Walter, and Nareg Seferian, “A ‘Frozen Conflict’ Boils Over: Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Future Implications,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 18, 2024.

Landow, Charles, and James McBride, “Moving Past the Troubles: The Future of Northern Ireland Peace,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 16, 2024.

Lappin, Yaakov, “The Implications of Rafah’s Cross-Border Tunnels,” *Jewish News Syndicate*, 2024.

Lasensky, Scott, “Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American Foreign Aid,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 2004.

Lawless, Robert, “The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 16, No. 10, 1976.

Lendon, Brad, “How Does Hamas Get Its Weapons? A Mix of Improvisation, Resourcefulness and a Key Overseas Benefactor,” CNN, October 12, 2023.

Levine, Mel, “Palestinian Economic Progress Under the Oslo Agreements,” *Fordham International Law Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1995.

Levitt, M., and L. von Thaden, “Guns, Drugs, and Smugglers: A Recent Heightened Challenge at Israel’s Borders with Jordan and Egypt,” Washington Institute, July 2023.

Levy, Ido, “ Hamas Is Weakened, but a Prolonged Guerilla Conflict Looms,” *PolicyWatch* 3929, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 12, 2024.

Levy, Yagil, “Lines Increasingly Blurred Between Soldiers and Settlers in the West Bank,” *Foreign Policy*, November 9, 2023.

Lewis, Aidan, “High Risk of Famine Persists Across Gaza, Global Hunger Monitor Says,” Reuters, June 26, 2024.

Li, Shan, Dov Lieber, and Fatima AbdulKarim, “The Israeli Ultranationalist Quietly Reshaping the West Bank,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 2024.

Lieberman, Robert C., “The ‘Israel Lobby’ and American Politics,” *Perspective on Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2009.

- Lincoln, Jonathan, "How to Keep the Peace in Gaza," *Foreign Affairs*, September 4, 2024.
- Lis, Jonathan, "Israel Mulling Compensation for West Bank Settlers Willing to Move," *Haaretz*, February 20, 2014.
- Lloyd, Grayson J., "The Diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations and the International Community," in James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares, eds., *Out of the Ashes*, ANU Press, 2003.
- Luft, Gal, "Palestinian Military Performance and the 2000 Intifada," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 4, December 2000.
- Lundy, Kathleen P., "Lasting Peace in Northern Ireland: An Economic Resolution to a Political and Religious Conflict," *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2001.
- Lynch, Marc, and Shibley Telhami, "The Two State Mirage: How to Break the Cycle of Violence in a One-State Reality," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2024.
- Magid, Aaron, "Jordan Was Already Walking a Tightrope. Then the Gaza War Happened," Atlantic Council, April 3, 2024.
- Magid, Jacob, "PA Announces Halt to Security Coordination with Israel; US Cautions Against Move," *Times of Israel*, January 26, 2023a.
- Magid, Jacob, "UAE: 'Viable Two-State Solution Plan' Needed Before We Commit to Rebuilding Gaza," *Times of Israel*, December 13, 2023b.
- Magid, Jacob, "Netanyahu Presents Post-War Plan to Cabinet, Aims for 'Local Officials' to Govern Gaza," *Times of Israel*, February 23, 2024.
- Martinez, A., and G. Myre, "Israel Is Engaged in Conflicts on 3 Separate Fronts: Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran," NPR, 2024.
- Masalha, Nur, "Political Violence, Military Conflict, and Civil Unrest in Palestine: The Palestinian Police, The Fatah Tanzim, and the 'Al-Aqsa Intifada,'" Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, 2003. As of December 4, 2024:
https://www.hfg.org/grant_summaries/political-violence-military-conflict-and-civil-unrest-in-palestine-the-palestinian-police-the-fatah-tanzim-and-the-ae-al-aqsa-intifadaae/
- Mazetti, Mark, and Ronen Bergman, "'Buying Quiet': Inside the Israeli Plan That Propped Up Hamas," *New York Times*, December 10, 2023.
- McBride, James, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky, "China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2, 2023.
- McDonough, Frances, "Palestinians More Positive on Abraham Accords and Open to Vying Powers Than Arab Neighbors," *Fikra Forum*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 23, 2023.

McGarry, John, and Brendan O’Leary, *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt, “Is It Love or the Lobby? Explaining America’s Special Relationship with Israel,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2009.

Mellen, Ruby, Artur Galocha, Lauren Weber, David Ovalle, and Hajar Harb, “Gaza Is Going Hungry. Its Children Could Face a Lifetime of Harm,” *Washington Post*, April 4, 2024.

Miller, Aaron David, “America Needs to End Its Obsession with Trying to Fix Everything in Gaza,” *The Guardian*, July 29, 2014.

Miller, Aaron David, “Why the Oslo Peace Process Failed—And What It Means for Future Negotiators,” *Times of Israel*, September 14, 2023.

Miller, Matthew, “Sanctioning Violent Palestinian Group in the West Bank,” press release, U.S. Department of State, June 6, 2024a.

Miller, Matthew, “Sanctioning Israeli Group for Disrupting and Destroying Humanitarian Aid to Civilians,” press release, U.S. Department of State, June 14, 2024b.

Mohammad, Linah, “Children Make Up Nearly Half of Gaza’s Population. Here’s What It Means for the War,” NPR, October 19, 2023.

Mohan, Anand, “The Historical Roots of the Kashmir Conflict,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1992.

Morris, Benny, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001*, Random House, 1999.

Morris, Loveday, Evan Hill, Samuel Granados, and Hazem Balousha, “What Israel’s Strategic Corridor in Gaza Reveals About Its Postwar Plans,” *Washington Post*, May 17, 2024.

Muasher, Marwan, Amr Hamzawy, Rain Ji, Mohanad Hage Ali, Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, and Yasmine Farouk, “Governing Gaza After the War: The Regional Perspectives,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 16, 2024.

Myers, Steven Lee, and Sheera Frenkel, “In a Worldwide War of Words, Russia, China and Iran Back Hamas,” *New York Times*, November 3, 2023.

Nachtwey, Jodi, and Mark Tessler, “The Political Economy of Attitudes Toward Peace Among Palestinians and Israelis,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 2, April 2002.

Nakhoul, Samia, and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Jordan Foils Arms Plot as Kingdom Caught in Iran-Israel Shadow War,” Reuters, May 15, 2024.

- National Army Museum, "The Troubles," webpage, undated. As of November 11, 2024:
<https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/troubles-1969-2007>
- National Counterterrorism Center, "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," webpage, November 2022a. As of March 4, 2024:
https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/pflp_fto.html
- National Counterterrorism Center, "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC)," webpage, December 2022b. As of March 4, 2024:
https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/pflp_gc_fto.html
- National Counterterrorism Center, "Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)," webpage, February 2023a. As of March 4, 2024:
https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/pij_fto.html
- National Counterterrorism Center, "Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)," webpage, August 2023b. As of March 4, 2024:
https://www.dni.gov/nctc/ftos/plf_fto.html
- NATO—See North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- Neumann, Neomi, "Jewish Extremist Violence in the West Bank Could Trigger a Second Front," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 16, 2023.
- Neumann, Neomi, "Prioritizing the West Bank Amid Escalation and Deterioration," *PolicyWatch* 3923, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 30, 2024.
- Neumann, Neomi, and Ghaith al-Omari, "Reforming the Palestinian Authority: A Roadmap for Change," *Policy Notes* 150, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 22, 2024.
- Nevett, Joshua, "Rishi Sunak Backs Calls for Humanitarian Pauses in Israel-Hamas War," BBC, October 25, 2023.
- Newman, D., "The Geopolitics of Peacemaking in Israel-Palestine," *Political Geography*, Vol. 21, No. 5, 2002.
- Ngo, Victoria K., Bahr Weiss, Trung Lam, Thanh Dang, Tam Nguyen, and Mai Hien Nguyen, "The Vietnam Multicomponent Collaborative Care for Depression Program: Development of Depression Care for Low- and Middle-Income Nations," *Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy*, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2014.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Statement by the Secretary General of NATO," press release 95(79), September 5, 1995. As of November 21, 2024:
nato.int/docu/pr/1995/p95-079.htm

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “15 Years Ago, Dayton Peace Accords: A Milestone for NATO and the Balkans,” webpage, December 14, 2010. As of November 21, 2024:

https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/news_69290.htm?selectedLocale=en

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s Role in Kosovo,” webpage, last updated November 20, 2023. As of July 26, 2024:

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48818.htm

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995–2004),” webpage, last updated March 21, 2024. As of November 21, 2024:

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52122.htm

Norwegian Refugee Council, “Israel’s Siege Now Blocks 83% of Food Aid Reaching Gaza, New Data Reveals,” press release, September 16, 2024.

Nusseibeh, Lana, “UAE: A Temporary International Mission Is Needed in Gaza,” *Financial Times*, July 17, 2024.

O’Carroll, Lisa, “EU Appears to Backpedal on Freezing of Palestinian Aid Payments,” *The Guardian*, October 9, 2023.

Office of the Quartet, “Dual-Use Lists,” webpage, undated-a. As of October 30, 2024:

<https://www.quartetoffice.org/page.php?id=5d6873y6121587Y5d6873>

Office of the Quartet, “The Initiative for the Palestinian Economy: An Overview,” webpage, undated-b. As of November 20, 2024:

<https://www.quartetoffice.org/page.php?id=59bc98y5880984Y59bc98>

“Optimistic Plans for Post-War Gaza Have Little Basis in Reality; Aid, Policing, Reconstruction—Everything Is Even Harder Than It Sounds,” *The Economist*, July 18, 2024.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “OSCE Minsk Group,” webpage, undated. As of April 1, 2024:

<https://www.osce.org/mg>

O’Sullivan, Olivia, “To Engage in the Middle East Peace Process, UK Needs Dedicated Diplomatic Leadership,” Chatham House, November 8, 2023.

Oulmakki, Ouail, Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Andrey Hernandez Meza, and Jérôme Verny, “The Implications of Chinese Investments on Mediterranean Trade and Maritime Hubs,” *Journal of Shipping and Trade*, Vol. 8, No. 28, November 13, 2023.

Oxfam, *Treading Water: The Worsening Water Crisis and the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism*, Oxfam Briefing Paper, March 2017. As of January 5, 2025:

https://oi-files-d8-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bp-treading-water-gaza-reconstruction-mechanism-220317-en.pdf

Oxfam, *Right to Live Without a Blockade: The Impact of Israeli Access and Movement Restrictions on the Gaza Economy*, Oxfam Factsheet, June 2022.

Oxford Analytica, *The Palestinian Authority Faces Existential Threats*, August 17, 2023.

Pacchiani, Gianluca, "Rejecting IDF Claims, Palestinian Pollster Says 'Highly Unlikely' Hamas Falsified Its Results, but Vows to Probe," *Times of Israel*, August 29, 2024.

Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Public Opinion Poll No (90)," webpage, December 13, 2023. As of November 20, 2024: <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/963>

Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Public Opinion Poll No (91)," webpage, March 5–10, 2024a. As of November 20, 2024: <https://pcpsr.org/en/node/973>

Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No (93)," webpage, September 17, 2024b. As of November 20, 2024: <https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/991>

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, "Estimated Population in the Palestine Mid-Year by Governorate, 1997–2026," webpage, May 26, 2021. As of January 5, 2025: https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/statisticsIndicatorsTables.aspx?lang=en&table_id=676

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, "Socio-Economic Indicators on the Impact of the Israeli Occupation on Gaza Strip, 2023," press release, October 16, 2023a. As of January 5, 2025: https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/Press_En_GazaUnderAttack2023E.pdf

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, "Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) Issues a Press Release on the Impact of the Israeli Occupation Aggression on the Right to Education in Palestine During the 07/10/2023–11/11/2023 Period," webpage, November 13, 2023b. As of November 20, 2024: <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=4630>

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS): Labour Force Survey Results,” webpage, April 30, 2024. As of January 5, 2025:

<https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/post.aspx?lang=en&ItemID=5734>

“Palestinian Factions Hamas and Fatah End Split on Gaza,” BBC, October 12, 2017.

“Palestinian President Rips Hamas’ ‘Bloody Coup,’” CNN, June 22, 2007.

Palestinian Monetary Authority, *Annual Report 2017*, September 2018.

PCPSR—See Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.

Petraeus, David, Meghan O’Sullivan, and Richard Fontaine, “Israel’s War of Regime Change Is Repeating America’s Mistakes: But Israel Can Still Learn from America’s Successes,” *Foreign Affairs*, June 17, 2024.

Pike, John, “CNRT Timorese National Resistance Council,” Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program, September 22, 1999.

Pletka, Danielle, “What Is Iran’s Role in the Hamas Attack on Israel?” *Foreign Policy*, 2023.

Pressman, Jeremy, “A Saudi Accord: Implications for Israel-Palestine Relations,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, Quincy Brief No. 61, July 2024.

Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Defence, Grant Shapps, and Rishi Sunak, “Prime Minister Deploys UK Military to Eastern Mediterranean to Support Israel,” press release, October 13, 2023.

Protocol on Economic Relations Between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO, signed in Paris, April 29, 1994 (Paris Protocol).

Protocol to the Treaty of Peace, August 3, 1981. As of December 14, 2024: <https://assets.mfo.org/b798ff05e0773f72498063dd059cd536>

Psara, Maria, and Jorge Liboreiro, “Revealed: Josep Borrell’s 10-Point Peace Roadmap for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Euronews*, January 19, 2024.

Public Law 101-246, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991; Section 414, Membership of the Palestine Liberation Organization in United Nations Agencies, February 16, 1990.

“Putin Hosts Assad, Expected to Focus on Rebuilding Syria,” Associated Press, March 15, 2023.

Qarmout, Tamer, and Daniel Béland, “The Politics of International Aid to the Gaza Strip,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 4, Summer 2012.

Quandt, William B., “Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 101, No. 3, 1986.

Quandt, William B., *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, Brookings Institution Press, 2010.

Rachmilovitz, Orly, "The Israeli Supreme Court on Military Demolition of Palestinian Homes," *Versa: Opinions of the Supreme Court of Israel*, Cardozo School of Law, January 17, 2016.

The RAND Palestinian State Study Team, *Building a Successful Palestinian State*, RAND Corporation, MG-146-1-DCR, 2007. As of November 20, 2024: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG146-1.html>

Rasgon, Adam, "These Workers Are Risking Their Lives to Restore Gaza's Phone Network," *New York Times*, March 13, 2024.

Reagan, Ronald, "Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989," White House, December 22, 1987.

Refugees International, "Scorecard: Israel Fails to Comply with U.S. Humanitarian Access Demands in Gaza," Issue Brief, November 12, 2024. As of December 4, 2024: <https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/scorecard-israel-fails-to-comply-with-u-s-humanitarian-access-demands-in-gaza/>

Regev, Mark, "Looking Back at Egypt's Anwar Sadat's Historic Jerusalem Visit, 45 Years Ago," *Jerusalem Post*, November 24, 2022.

Reilly, Benjamin, "Timing and Sequencing in Post-Conflict Elections," in Arnim Langer and Graham K. Brown, eds., *Building Sustainable Peace: Timing and Sequencing of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding*, Oxford University Press, 2016.

Riedel, Bruce, "How the 1999 Kargil Conflict Redefined US-India Ties," Brookings Institution, July 24, 2019.

Rifkind, Gabrielle, *Pariahs to Pioneers*, Oxford Research Group, May 2010.

Roebuck, William, "Has Gaza Created Structural Impediments to Normalization?" Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, September 19, 2024.

Rose, David, "The Gaza Bombshell," *Vanity Fair*, March 3, 2008.

Rossoukh, Ramyar D., and Naghmen Sohrabi, "On the Third Anniversary of the Abraham Accords: A Conversation with Shai Feldman and Sanam Vakil," Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, September 15, 2023.

Rudoren, Jodi, and Fares Akram, "Palestinians Sign Deal to Set Up Elections," *New York Times*, May 20, 2012.

Sabha, Rajya, "Indian Soldiers Killed in Various Wars and Operations," Government of India Press Information Bureau, December 5, 2001. As of December 14, 2024:
<https://archive.pib.gov.in/archive/releases98/lyr2001/rdec2001/05122001/r0512200129.html>

Sachs, Natan, "What Benny Gantz's Resignation Means for Israeli Policy and Politics," Brookings Institution, June 14, 2024.

Safty, Adel, "Sadat's Negotiations with the United States and Israel: From Sinai to Camp David," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1991.

Said, Summer, Fatima AbdulKarim, and Stephen Kalin, "Once Hamas's Sworn Enemy, A Palestinian Exile Rises as a Potential Strongman," *Wall Street Journal*, July 25, 2024.

Said, Summer, and Carrie Keller-Lynn, "Israeli War Cabinet Meets to Consider Egyptian Proposal to End War in Gaza," *Wall Street Journal*, December 25, 2023.

Salama, Vivian, "Palestinian Authority's Financial Plight Threatens U.S. Plans for Postwar Gaza," *Wall Street Journal*, February 18, 2024.

Salvo, David, and Stephanie De Leon, "Russia's Efforts to Destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina," German Marshall Fund Alliance for Securing Democracy, Brief No. 17, April 2018.

Samhouri, Mohammed, "Decoding the Current Palestinian Financial Crisis," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019.

Satloff, Robert, and Patrick Clawson, "U.S. Economic Aid to Egypt: Designing a New, Pro-Growth Package," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 7, 1998.

Saul, Jack, *Collective Trauma, Collective Healing: Promoting Community Resilience in the Aftermath of Disaster*, Routledge, 2022.

Saxenz, Anushka, "75 Years of China-Russia Relations: Indeed a 'No Limits' Partnership," Institute for Security & Development Policy, May 27, 2024.

Schear, James A., Jeffrey Martini, Eric Robinson, Michelle E. Miro, and James Dobbins, *Stabilizing Eastern Syria After ISIS*, RAND Corporation, RR-2541-OSD, 2020. As of October 25, 2024:
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2541.html

Schecter, Anna, "Inside the Effort to Create a Far-Reaching U.S.-Saudi-Israeli Pact to End the War," NBC News, January 18, 2024.

Scheffer, David J., "Ethnic Cleansing Is Happening in Nagorno-Karabakh. How Can the World Respond?" Council on Foreign Relations, October 4, 2023.

Scheindlin, Dahlia, “Why Israel Won’t Change: The War in Gaza Will Likely Reinforce the Country’s Rightward Tilt,” *Foreign Affairs*, November 29, 2023.

Schwartz, Jordan, Shelly Hahn, and Ian Bannon, *The Private Sector’s Role in the Provision of Infrastructure in Post-Conflict Countries*, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, August 2004.

Schwengler, Aaron T., and Alexander T. Pack, *Gaza (Re)Occupation: Parallels and Lessons from Northern Ireland*, U.S. Army War College, April 15, 2024.

Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, “Cablegram Dated 15 May 1948 Addressed to the Secretary-General,” 1948. As of December 14, 2024: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/649818>

Sen, Amartya, *Development as Freedom*, Anchor Books, 2000.

Shahidsaless, Shahir, “Decoding Iran’s Position on the Gaza War,” Stimson Center, October 27, 2023.

Shalom, Zaki, “The United States and the Israeli Settlements: Time for a Change,” *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2012.

Sharp, Jeremy M., *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel*, Congressional Research Service, RL33222, updated February 18, 2022.

Sharp, Jeremy M., *Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations*, Congressional Research Service, RL33003, updated May 2, 2023.

Shatz, Howard J., Gabrielle Tarini, Charles P. Ries, and James Dobbins, *Reconstructing Ukraine: Creating a Freer, More Prosperous, and Secure Future*, RAND Corporation, RR-A2200-1, 2023. As of October 26, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2200-1.html

Shbair, Bilal, Hiba Yazbek, and Abu Bakr Bashir, “Gazans Grapple with Prospect of Israeli Presence Postwar,” *New York Times*, September 4, 2024.

Shikaki, Ibrahim, “An Economic Analysis of Kushner’s Failed Plan,” Arab Center Washington DC, July 3, 2019.

Shikaki, Ibrahim, “‘Economic Peace’ with Israel Won’t Help Palestinians,” *Foreign Policy*, June 2, 2021.

Shikaki, Khalil, “The Future of Palestine,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 6, November/December 2004.

Shikaki, Khalil, and Dahlia Scheindlin, *Role of Public Opinion in the Resilience/Resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict—Palestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll (2016–2018), Final Report*, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University, December 2018.

Shlaim, Avi, “Britain and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Summer 1987.

Shlaim, Avi, "The United States and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds., *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of World Order*, Palgrave, 2002.

"Shortage of Palestinian Workers at Israeli Building Sites Leaves Hole on Both Sides," *Times of Israel*, April 4, 2024.

Shurafa, Wafaa, and Julia Frankel, "In the Searing Heat of the Gaza Summer, Palestinians Are Surrounded by Sewage and Garbage," Associated Press, June 27, 2024.

Shurkin, Michael, "The Mysterious Case of Palestinians' Missing Agency," *Pax Americana*, Substack blog post, August 20, 2024.

Silberman, James M., Charles Weiss, and Mark Dutz, "Marshall Plan Productivity Assistance: A Unique Program of Mass Technology Transfer and a Precedent for the Former Soviet Union," *Technology in Society*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1996.

Silverman, Daniel, Anna Pechenkina, Austin Knappe, and Yehonatan Abramson, "America Has More Latitude with Israel Than It Thinks: Why U.S. Pressure Can Persuade Netanyahu to Change Course in Gaza," *Foreign Affairs*, August 28, 2024.

Simpson, Brad, and Varsha Venkatasubramanian, *U.S. Sought to Preserve Close Ties to Indonesian Military as It Terrorized East Timor in Runup to 1999 Independence Referendum*, National Security Archive, August 28, 2019.

Skogstad, Samuel, Thomas Bertone, Art Dimas, Lawrence Long, and Joseph Anderson, *Evaluation of the USAID/Kosovo Economic Reconstruction Project*, United States Agency for International Development, November 2003.

Slater, Jerome, "Just War Moral Philosophy and the 2008–09 Israeli Campaign in Gaza," *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 2, Fall 2012.

Snow, Shawn, "Analysis: Why Kashmir Matters," *The Diplomat*, September 19, 2016.

Sobchak, Frank, "Remaking Mistakes in Gaza," *War on the Rocks*, January 8, 2024.

Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey, Dennis Ross, and Adam Boehler, "How Peace and Prosperity in the Middle East Can Still Be Reached," *Time*, October 15, 2023.

"Special Branch Officer's Insider View of Northern Ireland's 'Secret War,'" *News Letter*, November 12, 2016. As of November 11, 2024:
<https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/special-branch-officers-insider-view-of-northern-irelands-secret-war-1181021>

Spencer, John, "Israel Is Winning: But Lasting Victory Against Hamas Will Require Installing New Leadership in Gaza," *Foreign Affairs*, August 21, 2024.

Stacey, Kiran, “How Keir Starmer Averted Gaza Ceasefire Vote Crisis,” *The Guardian*, February 21, 2024.

Suisman, Doug, Steven N. Simon, Glenn E. Robinson, C. Ross Anthony, and Michael Schoenbaum, *The Arc: A Formal Structure for a Palestinian State*, RAND Corporation, MG-327-2-GG, 2005. As of December 17, 2024: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG327-2.html>

Sukkarieh, Mona, “Between Tales and Facts: The Long Saga of Gaza Marine,” Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs, February 2024.

Sullivan, Colleen, “Omagh Bombing,” *Britannica*, last updated September 19, 2024.

Svetlova, Ksenia, “Interview with Shadow Fatah Leader Samer Sinijlawi,” *Jerusalem Strategic Tribune*, August 2024.

Systematica, “Road and Transportation Master Plan of West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2013–2016,” webpage, undated. As of December 17, 2024: <https://www.systematica.net/project/road-and-transportation-master-plan-of-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/>

Taylor, John B., “Reconstruction of Iraq’s Banking Sector,” press release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 10, 2003.

“Text of the Declaration by Palestinian Groups After Meeting in Cairo,” *Haaretz*, March 18, 2005.

Times of Israel staff and Reuters, “Multiple Factual Flaws: Israel Contests UN-Backed Report on Imminent Famine in Gaza,” *Times of Israel*, March 30, 2024.

Toameh, Khaled Abu, “PA to Form Plan for Extensive ‘Disengagement’ from Israel,” *Times of Israel*, February 6, 2018.

Toossi, Sina, “How Iran Really Sees the Israel-Hamas War,” *Foreign Policy*, November 2, 2023.

Traiman, Alex, “‘Future of Judea & Samaria’: Former US Envoy Unveils Sovereignty Plan,” *Jewish News Syndicate*, February 29, 2024.

Transitional Shelter Assistance—Technical Working Group-Gaza, *1st Draft Gaza Shelter Response—Technical Guidance (Oct 2023 Escalation)*, Catholic Relief Services, Shelter Cluster, Norwegian Refugee Council, International Organization for Migration, Save the Children, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, We World, Palestine Housing Council, and CARE, March 2024.

Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, March 26, 1979. As of December 14, 2024: <https://assets.mfo.org/e9944888d5376063dbf8e952e701bfd4>

“UAE Reportedly Willing to Join Multinational Force for Gaza Reconstruction After the War,” *Haaretz*, July 20, 2024.

UK House of Commons Library, “UK Aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip: FAQs,” webpage, April 29, 2024. As of October 14, 2024:
<https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9900/>

UK Ministry of Defence, “Kosovo Force 1999–2000 (KFOR),” webpage, undated. As of December 14, 2024:
<https://english.defensie.nl/topics/historical-missions/mission-overview/1999/kosovo-force-1999---2000-kfor>

UK Ministry of Defence, “UK Forces Airdrop 100 Tonnes of Aid for Gaza Civilians,” press release, May 9, 2024.

UK Parliament Debates, “Volume 746: Israel and Gaza,” debated on February 27, 2024a.

UK Parliament Debates, “Volume 749: UK Armed Forces in Middle East,” debated on April 29, 2024b.

“UK Team Helping Palestinian Authority Prepare for Gaza Takeover: Defense Secretary,” *Arab News*, December 7, 2023.

UN—*See* United Nations.

UNCTAD—*See* UN Trade and Development.

United Nations, “The Quartet,” webpage, undated. As of December 14, 2024:
<https://www.un.org/unispal/the-quartet/>

United Nations, “Reconciliation Must Evolve to Reflect Growing Complexity of Today’s Conflicts, Participants Stress During Day-Long Security Council Open Debate,” UN Security Council meeting, November 19, 2019.

United Nations, “Human Rights Council Hears That 700,000 Israeli Settlers Are Living Illegally in the Occupied West Bank—Meeting Summary (Excerpts),” press release, March 28, 2023.

United Nations, “Gaza at ‘Most Dangerous’ Stage Amid Huge Unexploded Weapons Risk, Warns Demining Expert,” April 30, 2024a.

United Nations, “Gaza: Children Are Starving Amid Persistent Aid Access Obstacles, Warn UN Agencies,” May 31, 2024b.

United Nations, “New Famine Alert for Gaza Where Families Go Days Without Food,” June 27, 2024c.

United Nations Children’s Fund and Save the Children International, “Education Under Attack in the Gaza Strip,” infographic, January 8, 2024.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Developments in the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, September 11, 2023.

United Nations Development Programme, *Gaza War: Expected Socioeconomic Impacts on the State of Palestine*, May 2024.

United Nations Environment Programme, *Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Gaza: Preliminary Assessment of Environmental Impacts*, 2024.

United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “UN Experts Alarmed by Rise in Settler Violence in Occupied Palestinian Territory,” November 10, 2021.

United Nations Human Settlements Programme, *Preliminary Report on the Status of the Development of the Efforts to Reconstruct the Human Settlements in the Gaza Strip*, April 2, 2024.

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, “Background,” webpage, undated. As of December 14, 2024: <https://unmogip.unmissions.org/background>

United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Background,” webpage, 2003. As of November 21, 2024: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unmibh/background.html>

United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, “Mandate,” webpage, 2005. As of December 14, 2024: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmiset/mandate.html>

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Coordination Structure,” webpage, undated. As of October 30, 2024: <https://www.ochaopt.org/coordination/coordination-structure>

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “The Other Mass Displacement: While Eyes Are on Gaza, Settlers Advance on West Bank Herders,” November 1, 2023.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Needs and Response Update | 19–25 March 2024,” March 29, 2024a.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel—Reported Impact | Day 180,” infographic, April 3, 2024b. As of July 26, 2024: <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-reported-impact-day-180>

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Needs and Response Update | 26 March–01 April 2024,” April 5, 2024c.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Reported Impact Snapshot | Gaza Strip,” infographic, July 24, 2024d.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Situation Update #223 | Gaza Strip,” September 27, 2024e.

United Nations Peacekeeping, “India-Pakistan Background,” webpage, undated. As of December 14, 2024:
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unipombackgr.html>

United Nations Peacemaker, “Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) on the Situation Relating to Kosovo,” webpage, June 10, 1999. As of July 26, 2024:
<https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-resolution1244>

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “Where We Work,” webpage, undated. As of July 17, 2024:
<https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/west-bank>

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, *UNRWA Situation Report #133 on the Situation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Including East Jerusalem*, September 3, 2024.

United Nations Security Council, “Letter Dated 8 October 1993 from the Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” October 11, 1993.

United States Agency for International Development, “Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA),” webpage, undated. As of November 21, 2024:
<https://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza/meppa>

United States Agency for International Development, *AE Services for the Transportation Feasibility for Linking the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, March 2006.

United States Government Manual, “Economic Cooperation Administration,” 1948. As of November 21, 2024:
https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Economic_Cooperation_Administration_1948.pdf

UNOCHA—See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

UNRWA—See United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

UN Trade and Development, *Report on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People: Developments in the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, 2022.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Conflict—Azerbaijan: Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh),” webpage, undated. As of November 11, 2024:
<https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/388>

urbanNext, "Flexible Urbanisms: Towards Incremental Urbanism," webpage, undated. As of December 14, 2024:
<https://urbannext.net/flexible-urbanisms/>

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, *Approval of State of Texas Action Plans for Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery Funds*, May 1, 2018.

U.S. Department of State, *2023 Investment Climate Statements: West Bank and Gaza*, undated-a.

U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," webpage, undated-b. As of May 29, 2024:
<https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/>

U.S. Department of State, "The Oslo Accords, 1993," webpage, undated-c. As of December 14, 2024:
<https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/97181.htm>

U.S. Department of State, "Rambouillet Agreement," webpage, undated-d. As of May 29, 2024:
https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html

U.S. Department of State, "Bosnia Fact Sheet: Chronology of the Balkan Conflict," webpage, December 6, 1995. As of November 21, 2024:
https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/bosnia/balkan_conflict_chron.html

U.S. Department of State, "Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting," webpage, December 1999. As of July 26, 2024:
https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/kosovoi/ii/homepage.html

U.S. Department of State, "Kosovo Timeline," fact sheet, December 21, 2015. As of November 21, 2024:
<https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/2015/250812.htm>

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "The Arab-Israeli War of 1948," webpage, undated-a. As of November 21, 2024:
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/arab-israeli-war>

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "The Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," webpage, undated-b. As of December 14, 2024:
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo>

USSC—See U.S. Security Coordinator.

"US Imposes Sanctions on Extremist Israeli Settlers in West Bank," *The Guardian*, August 28, 2024.

U.S. Security Coordinator, "Security Update (April 2024)," Situation Report, U.S. Embassy, Jerusalem, Israel, April 2024a.

U.S. Security Coordinator, "Security Update (August 2024)," Situation Report, U.S. Embassy, Jerusalem, Israel, August 2024b.

U.S. Senate, letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, June 17, 2022. As of November 21, 2024:

https://www.ossoff.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Ossoff-Graham-USSC-Letter_Final.pdf

Vigers, Benedict, “Life in Israel After Oct. 7 in 5 Charts,” Gallup News, December 22, 2023.

Vinograd, C., “The Shadow War Between Iran and Israel: A Timeline,” *New York Times*, April 18, 2024.

de Waal, Thomas, “Prisoners of the Caucasus: Resolving the Karabakh Security Dilemma,” Carnegie Europe, June 16, 2016.

de Waal, Thomas, “In the Caucasus, Another Year of War or Peace,” Carnegie Europe, February 13, 2024.

Walker, Marcus, Fatima AbdulKarim, and Anat Peled, “The Way to Fix the Middle East Conflict Looks Obvious—Except to Israelis and Palestinians,” *Wall Street Journal*, August 18, 2024.

Wallenfeldt, Jeff, “The Anglo-Irish Agreement and Downing Street Declaration,” *Britannica*, last updated September 17, 2024.

Walter, Barbara F., “Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict,” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2003.

Waxman, Dov, and Jeremy Pressman, “The Rocky Future of the US-Israeli Special Relationship,” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2021.

Weatherald, Nathalie, and Ben Munster, “European Leader Divided on ICC Arrest Warrant Bid for Netanyahu,” *Politico*, May 20, 2024.

Webber, Esther, and Sam Blewett, “The Real PM? David Cameron Is Shifting Britain’s Stance on Israel,” *Politico*, April 17, 2024.

“What Is Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’?” Reuters, April 13, 2024.

“What Is the Palestinian Authority and What Is Its Relationship with Israel?” *Al Jazeera*, October 11, 2023.

White House, *Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People*, January 2020.

“Will Israel Release Marwan Barghouti, the ‘Palestinian Mandela’?” *Al Jazeera*, February 15, 2024.

Wilson, Scott, “Some West Bank Settlers Looking for a Way Out,” NBC News, August 11, 2005.

Wintour, Patrick, “Two-State Solution Would Mean Relocating 200,000 Settlers, Says Israeli Lawyer Who Has David Cameron’s Ear,” *The Guardian*, December 17, 2023.

- Wintour, Patrick, "Qatar and Egypt 'Will Help Form New Palestinian Technocratic Government,'" *The Guardian*, February 27, 2024a.
- Wintour, Patrick, "UK Has Issued 108 Arms Export Licenses to Israel Since 7 October," *The Guardian*, June 11, 2024b.
- "Withdraw to Move Forward," editorial, *Denver Post*, August 10, 2005.
- World Bank, "GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant 2017 International \$)—West Bank and Gaza, Israel, United States," World Development Indicators Database, undated.
- World Bank, *Unlocking the Trade Potential of the Palestinian Economy*, 2017.
- World Bank, "Are Global Banks Cutting Off Customers in Developing and Emerging Economies?" May 1, 2018.
- World Bank, *Doing Business 2020: West Bank and Gaza*, 2020a.
- World Bank, *Economic Developments in the Palestinian Territories*, November 24, 2020b.
- World Bank, "World Development Indicators: Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, Current US\$)," 2024.
- World Bank, European Union, and United Nations, *Gaza Strip Interim Damage Assessment: Summary Note*, March 29, 2024. As of December 14, 2024:
<https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/14e309cd34e04e40b90eb19afa7b5d15-0280012024/original/Gaza-Interim-Damage-Assessment-032924-Final.pdf>
- World Bank Group, "GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %)—West Bank and Gaza," webpage, undated. As of December 14, 2024:
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?locations=PS>
- World Health Organization, "Lethal Combination of Hunger and Disease to Lead to More Deaths in Gaza," December 21, 2023.
- "World Slams US Ceasefire Veto at UN Security Council on Israel's Gaza War," *Al Jazeera*, February 21, 2024.
- Worley, Will, "Unexploded Ordnance: The Growing Gaza Challenge That's Not Going Away," *The New Humanitarian*, June 10, 2024.
- Wrobel, Sharon, "Israel's Cost of Living the Highest Among OECD Countries in 2022, Data Shows," *Times of Israel*, August 27, 2023.
- Yaffe, Michael, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, and Robert Barron, "Half Right and Still Waiting," *Cairo Review of Global Affairs*, Winter 2019.
- Yasser, Nayera, and Michael Georgy, "Egypt Is Set to Take Part in Developing Gaza's Offshore Gas Field: Officials," Reuters, October 12, 2022.

Yiftachel, Oren, "Territory as the Kernel of the Nation: Space, Time and Nationalism in Israel/Palestine," *Geopolitics*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2002.

Zanotti, Jim, and Jeremy M. Sharp, *Israel and Hamas: Major Conflict After Surprise Attacks*, Congressional Research Service, IN12262, October 10, 2023.

Zbeedat, Nagham, "Health Crisis in Gaza Spirals as New Diseases, Infections Spread," *Haaretz*, May 16, 2024.

Ziwen, Zhao, "China to Host New Round of Hamas-Fatah Talks but Its Influence 'May Be Limited,'" *South China Morning Post*, July 17, 2024.



The authors examine the possibility that the extraordinary costs and destructiveness of the present Israeli-Palestinian conflict could demonstrate to all the urgent need for a path to a durable peace. The authors consider the history of this asymmetrical conflict; identify lessons from attempts to resolve other thorny conflicts; and set out a road map with short-, medium-, and long-term security, governance, economic, physical and social, and international pathways to such a peace.

Three characteristics have made this conflict especially difficult to resolve:

- (1) There are few credible Israeli or Palestinian partners to exert *leadership* for peace;
- (2) the *territorial claims* of both sides are incompatible; and
- (3) the conflict has attracted much *international involvement*, not always in support of compromise and peace.

The case studies highlight the importance of individual leaders' personal and political commitment to peace and the role of outside individuals. Leaders who can declare that it is time to explore peace can make a dramatic difference. There are also possible advantages of international pressure, even if the two sides are still far apart.

The road map to a durable peace is framed around the destination of a "second state" for the Palestinians. The prerequisites require credible leadership from all sides dedicated to peace. Success would be transformative for the region, its peoples, and the wider world. The benefits include restored security for Israelis and Palestinians, a new construct for Palestinian governance over the longer term, and economic and social revival for Gazans and Palestinians in the West Bank.

\$35.00

ISBN-10 1-9774-1480-X
ISBN-13 978-1-9774-1480-9



www.rand.org